ECON 7050 HW 4 Due Wednesday November 5
November 10, 2008
Problem 1 MWG 6.C.17 Problem 2 Consider and exchange Arrow-Debreu economy with two risk averse individuals (whose preferences over lotteries satisfy the vNM axioms), one commodity and two states of
ECON 7050
HW 5
Suggested Solutions
By Dan Hickman
Problem 1: Consider the monopolist facing a consumer whose preferences
over quantity bought, q, and payment, T , are represented by u (q, T ) = v(q)T .
There are two types of consumers: cfw_H , L . Assume
ECON 7050 HW on Contract Theory
due Dec 3
Problem 1 Consider the monopolist problem studied in class. Assume util ity of the buyer is u (x, t) = x t, and the marginal cost is constant at c. Assume the monopolist can observe the type of the customer () and
ECON 7050
HW#1
Suggested solutions
1
Edgeworth Box Economy
Problem 1 Consider the Edgeworth Box economy with two consumers: A, B
and strictly positive endowments = ( 1A , 2A , 1B , 2B ) > 0. Let the
preferences (of A and B correspondingly) be represented
ECON 7050
HW#2
Suggested Solutions
1
Part 1. First welfare theorem: A group
project
Problem 1 Refer to the link on our webpage (right below) for an incomplete "easy" proof of the First Welfare Theorem for the two individuals, two
outputs, two inputs econo
Econ 7050
Solutions to some review questions
December 14, 2006
1
Contract Theory
Problem 1 Consider the monopolistic screening problem with a continuum
of types from chapter 2 of BD. Solve for the full information allocation rule
(for a monopolist who can
September 12, 2005
Shuichiro Nishioka
Advanced Microeconomics 7050 Homework 1 Answer Key
Problem 1
(Answer key)
Discussion: Locally non-satiation and strongly monotone.
Monotone preferences imply that all the commodities are good and that more of even
one
ECON 7050
HW1
September 20, 2008
Problem 1 Consider the Edgeworth box economy discussed in class. There
are 10 pheasants and 10 buckets of apples, Adam and Eve have preferences
over their own consumption bundles (x1i ; x2i ) 2 R2 :
+
Characterize the set
ECON 7050
HW on Contract Theory
due November 28
Problem 1 Section 2.3 of the textbook. Consider the one-buyer one-seller
problem with a continuum of possible (payo-relevant) types, from , .
Suppose that monotonicity and local incentive constraint hold.
Econ 7050
Adverse selection
(based on BD(2005)
November 30, 2006
1
1.1
Full information
Monopolist Problem
Seller: T cq
Buyers have quasi-linear preferences i v (qi ) + mi
U (q, T, i ) = i v (q) T
Two types of buyers cfw_h, l , fraction of h-type buyers
1
Econ 7050
HW2
Suggested Solution
Problem 1
Consider function F (x, y) =
x2
9
+
y2
4
1, (x, y) R2
1. Find a pair (x0 , y0 ) > 0 such that F (x0 , y0 ) = 0.
Let y0 = 1, then we can solve the equation to nd x0 = 3 2 3
We know that: F (x0 , y0 ) = 0, F is co
Econ 7050 A model of the Final Exam
December 6, 2005
Problem 1 Assume two individuals i and j are risk averse and their preferences over lotteries can be represented by a von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility function. Pick a monetary prize x. 1. Show t
Econ 7050 HW#3 Suggested Solutions By Dan Hickman Problem 1: Prove that for any two distributions F,G such that G is a mean-preserving spread of F, any risk averse individual (whose preferences over lotteries are represented by vNM utility) prefers F to G