Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2015
Answer key for problem Set #1
Due in class Thursday, January 29
Problem 1. Suppose that, in a large city, 200 identical street vendors compete in a competitive market for hot dogs.
1 2
1. Fore each vendor i, tot
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2014
Answer key for problem Set #1
Due in class Tuesday, February 4
Problem 1. Suppose that, in a large city, 200 identical street vendors compete in a competitive market for hot dogs.
1 2
1. Fore each vendor i, tota
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2014
Answer Key to Problem Set #4
Due in class Thursday, March 20
Problem 1. Sub King and GyroMart are the only two sandwich shops in town.
Their goods are imperfect substitutes. Careful research has found that the d
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2015
Midterm Exam 2
Thursday, March 26, 2015
Read each problem carefully and answer each part as best you can. Partial credit will be
given, so please show your work. Number each part of your answers. Each part is wo
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2013
Final Exam
Friday, May 3, 2013
Read each problem carefully and answer each problem as best you can. Partial
credit will be given, so please show your work. Number each part in you answers.
Each part is worth 5 p
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2015
Answer Key: Final Exam
Tuesday, May 5, 2015
Read each problem carefully and answer each problem as best you can. Partial
credit will be given, so please show your work. Number each part in you answers.
Each part
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2015
Midterm Exam 1
Thursday, February 12, 2015
Read each problem carefully and answer each part as best you can. Partial credit will be
given, so please show your work. Number each part of your answers. Each part is
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Fall 2015
Answer key for problem Set #1
Due in class Thursday, September 10
Problem 1. Suppose that, in a large city, 100 identical street vendors compete in a
competitive market for hot dogs.
2
1. Fore each vendor i, total
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Fall 2015
Answer key for problem Set #1
Due in class Thursday, September 10
Problem 1. Suppose that, in a large city, 200 identical street vendors compete in a competitive market for hot dogs.
1 2
1. Fore each vendor i, tot
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2016
Problem Set #1
Due in class Thursday, January 28
Problem 1. Suppose that, in a large city, 100 identical street vendors compete in a
competitive market for ice-cream.
2
1. Fore each vendor i, total cost of produ
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2015
Midterm Exam 1
Thursday, February 12, 2015
Read each problem carefully and answer each part as best you can. Partial credit will be
given, so please show your work. Number each part of your answers. Each part is
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2016
Problem Set #4
Due in class Thursday, March 24
Problem 1. (True/False). For each statement, assert whether it is true of false
and explain your answer.
1. In a one shot sequential move pure Betrand game with two
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2016
Problem Set #4
Due in class Thursday, March 24
Problem 1. (True/False). For each statement, assert whether it is true of false
and explain your answer.
1. In a one shot sequential move pure Betrand game with two
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2014
Problem Set #5
Due in class Thursday, March 27
Problem 1. Assume two rms compete in Cournot competition, but compete for an
innite amount of time. The one-shot payos are listed below and the discount rate
is = .
Econ 444-02 (Corporate Economics), Fall 2015
Midterm Exam 1
Thursday, October 1, 2015
Read each problem carefully and answer each part as best you can. Partial credit
will be given, so please show your work. Number each part of your answers. Each
part is
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2015
Answer Key to Problem Set #3
Due in class March 5, 2015
Problem 1. There are two companies who oer tax return services in College Springs:
H & R Block and Bills Financial Service. Marginal cost for doing a tax r
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2015
Problem Set #5
This homework will not be collected, but is required material for
Midterm 2.
Problem 1. Assume two rms compete in Cournot competition, but compete for an
innite amount of time. The one-shot payos
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2015
Answer Key to Problem Set #4
Due in class Thursday, March 20
Problem 1. Incor is currently the only supplier of widgets and earns monopoly rents
of $700k. Enterprise is considering entering the market. It would
Economics of the Corporation
Economics 444
Spring 2015
Instructor: Paul Grieco
Office: 509 Kern Building
Email: paul.grieco@psu.edu
Office Hours: Wednesdays 10a-noon, Thursdays 12:30-1p or by appointment
Teaching Assistant: Yang Yu
Office: 403 Kern Buildi
Cournot
Games
Paul Grieco
Static Games
Intro
Nash
Equilibrium
Game Theory Intro and the Cournot Model
The Cournot
Model
Extensions
Concentration
and Anti-Trust
Paul Grieco
Econ 444 - The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2015
Oligopolies are Games
Courno
Bertrand
Games
Paul Grieco
Pure Bertrand
Duopoly
Capacity
Constraints
The Bertrand Model and Price Competition
Hoteling
Model
Paul Grieco
Econ 444 - The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2015
Price Competition
Bertrand
Games
Paul Grieco
Pure Bertrand
Duo
Course
Introduction
Paul L. E.
Grieco
What is
Industrial
Organization
Course Introduction
Why Study
IO?
Course Details
Paul L. E. Grieco
Administrative
Details
Econ 444 - The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2015
Economics of the Corporation
Course
Intr
Perfect
Competition
and Monopoly
Paul Grieco
Demand
Curves
Perfect
Competition
Perfect Competition and Monopoly
Monopoly
Surplus &
Eciency
Paul Grieco
Econ 444 - The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2015
Elements of a Market
Perfect
Competition
and Mono
Collusion
Paul Grieco
Finite Horizon
Games
Innite
Horizon
Games
Repeated Games and Price-Fixing
Collusion in
Practice
Paul Grieco
Econ 444 - The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2015
Explaining Price-Fixing
Collusion
Paul Grieco
Finite Horizon
Games
Inn
5
CUESTIONES ECONOMICAS Vol 22, No 2:2-3, 2005
Modelo Ecuatoriano de Equilibrio General Aplicado
(MEEGA)
WILSON PEREZ O. Y
MIGUEL ACOSTA A.*
Resumen
Los modelos de equilibrio general aplicado son parte de las herramientas tradicionales de
anlisis para eva
Stackelberg
Games
Paul Grieco
Dynamic
Games Intro
Stackelberg
Model
Sequential
Price Setting
Models
Low Price
Guarantees
Dynamic Games and the Stackelberg Model
Paul Grieco
Econ 444 - The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2015
Timing of Games
Stackelberg
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2013
Midterm Exam 1
Tuesday, February 19, 2013
Read each problem carefully and answer each part as best you can. Partial credit
will be given, so please show your work. Number each part of your answers. Each
part is
Econ 444 (Corporate Economics), Spring 2014
Answer Key: Midterm Exam 2
Thursday, April 3, 2014
Read each problem carefully and answer each part as best you can. Partial credit
will be given, so please show your work. Number each part of your answers. Each
Cournot Oligopoly
Daniel Grodzicki
Econ 444 (Sec. 001)
The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2016
Preliminaries
The Cournot Model is a model of firms who simultaneously
choose production quantities. Moreover, they do so only once.
Because there are onl
Dynamic Games Introduction
Daniel Grodzicki
Econ 444 (Sec. 001)
The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2016
Timing of Games
The Cournot and Bertrand Models are simultaneous static
games.
This really means that both firms take one action without
knowing
The Bertrand Model & Price Competition
Daniel Grodzicki
Econ 444 (Sec. 001)
The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2016
Price Competition
Within the Bertrand model, firms set prices instead of
quantities.
Choosing prices or quantities is equivalent for
Midterm 1 Review
Daniel Grodzicki
Econ 444 (Sec. 001)
The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2016
Topics
Thus far in the course we have covered the following topics
1
Pricing under perfect competition (Textbook Ch. 2)
2
Pricing under monopoly (Textbook Ch
Extensions to the Bertrand-Hotelling Model
Daniel Grodzicki
Econ 444 (Sec. 001)
The Pennsylvania State University
Fall 2016
Extensions of the Hotelling Model
We have learned how Bertrand competition with differentiated
products works when firms are identi