Z Emeccxsk \
Activity #1: Nim
Pair up with one (and only one) of your neighbors in the classroom and play the following game mUItiplegtimes, '
alternating who plays as the first player and who plays the second player across the games. Use the handout
Econ 327 Study Guide
A Game Needs:
1. Your actions must affect others and vice versa
2. Mutual Awareness
Collin Smith
How to Model a Game:
Every game needs three crucial elements
1. Players- Any number from 1 to a million
2. Strategies- A complete plan o
5. Combining simultaneous and
sequential moves.
In this section we shall learn
How the tools used to analyze sequential games can
be used on simultaneous games and vice versa.
How to understand games that involve both
sequential and simultaneous moves.
Ho
4. Mixed strategies
In this section we shall learn
How to not lose a game when it appears your
opponent has a counter to all your moves.
How to use unpredictability to your advantage.
Games People Play.
Games People Play.
Mixed strategies
Anyone for tenni
Games People Play
Economics 327 Professor Chris Ellis
Games People Play:
Some Preliminary Questions.
Question: What is game theory?
Answer: The analysis of strategic situations.
Question: And what is a strategic situation?
Answer: When two or more players
3. Simultaneous move games
with pure strategies
In this section we shall learn
How to figure out the outcomes to expect in
simultaneous move game, by
Looking for clearly best strategies, ones that are always
played
Eliminating from consideration strategie
Dalton France
3/7/16
Weber T 4-5:20
HW 7
1a. The main question asked in the article is if access of Medicaid was offered to
those with less income and they take the opportunity and how it would go about
affecting their health and their finances.
1b.
1c.
T
Dalton France
2/9/16
Weber T 4-5:20
Assignment #4
1a.
1b.
A one unit change in unemployment rate yields a negative .057 unit change in
the inflation rate. The unemployment rate is significant at the 1% level.
1c.
The coefficents and standard erros on UNE
a 2 L 1"
EC 327, Spring 2015 Midterm
University of Oregon _._._ May 5, 2015
Midterm K,
Tuesday, May 5, 2015 C75
Please do not open the exam until you are told to do 50. Do, however, write your name and
student ID below.
You will have 80 minutes to finish
Rapozo 1
Econ 327
Mike Urbancic
10 April 2015
Magic the Gathering
Magic the Gathering (or Magic for simplicity) is a trading card game where players battle
each other summoning spells and powerful creatures with the objective to defeat their opponent
by r
Ewes CAX Cl
A
Activity #1: We Can Still Do This Game Even If It Isnt Thors Day Today
.25;
0 Show that this game has no purestrategy Nash equilibrium.
0 Find the unique mixedstrategy Nash equi ' ' is game. <
" " - ~\ 3 :. \
ELW: we 60*?) ? * '5 59 W the
6. Uncertainty and Information
Many strategic situations involve the players
having different information. In this section we
shall learn
How to find out what your opponent knows.
How to credibly transmit information to your opponent
that you want them to
I. The Elements of DIPLOMACY
Each of the Great Powers has different potentials, faces different
problems,and demandsa different playing style. DIPLOMACY as
a whole hasmany elements,however,which remain the samefrom
game to game, position to position. It i
EC 327, Summer 2016
University of Oregon
Problem Set #3 Suggested Solutions
1. (2 points) DSR4e, 5U2, parts (a), (b), and (c). I gave the best-response rules on the problem set:
PMM = 9 + 0.5PSS
PSS = 3 + 0.25PMM
(a) The demand for Modern Multiplex is QMM
Collin Smith
Alex Monte Calvo
Econ 327, MW 2-320
March 10th, 2013
Boxing as a Strategic Situation
Through out life I have been a very avid sports and one sport that has always
intrigued and captivated me as a viewer has been boxing. Not only has boxing pr
EC 327, Summer 2016
University of Oregon
Problem Set #2
Due in lecture on Wednesday, August 24, 2016. No late problem sets are accepted for credit. (Seriously.)
Questions labeled as DSR4e come from the end-of-chapter exercises in the fourth edition of Gam
EC 327, Summer 2016
University of Oregon
Problem Set #1
Questions labeled as DSR4e come from the end-of-chapter exercises in the fourth edition of Games of Strategy by
Dixit, Skeath, and Reiley. Question 2U1 refers to question U1 of chapter 2, and the oth
EC 327, Summer 2016
University of Oregon
Problem Set #3
Due in lecture on Thursday, September 1, 2016. No late problem sets are accepted for credit. (Seriously.)
Questions labeled as DSR4e come from the end-of-chapter exercises in the fourth edition of Ga
EC 327, Summer 2016
University of Oregon
Problem Set #2 Suggested Solutions
1. (2 points) DSR4e, 3U5.
(a) Amy will win this game if both players are playing optimally. This game has a first-mover advantage, because
if Amy plays optimally there is nothing
Solutions to Chapter 5 Exercises
SOLVED EXERCISES
S1.
(a)
Rs best-response rule is given by y = 10x x. L spends $16 million, so x = 16. Then
Rs best response is y = 1016 16 = 10(4) 16 = 40 16 = 24, or $24 million.
(b)
Rs best response is y = 10x x, and Ls
Solutions to Chapter 7 Exercises
SOLVED EXERCISES
S1.
(a)
The game most resembles an assurance game because the two Nash equiibria
occur when the players use symmetric moves. (Here they both use the same moves to arrive at the
Nash equilibria; in other ga
Solutions to Chapter 4 Exercises
SOLVED EXERCISES
S1.
(a)
For Rowena, Up strictly dominates Down, so Down may be eliminated. For Colin, Right
strictly dominates Left, so Left may be eliminated. These actions leave the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
(Up, R
Solutions to Chapter 6 Exercises
SOLVED EXERCISES
S1.
Second-mover advantage. In a sequential game of tennis, the second mover can best respond to
the first movers chosen action. Put another way, the second mover can exploit the information she learns
fro
EC 327, Summer 2016
University of Oregon
Practice Midterm Suggested Solutions
Midterm on Thursday, August 25, 2016
Your name:
Email address:
@uoregon.edu
Practice Midterm Suggested Solutions
actual Midterm on Thursday, August 25, 2016
Please do not open t
EC 327, Summer 2016
University of Oregon
Problem Set #4
Due in lecture on Wednesday, September 7, 2016. No late problem sets are accepted for credit. (Seriously.)
Questions labeled as DSR4e come from the end-of-chapter exercises in the fourth edition of G
EC 327, Summer 2016
University of Oregon
Practice Final Exam
actual Final Exam on Thursday, September 8, 2016
Your name:
Email address:
@uoregon.edu
Practice Final Exam
actual Final Exam on Thursday, September 8, 2016
Please do not open the exam until you
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