Aeschylos Oresteia
Study Guide
Agamemnon, The Libation Bearers, The Eumenides
The ruling family of Argos was subjected to a curse that afflicted generation after
generation
o Starts with Tantalos, a m
Aeschylos The Persians
Study Guide
The Persians
The play was produced in 472
o 8 years after the Battle of Salamis (which occurred in 480)
Earliest surviving play by Aeschylos, and therefore our oldes
Aeschylos Prometheus Bound
Aeschylos and Prometheus Bound
This tragedy is based on the story of Prometheus punishment at the hands of Zeus
o Prometheus means foresight
o Was a Titan, the immortal rac
Washington University in St. Louis
L32 Political Science 506 Theories of Individual and Collective Choice II
John W. Patty Spring 2012
Syllabus
This course is an introduction to noncooperative game th
Midterm Exam # 2: Answers Graduate Game Theory Due April 12th, 2010 at 3pm
This is an open book and open notes exam. Do not discuss the exam with anyone other than Professor Patty prior to 3pm April 1
Midterm Exam # 2 Graduate Game Theory Due April 12th, 2010 at 3pm
This is an open book and open notes exam. Do not discuss the exam with anyone other than Professor Patty prior to 3pm April 12th. The
Midterm Exam # 1 Answers Graduate Game Theory Due March 15th, 2010 at 3pm This is an open book and open notes exam. Do not discuss the exam with anyone other than Professor Patty prior to 3pm March 15
Midterm Exam # 1 Graduate Game Theory Due March 28th, 2011 This is an open book and open notes exam. Do not discuss the exam with anyone other than Professor Patty prior to the due date. The point val
Midterm Exam # 1 Graduate Game Theory Due March 15th, 2010 at 3pm This is an open book and open notes exam. Do not discuss the exam with anyone other than Professor Patty prior to 3pm March 15th. The
Game Theory Lecture 7 Signaling Games
Prof. John Patty
1
Classical Signaling Games: Sender: knows Receiver's preferences state of nature , chooses message, m Receiver: knows Sender's preferences, dist
Repeated Games
Prof. John Patty
1
Stage game: N : finite set of players Ai: finite set of actions for i N A iN Ai: action profiles gi A R: stage payoff function for i N For t 1, H t = (A)t is the set
Game Theory Lecture 7 Perfect and Sequential Equilibria
Prof. John Patty
1
Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies PBE (and SPNE) never involve strictly dominated strategies. But they may involve u
Nash Equilibrium
Prof. John Patty
1
Recall that ui maps outcomes into payoffs for player i. Let vi S R denote the (expected) payoff of player i. The difference between vi and ui is simply what they ta
Game Theory Lecture 5 Bayes Nash Equilibrium
Prof. John Patty
1
Bayes's Rule Let be a set of states of nature. An event is any subset of . Then, for any state and any event B , the conditional probabi
Backwards Induction
Prof. John Patty
1
A simple bargaining situation
Player 1: Proposer Propose Decline
Player 2: Responder ,1 Veto Player 1: Proposer 1,0 Override Accept Sign
-1,-1
0,2
2
A simple bar
Game Theory Lecture 8 Bargaining Models
Prof. John Patty
1
Rubinstein's Bargaining Game 2 players dividing a fixed pie Complete and perfect information bargaining Players alternate making offers After
Game Theory Lecture 1 Decision Theory and Game Forms
Prof. John Patty
1
The Theory of Choice & Expected Utility Classical decision theory no uncertainty with finite choices: Weak orders with infinite
Homework Assignment #7 Graduate Game Theory Due Wednesday, April 18th, 2012 at 11:59pm. Prepare your answers in LaTeX and email to Gordon and Professor Patty. 1. Consider the following public good pro
Homework Assignment #6 Graduate Game Theory Due March 29th. Note. In the bargaining games discussed below, a stage-game undominated voting strategy is one in which a player votes with probability one
Homework Assignment #6 Graduate Game Theory Due Wednesday, March 28th, 2012 at 11:59pm. Prepare your answers in LaTeX and email to Gordon and Professor Patty. Find at least one perfect Bayesian equili