Bayesian Games
Debraj Ray, November 2006
Unlike the previous notes, the material here is perfectly standard and can be found in the
usual textbooks: see, e.g., Fudenberg-Tirole. For the examples in these notes (except for the
very last section), I draw he
Sequential Games with Incomplete Information
Debraj Ray, November 2006
For the remaining lectures we return to extensive-form games, but this time we focus on
imperfect information, reputation, and signalling games. Our rst task is to formulate an
appropr
Repeated Games
Debraj Ray, October 2006
1. P
A repeated game with common discount factor is characterized by the following additional constraints on the innite extensive form introduced earlier: Ai (t) = Ai for all t, and Ci (t, h(t) = Ai
for every t-hist
Renegotiation in Repeated Games
Debraj Ray, October 2006
1. I
The huge multiplicity of equilibria given by the folk theorem motivates an obvious question:
why would players deliberately select on equilibria with bad outcomes if better equilibria
are avail
Game Theory Fall 2006
Problem Set 5
[1] Look at this game:
11
1
5
5
x
u
y
4
0
x
a
10
0
2
1
b
y
3
1
(a) Find all the sequential equilibria of this game.
Now look at this game:
11
1
5
5
x
u
y
4
0
x
a
10
0
2
r
1
1
b
y
3
1
(b) Find all the sequential equilibr
Game Theory Fall 2006
Problem Set 3
[1] (a) Omitted. The question I wrote here earlier may work but it is harder than I thought
.
(b) In a repeated game with discounting and with one-period payo functions dened continuously over the product of nite action