Your Name: _ Final Exam: 16 May 2003 Econ 431 David Reiley You have 120 minutes to take this exam There are a total of 100 points possible, plus one extra-credit question worth 15 points. Please make sure to pace yourself, so that you answer all ques
Your Name: _ Final Exam: 18 Dec 2003 Econ 431 David Reiley You have 120 minutes to take this exam. There are a total of 100 points possible, plus three extra-credit questions (1f, 1g, 4g) worth a total of 20 points. Please make sure to pace yourself,
Your Name: _ Final Exam: 7 May 2004 Econ 431 David Reiley You have 120 minutes to take this exam (11:00am to 1:00pm). There are a total of 100 points possible, plus four extra-credit questions worth 5 points each. Please make sure to pace yourself, s
University of Arizona
Department of Economics
Professor Dufwenberg
sample
ECON 431
Games & Decisions
Midterm #3
0. Whats your name? .
1. Consider the following ultimatum game: player 1 picks a number x such that
0 x 1, which we interpret as his bargaining
University of Arizona, Department of Economics
Econ 431, Fall 2016, Martin Dufwenberg
Problem Set 3
JW Chapter 19: Exercises 1a (answer also the following: (i) JW refers to backward induction.
Find also all subgame perfect equilibria (SPE)! Is there any d
University of Arizona
Department of Economics
Professor Dufwenberg
sample
ECON 431
Games & Decisions
Midterm #2
Whats your name? .
1. Consider the following extensive form game:
A
Yes
No
B
0
0
Reneg
Pay
A
Accept
-1
8
Reject
3
3
-2
0
(i) List all strategie
University of Arizona, Department of Economics
ECON 431, Fall 2016, Martin Dufwenberg
Weak Dominance
Watson discusses how a rational player will never choose a strictly dominated
strategy. At times ruling out strictly dominated strategies, and even perfor
l?
s
5:
Simple Examples
These are intended to illustrate the concepts dened in the paper and display
special phenomena which occur in these games.
The rst. player has the roman letter strategies and the payoff to the left, etc.
Ex.1 5 aa 3 i
-4 a 4
- 5 be
1
ECON 431: Games and Decisions
Timothy Dang
University of Arizona
Test-formatted unsolved exercises
Version 0.0.08
(The 1st version this semester)
January 11, 2017
Copyright 2017 Timothy ONeill Dang
Currently all rights reserved, but check back if you wa
AREC/ECON 478 EXAM I *
PROF. LUECK SPRING 2009
PUT YOUR NAME ON THE BACK ONLY. USE ONLY THE SPACE ALLOTTED FOR YOUR ANSWERS. SHOW ALL WORK. LABEL ALL
1. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS [20 points] A recent empirical study estimates the determinants of potentia
Name: _
Economics 431 Quiz #1
Amy and Beth are competing sellers. Their price competition can be described by the following game, which is derived from the demand curve Q = 6 p, where p dollars per unit is the lowest price, and where the game's payoffs re
Name: _
Economics 431 Quiz #1
Amy and Beth are competing sellers. Their price competition can be described by the following game, which is derived from the demand curve Q = 6 p, where p dollars per unit is the lowest price, and where the game's payoffs re
Name: _
Economics 431 Quiz #2
Amy and Beth are competing sellers. Their price competition can be described by the following game, which is derived from the demand curve Q = 6 p, where p dollars per unit is the lowest price, and where the game's payoffs re
Name: _
Economics 431 Quiz #2
Amy and Beth are competing sellers. Their price competition can be described by the following game, which is derived from the demand curve Q = 6 p, where p dollars per unit is the lowest price, and where the game's payoffs re
Name: _
Economics 431 Quiz #5
People, animals, and organizations often find themselves in a situation where each must choose to "fight" ("be tough") or "concede" ("give in"). Here are the payoffs for a twoplayer game of this kind, a game of "chicken":
Giv
Name: _
Economics 431 Quiz #5
People, animals, and organizations often find themselves in a situation where each must choose to "fight" ("be tough") or "concede" ("give in"). Here are the payoffs for a twoplayer game of this kind, a game of "chicken":
Giv