Mountains 0.01 (2.17) NonContiguous 0.10 (0.31) Democracy 0.36
(1.29) Pseu R 2 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.16 Obs 853 853 833 734 Table 3.
Religious Fractionalization and Conflict many other ethnic groups
on a global scale, most ethnic groups are not accurately def
for free-riding within the group. For a model that does this, see
Esteban and Ray (APSR 2001). Polarization and Conflict 161 so in
particular large groups still have a higher win probability. Finally,
invoke (7.49) and (7.47) to write down the condition f
income y to be at the point (1 t)x + ty. Thus the parameter t is
inversely proportional to breadth of identification. The perceived
density of y from the vantage point of an individual located at x is
then 1 t f y (1 t)x t ! It is easy to see that the pol
conflict and distribution study: (7.48) P(ni)pipj = r i , where pi (and
likewise pj) is just the win probability or conflict share niri/R. We may
use this to obtain a quasi-closed-form for the net payoff from conflict:
(7.49) P(n)pi c(ri) = P(ni) pi 1 pi(
is salient? To some extent, the answer must depend on the set of
available policies. One might say that a society is polarized if the
average resistance over a set of policies is high. Can apply this
notion quite easily once we fix a space of policies and
and Conflict 151 7.13 A Behavioral Approach to Polarization No
measurement theory can do justice to the claim that there is indeed a
link between polarization and conflict. Two potential links: (1)
Empirical: fit the measures to the data and see they are
so we will have the produced output divided in some given way
among the contributing agents. The question is: how does the
inequality in this division affect efficiency? Our focus will be on an
aspect of production that we did not consider in the last sec
We are going to show that the last line in (7.46) is maxed at ni = nj =
1/2. There are three terms in this last line, each raised to different
powers. It is very easy to verify that the first and second of these,
P(ni)niP(nj)nj and ninj , are each maximiz
may decompose the polarization measure (7.20) into several
components. First, there are the internal polarizations of the middle
density (Pm) and of the two side densities (Ps). Next, there are
various subtotals of effective antagonism felt by members of
measurement of polarization. Indeed, it is conceivable that such
measures will perform better than the more commonly used
fragmentation measures in the analysis of social conflict. But a full
exploration of this last theme must await future research (thou
Nonlinearity. Same direction of population or income movements may
cause polarization to go down or up, depending on context. Income
Density 3. Nonlinearity. Same direction of population or income
movement may cause polarization to go down or up, dependin
Lemma 7.8 , this minimum value is 3. Using this information in (7.32),
we are done. Lemma 7.11. Given that P(f) is of the form (7.20), Axiom
3 is satisfied. Proof. Consider a symmetric distribution composed of
four basic densities, as in the statement of
consequently, if E Pn i=1 e i , E must maximize M(`)f(E)E
with respect to E. Thus I(`) is simply S M(`)f(E ) + E . It is easy
to check that I(`) is monotonically decreasing in M(`) and indeed, that
I(`) 0 along any sequence such that M(`) 1. Thus under so
. . . n 2 G vGG Then R (squared) is the unique
real eigenvalue of this matrix. [The associated share vector is the
unique positive eigenvector (on the simplex) corresponding to this
eigenvalue.] Remark. Observe the squaring of the population
coefficients.
greater empirical relevance, the behavioral approach cannot be
dispensed with as a conceptual check on the axioms. In particular,
issues of group formation, group salience, the use of alternative
forms of resources in a conflictual process, and role of lo
Wolff [2001] also consider a measure of this type but with income
distances across groups explicitly considered. Polarization and
Conflict 145 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Ethnic polarization index Ethnic
where r = (r1, . . . ,rn) is a (nonnegative) vector. Depending on the
application, Y could be a public good or a private good. I now
introduce the three channels through which inequality might function:
A. Wealth. Suppose that the team good is public, and
ethnic fractionalization; the latter is not. The same is true if a measure
of ethnic dominance (Collier (2001) and Collier and Hoeffler (2002) is
used instead. Both these observations are still true if ethnic is
replaced by religious. The analysis is also
at all exceptional: it is quite reasonable to suppose that some poor
agents do not make contributions, while the richer agents do. So let w
be some wealth distribution. Let I be the set of all agents who make
positive contributions: I = cfw_i|ri > 0. Obse
inequality affect the incentives of participating agents? 8.1 Inequality
in Endowments I build on a classic paper on the voluntary provision
of public goods by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1981). There are n
agents, each of whom contributes resources ri t
have a first best outcome to start with. The additional assumption that
we wish to make is related closely to (5). Specifically, we suppose:
(A.4) For each ex post outcome (c(e), e) such that F(e) F(e ), there
is i with ei > 0, and (8.30) u i c (ci , li)F
is complete. Tentative Notes on Simulations: Unfortunately, we could
not obtain analytically the parameter values for which the unequal
pair dominates equal minority with m = 1, 2. We therefore turned
towards simulations, the results of which we now exami
can be squeezed. 128 Polarization and Conflict Take a closer look at
this last one. Let f be any density and let lie in (0, 1]. A -squeeze of
f is a transformation f : (7.1) f (x) 1 f x [1 ]m . Scalings,
slides and squeezes partition the space of all dens
Inequality and Growth of valuable resources (such as import quotas)
in their direction. New blood didnt get a chance. See also Banerjee
(1997) on bureaucratic corruption. 2. Sokoloff and Engerman (2000)
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) have argue
anger or social disapproval might induce such changes, and in so
doing, lend credibility to punishments (for similar ideas, see, e.g.,
Frank [6]). It is to be expected that the degree of inefficiency will be
lowered in the presence of these emotions. But
some family. Suppose that it incurs training cost x and leaves
bequest b; then by stationarity, W = (1 + r)b + w(x). Now, given the
choice of x, b must maximize (6.48) U(W x b) + V(w(x) + (1 + r)b)
subject to b 0. Defining B b + x, this can equivalently b
observable action, followed by some collective action the social
planners move. Suppose, moreover, that a collective action
(contingent on individual decisions) cannot be credibly committed in
advance.4 Specifically, define a soft mechanism to be one that
densities of equal height i. We first prove that satisfies the
fundamental Cauchy equation (7.11) (p)(p 0 ) = (pp0 )(1) for
every (p, p 0 ) 0. To this end, fix p and p 0 and define r pp0 . In what
follows, we assume that p r. 1 Consider a configuration wi
game. Proof. Suppose that (c(e), e) (c, e) is an ex post outcome with
F(e) > 0. Denote by Wi(c, l) the partial derivative of W with respect to
ci . Then, under (A.1)(A.3) and using the ex post maximization
problem (4), (c, e) must satisfy the following pr
lj), or (ii) ej (0, Lj) and u j c (cj , lj)Fj(e) , u j l (cj , lj), or (iii) ej = 0 and
u j c (cj , lj)Fj(e) > u j l (cj , lj). To prove the claim, first recall that each
player gets strictly more than inaction at (c, e), so that by (A.2), (u i c
(ci , li