1. Suppose, hypothetically, that the rates of return of stocks in a certain category
have mean 3.2 and standard deviation 5.0. The units here are percents. Assume
that these rates of returns are approximately normally distributed.
(a) If you select one st
Based on a sample of 50 x-values having mean 35.36 and standard deviation 4.26,
(a)
test at the 0.05 level of significance the null hypothesis : = 34 versus
the alternative : 34.
(b)
find a 95% confidence interval for the population mean.'
(c)
determine i
MA200.2 Game Theory II, LSE
Problem Set 1
These questions will go over basic game-theoretic concepts and some applications. This
homework is due during class on week 4.
[1] In this problem (see Fudenberg-Tirole Ex. 1.1) you are asked to play with arbitrar
The first of these shows all available information, and the second eliminates countries with
incomplete information. The United Nations sources are responsible for the incompleteness,
primarily because the United Nations does not keep data on colonies (Be
Continuous probability distributions:
-the normal distribution
-the sampling distribution
-the uniform distribution
-dont forget the random walk in the pamphlets
Inferences about populations estimation:
-Point estimation
-Confidence interval estimation fo
On time
Not
Total
Moe
Day
90 90%
10 10%
100
Night
10 50%
10 50%
20
Total
100 83
20 17
120
On time
Not
Total
Jill
Day
19 95%
1 5%
20
Night
75 75%
25 25%
100
Total
94 78
26 22
120
Time variable is not independent
Time variable and punctuality highly depende
HW#3 Solution
1. Ch9 Q12
2.
(a)
(b)
The linear model is not appropriate because the association is clearly curved in the
scatterplot. Also, the residuals plot shows a curved pattern, fur
HW#2 Solution
1.
(1) Ch5 Q20
(2) Ch6 Q16
(3) Ch6 Q44
(4) Ch7 Q40
(5) Ch8 Q40
(6) Ch8 Q42
2. (1)
According to the Normal model, we expect 68% of cars to get between 19 and 29 mpg,
95% of
Midterm 2: Revision
Srijita Ghosh
April 3, 2015
Regression
Chapter 9,10
Chapter 9
Be careful about extrapolation, i.e estimating y for an extreme value
of x, dubious
Outliers: unusual point
leverage: x-value is far from mean
high residual
inuential:
4. The Cleveland Casting Plant produces iron automotive castings for Ford Motor Company.
The pouring temperatures (in degrees Fahrenheit) for a sample of 10 crankshafts produced at the
plant are listed below. When the process is stable, the target pouring
Sample Final Exam Questions for simple regression
Name:
Complete all questions on the exam. Show your work and the appropriate formulas. You can
use your calculator for addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and summation. All other
calculations
Consider the regression of LCO2/Cap (C22) on predictors MFRatio, LGDP, LGDP/Cap,
and LPopn. These predictors are C14, C18, C19, C20. Be sure to ask for the VIF
numbers; this is done through Stat Regression Regression Options Variance
inflation factors. Yo
MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE
Summary of Lecture 2
Repeated Games
1. The General Setup
Let G = (A1 , . . . , An ; f1 , . . . , fn ) be an n-person game in normal form. We are interested in
repetitions of G, perhaps innitely many times. This gives rise to a
MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE
Summary of Lecture 3
Repeated Games: Collusion and Punishments
1. More on Nash Reversion
Is Nash reversion the worst imaginable credible punishment? To answer this question rst
look at the worst imaginable punishment you can in
MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE
Summary of Lecture 4
More on Collusion and Punishments in Repeated Games
1. Punishments More Severe Than Nash Reversion
In the previous section we provided a detailed example of a real-life game the Cournot
oligopoly in which t
MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE
Lecture 5: Variations on Repeated Games
1. Introduction
The Pandoras Box problem generated by repeated games nds its most extreme expression
in the Folk Theorem. In that theorem, everything better than minmax is sustainable as
MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE
Lecture 9: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
1. Some Examples
For the last two lectures we return to extensive-form games, but this time we focus on
imperfect information and especially on signalling games. Our rst ta
MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE
Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
1. The Spence Signaling Model
Or: a model of education in which you dont really learn anything . . .
[But thats not why this model is famous. Its because this is one of th
MA200.2 Game Theory II, LSE
Answers to Problem Set 1
[1] In part (i), proceed as follows. Suppose that we are doing 2s best response to 1. Let p
be probability that player 1 plays U . Now if player 2 chooses L, her payo is
pb + (1 p)f
while if she chooses
MA300.2 Game Theory 2005, LSE
Answers to Problem Set 2
[1]
(a) This is standard (we have even done it in class). The one-shot Cournot outputs can be
computed to be A/3, while the payo to each rm can be computed to be A2 /9.
(b) Suppose that each rm tries
MA300.2 Game Theory 2005, LSE
Answers to Problem Set 3
[1a] The set of players is cfw_1, 2. A state is a pair of numbers (v1 , v2 ), where vi is the valuation
(and equivalently, here, the type ) of person i, for i = 1, 2. The set of actions for each playe
MA300.2 Game Theory 2005, LSE
Problem Set 2
[1] Repeated Cournot with Nash reversion. Consider the two player Cournot model with
linear demand curve p = A X and marginal cost of production equal to zero.
(a) Solve for the one-shot Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Consider the data in the file CO2_1997.MPJ concerning release of CO2 , carbon dioxide, into the
atmosphere in year 1997. This is a Minitab project file, and it contains two worksheets. This file
will be used for problems 18. You can get this file from the