Mathematical analysis MD PART 1 Let us say there are N+1 voters with X possible rankings. Let us say you arrange all the voters in the positions XA (i) where XA 0 is the lowest number value assigned to candidate A and XA 4 is the greatest. The median vote
Summary UP 1. UP is practivanle for dividing items 2 plaers begin by ranking the items from best to worst 2. Starting from top choice work down the list, naming independently 1 at a time the items they most prefer of those that remain. At each stage, if A
Nathaniel Elghanayan april 25th Game theory and the humanities. My question is rather succinct this week but is intrinsic to understanding chapters 9-10. Starting on p 214 and going on you show (x,y) payoffs and [x,y] payoffs the bottom one is in anticipa
Nathaniel Elghanayan Note I am agnostic and do not mean any of this to be offensive, though I doubt you will find it so. My first question is why dont people chose to believe in a religion where no matter what happens they are guaranteed eternal paradise?
Monday april 25th Win win fair seperations ( fair division precedures some specifically) Look up fair division Fair outcomes inc
This is used (in many partnership agreements). If they break up one party can make an offer to buy out another ( if this 2 par
POLITICAL ENGINEERING: THE DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS
Politics V53.0810 New York University Spring 2011 Class: Mon. & Wed., 2 3:15 PM Description Institutions are the rules by which societies govern themselves. In this course, the tools of economic theory, ga
Minimax vs minisum ( essentially AV voting) Hamming distance is often used in electrical engineering as refers to circuits.
Evolutionarily STABLE STRATEGY ( not every nash equilibrium is an ESS).
Here is the game of chicken SWERVE SWERVE Row
Col DONT SWER
Revelation game SB Believe Dont believe Reveal 3,4 2 Dont reveal 4,2 2,3 There is a pareto superior BUT IT IS NOT BEST OUTCOME FOR BOTH PLAYERS Lala = nash equilibrium ( stable) Lala = pareto superior Lala = pareto optimal So (3,4) is pareto 3,4 and 4,2 a
Wednesday April 13th Banzef weighted voting Concerned with how weighting affects power distribution ( sometimes it does not) the total number is 7 (3,2,2) so the Decision rule is 4 and the minimum winning coalition is the minimum number of partners where
Governor cuomo blind budget prison cuts and populations ( group the 2 issues) less to loose more to gain souther democrats) or separate the issues or let them see what they vote on and try and make a deal Sheldon silver Cuomo, Any republican or republican
Designing political institutions, reading response Monday April 18th
Ulfelder, on p 74 of Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation talks about the random narrative strategy proposed by Fearon ad Laitin ( 2008). This process emphasizes randomizing selection of
enhance the expression of choice Or the efficiency of gov Game theory Class March 7th Ch 6 we only need give a cursory glance. Joint work with Richard pardoff at duke it is a technique to minimize misrepresentation with borda counts etc. ensure representa
The majority judgement SDF Social Decision Function I like it, it means that we do not weight the amount a candidate likes someone based on ( I like john 6 utils ) the newer median says I prefer john. Problem does it allow to express intolerable can
Midterm examination Designing Political Institutions ; Prof Steven J Brams March 21, 2011 Nathaniel Elghanayan
Question 1) MD)Yes it is possible. Refer to table 1 Here candidate B wins by MD but only voter 1 would have voted for candidate B in AV voting.
Midterm examination Designing Political Institutions ; Prof Steven J Brams March 21, 2011 Nathaniel Elghanayan Question 1) MD)Yes it is possible. Refer to table 1 Here candidate B wins by MD but only voter 1 would have voted for candidate B in AV voting.
Mathematical analysis of MN part 1 To put it numerically the minimum vote score allowable is 1 represented by and the maximum vote score is . the number of voters is N. As N increases the total accumulated points of both candidates (N*) increases and the
question 6 poli sci midterm 6) gives a homogeneous value to each object in the agenda and allows people to numerically value proposols and try to prevent manipulations by those setting agenda ( riker ch 4) It is only rationale for people to procede in a w
Political Science Monday April 11 Mathematics and democracy: Conflict : Helping the worst off and avoiding envy More theoretical than the paradoxes of fair division Chapter on political philosophy KiLGOR AND bRAMS :How democracy resolves Conflict in Diffi
Ask professor brams if this reminds him of anti trust
de jure monopolies, which are those that are protected from competition by government actions, and de facto monopolies, which are not protected by law from competition and are simply the only supplier
Set up a model and try and test a model. If it is a ulfelder model : carefully view the assumptions and how well they fit Ulfelder talks about the model in venezualla where they look btw autocracy and democracy ( also Thailand) Both countries were relativ
Wednesday april 20th Poli sci Nathaniel Elghanayan May 9-11 ( M-W) MAY 11-13 ( W-F) MAY 13-16 (F-M) Theory of moves allows people to better capture negative emotions ( it is harder to look at the positive side to model emotions) or model other emotions su