ECON 510: Advanced Microeconomic Theory HW4
This assignment is due on Thursday, April 10, 2014 at the start of class. Any assignments turned in after
the start of class will receive 10% off. No assignments can be turned in after the answers are provided
1
Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic
Theory
Class 3: Game Theory Review
Motta, Chapter 8; 410 Notes
Dr. J eremy Petranka
Profit-Maximization in Monopolies
2
d/dq=p(q)+p(q)qC'(q)=0
When a firm is deciding whether to increase
its sales volume, it must take in
1
Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic
Theory
Class 7: Dynamic Games
Motta, Chapter 4
Dr. J eremy Petranka
Bertrand Model of Price Competition
2
Re minde r:HW1Due ne xt
Thurs day
Bertrand Model of Price Competition
3
S te p1:How will 2 firms in an
industry be
Economics 510
Exam 1
Solutions
I. Provide brief answers to the following question:
[a] Suppose you know how Anne ranks different lotteries (x, ). How can you tell if Anne
is risk averse? How can you tell if Anne is risk neutral?
Solution: If Anne always r
Economics 510
Spring 2013
Midterm 2
Solutions
I For an Edgeworth box economy, define the following terms:
[a] Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
solution: An economy is E WD fS; ui ; i ; ei W i D A; Bg where S WD f1; 2g, there are two
agents, A and B , with vN-M u
Econ : Solutions to Homework
February ,
. For each of the following functions f W RC ! R, compute the rst and second
derivative. Indicate whether or not the function is concave (ie, check whether or not
the second derivative is nonpositive).
p
(a) f .x/
Exercises on Demand
Economics
R. Vijay Krishna February ,
Problems
. For each of the following utility functions, nd the MRS at an arbitrary bundle x.
b
(a) u(x) = xa x
(b) u(x) = x e x
(c) u(x) = a ln x + b ln x
(d) u(x) = x + x
(e) u(x) = min[x , x ]
Econ 510 Solutions to Homework 4
1. Consider an economy with two consumers, A and B , and two states, 1 and 2.
Each consumer has a vN-M utility function for lotteries over money. For each
p
consumer, utility of money is x , and each consumer believes stat
Econ : Homework
February ,
. Exercises , , and , pp of the text.
0
0
0
0
. Let .x; / D .x1 ; : : : ; xN I 1 ; : : : ; N / and .x 0 ; 0 / D .x1 ; : : : ; xN I 1 ; : : : ; N / be
p
two bets, and suppose v.c/ D c is a vN-M utility function. Suppose bets ar
Microeconomics
April 2015
The Great Collapse of Two Miniscule Countries
In 2008, the world went into a financial crisis. All over the world the financial quake was
felt. Economies trembled, countries hid from one another and many citizens were left broke
Advanced Microeconomic Theory
Lecture Notes
Srgio O. Parreiras
Economics Department, UNC at Chapel Hill
Spring, 2015
Decision Theory: Lotteries
A lottery is a pair of outcomes and their respective probabilities:
= (x1, x2, . . . , xn ), (p1, p2, . . . ,
1
Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic
Theory
Class 5: Standard Model Review
Motta, Chapter 8; 410 Notes
Dr. J eremy Petranka
Upcoming Due Dates
2
Game Theory (Continuous Games)
3
No rm alFo rm Gam e :
1.
2.
3.
A set of players
Moves each player can make
Payo
1
Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic Theory
Class 15: Asset-Based Pricing Model
Motta, Chapter 3
Dr. J eremy Petranka
Product Differentiation Asset-Based Model
2
Product Differentiation Asset-Based Model
3
Make a mathematical model
3 2 3 2
3
U v qi
qi q
1
Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic
Theory
Class 8: Collusion Introduction
Motta, Chapter 4
Dr. J eremy Petranka
Stackelberg Model of Quantity Competition
2
As timing is an integral part of the game, an extensive-form
game is reasonable and we should find
1
Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic Theory
Class 13: Relevant Market Definition
Motta, Chapter 3
Dr. J eremy Petranka
Class 13 Relevant Market Definition
2
I lied about this
T 3/18 Case 3 Pre-Quiz
Why the HHI?
3
?
Assume n firms are competing in a Cournot
1
Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic
Theory
Class 2: Math Review/Profit Maximization
Motta, Chapter 8; 410 Notes
Dr. J eremy Petranka
Class 2 Math Review/Profit-Maximization
2
Class 2 Math Review/Profit-Maximization
3
Class 2 Math Review/Profit-Maximization
1
Econ 510: Advanced Microeconomic
Theory
Class 4: Game Theory (Continuous
Games)
Dr. J eremy Petranka
Motta, Chapter 8; 410 Notes
Game Theory (Continuous Games)
2
No rm alFo rm Gam e :
1.
2.
3.
A set of players
Moves each player can make
Payoffs the play
1
Question: Are you currently NOT registered in this class
(but are hoping to get in)? If so, please:
1.
2.
Do not sit down (the number of seats pretty much matches the
number of registered students)
Fill out the Application for Enrollment form at the fro
dam: nu?
8mm 8mm .Mtf
Swen WM " with 9am
xl nd 30 odd m £5946 UN FfM LQMC:S
P
Rw M:
L FM wwnc
I amide-0:1 whra,
. htms diffeI
. Hm: kw) «021 1')
'9er L. g!
' ' ' 8
NUNQUnACtd \mpxu was
as cw
e 6
Sufa QM t? 0 Odd an mamas NM ( 515
N do "w: 3