Game Theory and Strategy V31.0216
Solutions to Problem Set 3
F1 and F2 set prices p1 , p2 simultaneously
Constant marginal costs c1 = c2 = c
Prot maximization
Consumers
Buy from F1 if
p1 + ty 2 < p2 + t(1 y )2
(1)
p1 + ty 2 > p2 + t(1 y )2
(2)
Buy f
Game Theory and Strategy
V31.0216
Solutions to Problem Set 2
1
Penalty shots revisited
l
m
r
L
4,6
7,3
9,1
M
6,4
3,7
6,4
R
9,1
7,3
4,6
Part A
No, no strategy is dominated by any other (pure) strategy.
Part B
For what beliefs about Player 1s strategy is m
Game Theory and Strategy: Problem Set 5
Raquel Fernndez
V31.0216
This problem set is due in class on Tuesday, April 5th.
1. Evolutionary Stability and Weak Domination (Osborne). Suppose that the pure strategy s* is
evolutionarily stable. Is it possible th
Game Theory and Strategy
V31.0216
Solutions to Problem Set 1
1
Strictly and weakly dominated strategies
Here is an example of a two-player game matrix where Player 2s strategy l is strictly dominated by both
strategies c and r, while Player 1s strategy M