CS 15-892 Foundations of Electronic Marketplaces
Homework 3
Prof. Tuomas Sandholm
Carnegie Mellon University
Computer Science Department
November 18, 2013
Due November 25th in the beginning of class.
This homework is self-contained so you will not need an
Implementation
in Bayes-Nash equilibrium
Tuomas Sandholm
Computer Science Department
Carnegie Mellon University
Implementation in Bayes-Nash equilibrium
Goal is to design the rules of the game (aka mechanism) so that in
Bayes-Nash equilibrium (s1, , s|A|)
CS 15-892
Foundations of Electronic Marketplaces
Tuomas Sandholm
Professor
Computer Science Department
Carnegie Mellon University
Instructors web page:
www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm
Course web page:
www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm/cs15-892F13/cs15-892.htm
Motivation
CS 15-892 Foundations of Electronic Marketplaces
Homework 2
Prof. Tuomas Sandholm
Carnegie Mellon University
Computer Science Department
October 23, 2013
Due November 4th in the beginning of class.
You may use any sources that you want. If you do so, you
CS 15-892 Foundations of Electronic Marketplaces
Homework 1
Fall Semester 2013
Tuomas Sandholm
Professor
Carnegie Mellon University
Computer Science Department
September 23, 2013
Due October 2nd, in the beginning of class. In this homework, you may use an
(More on) characterizing
dominant-strategy implementation
in quasilinear environments
(see, e.g., Nisans review: Chapter 9 of Algorithmic Game Theory book)
Tuomas Sandholm
Professor
Computer Science Department
Carnegie Mellon University
Some characterizat
Preference Elicitation in
Combinatorial Auctions:
An Overview
Tuomas Sandholm
[For an overview, see review article by
Sandholm & Boutilier in the textbook
Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press 2006,
posted on course home page]
Setting
Combinatorial auction: m
Multi-unit auctions &
exchanges
(multiple indistinguishable units
of one item for sale)
Tuomas Sandholm
Computer Science Department
Carnegie Mellon University
Auctions with multiple
indistinguishable units for sale
Examples
IBM stocks
Barrels of oil
Pork