Game Theory Fall 2006
Problem Set 3
[1] (a) Omitted. The question I wrote here earlier may work but it is harder than I thought
.
(b) In a repeated game with discounting and with one-period payo funct
ECON-SHU 216 Problem Set 1 Solutions
Problem 1.
(1) uM (p, 1) = 2p + (1)(1 p) = 1 3p
(2) uM (p, 0) = 0 + 2(1 p) = 2 2p
(3) Graph:
(4) By letting uM (p, 1) = uM (p, 0), we get p = 0.6.
So Moriatys maxi
ECON-SHU 216 Problem Set 4
Due May 17th (W) in class
(1) Consider a market that is dominated by a monopoly (the Incumbent). A new firm (the
Competitor) is considering to enter the market.
There could
ECON-SHU 216 Problem Set 2 Solutions
Problem 1.
(1) There is no pure strategy equilibrium in this game.
(2) Assume Moriaty plays Dover with probability p and Canterbury with probability
1 p. In the eq
ECON-SHU 216 Problem Set 3
Due Apr 26 (W) in class
(1) Consider a game with two sellers and two buyers. Each seller has one good to sell. The
costs of providing the good are $2 for Seller 1 (s1 ) and
Bayesian Games
Debraj Ray, November 2006
Unlike the previous notes, the material here is perfectly standard and can be found in the
usual textbooks: see, e.g., Fudenberg-Tirole. For the examples in th
Sequential Games with Incomplete Information
Debraj Ray, November 2006
For the remaining lectures we return to extensive-form games, but this time we focus on
imperfect information, reputation, and si
Repeated Games
Debraj Ray, October 2006
1. P
A repeated game with common discount factor is characterized by the following additional constraints on the innite extensive form introduced earlier: Ai (t
Renegotiation in Repeated Games
Debraj Ray, October 2006
1. I
The huge multiplicity of equilibria given by the folk theorem motivates an obvious question:
why would players deliberately select on equi
Game Theory Fall 2006
Problem Set 5
[1] Look at this game:
11
1
5
5
x
u
y
4
0
x
a
10
0
2
1
b
y
3
1
(a) Find all the sequential equilibria of this game.
Now look at this game:
11
1
5
5
x
u
y
4
0
x
a
10
Urban Economics
Problem Set #5
Question 1
Assume you run regression where you explain vineyard land profits as a function of
temperature, rainfall and a time trend. The table below reports the results