Problem Set 2
Ying Chen ECN 416 Game Theory Three questions due Thursday February 4, at the beginning of class
1. Consider the following 2-player game. 10 0 2 10 3 3 2 0 10 10 2 4 6 3 3 6 4 6 6
1
Find the following sets of best responses. (a) 1 () for =
Problem Set 3
Ying Chen ECN 416 Game Theory Three questions due Thursday, February 11, at the beginning of class
1. Nash Equilibria and Iterated Deletion Consider the following game. 2 0 3 4 1 3 1 1 1 2 0 2 4 2 2 3 3 0
(a) What strategies survive iterated
Sketch of Solutions to Problem Set 1
Ying Chen, ECN 416 Game Theory
1. Consider the following game: 1 3 3 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 2 1 0 3 0
1
(a) Assume that both players are rational. What happens? If player 1 is rational, he wont play since is strictly
Suggested Solutions to Problem Set 2
Ying Chen ECN 416 Game Theory
1. Consider the following 2-player game. 10 0 2 10 3 3 2 0 10 10 2 4 6 3 3 6 4 6 6
1
Find the following sets of best responses. (a) 1 () for = 1 1 1 . (Notation: The rst element in is th
Sketch of Solutions to Problem Set 3
Ying Chen ECN 416 Game Theory
1. Nash Equilibria and Iterated Deletion Consider the following game. 2 0 3 4 1 3 1 1 1 2 0 2 4 2 2 3 3 0
(a) What strategies survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies? st
Problem Set 1
Ying Chen, ECN 416 Game Theory Four questions due Thursday, January 28, 2010, at the beginning of class.
1. Consider the following game: 1 3 3 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 2 1 0 3 0
1
(a) Assume that both players are rational. What happens? (b) A
Problem Set 5
ECN 416 Game Theory Ying Chen, Spring 2010 Two questions due March 2, at the beginning of class
1. Not Survivor. Six former game theory students Ann, Bob, Carl, Dora, Ed, and Fran are the contestants in a new real TV show. They are placed on
Problem Set 4
Ying Chen ECN 416 Game Theory Three questions due Tuesday, February 23, at the beginning of class
1. Bertrand Model revisited Suppose two rms sell identical products and engage in price competition. The market demand function is = 100 and th
Handout on Mixed Strategies
ECN 416, Spring 2010
Main Lesson in class: If a mixed strategy is a best response, then each of the pure strategies involved in the mix must itself be a best response. In particular, each must yield the same expected payo. Befo
Economics 416, Game Theory Ying Chen, Spring 2010
Games and applications
The following is an almost complete list of the games and applications that we have discussed so far in class. The grade game (selsh vs selsh; selsh vs nonselsh .) Prisoners dilemma
Suggested Solutions to Problem Set 6
ECN 416 Game Theory
1. Suppose you are trying to buy a house and you are bargaining with the current owner over the sale price. The house is worth $200 000 to you and $100 000 to the current owner. So if the price is b
Suggested Solutions to Problem Set 4
Ying Chen ECN 416, Game Theory
1. Bertrand Model revisited Suppose two rms sell identical products and engage in price competition. The market demand function is = 100 and the consumers will buy from the rm that oers a
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Problem Set 7
Economics 416, Game Theory Ying Chen, Spring 2010 Three questions due Thursday April 1, at the beginning of class
1. Entry and Competition Revisited. In the entry and competition game (Dutta, page 194) we discussed in class, we found two pur
Problem Set 6
ECN 416 Game Theory Ying Chen, Spring 2010 Three questions due March 25, at the beginning of class
1. Suppose you are trying to buy a house and you are bargaining with the current owner over the sale price. The house is worth $200 000 to you