Name:.
ECO 5341 (Section 1) Spring 2016
Midterm
March 22nd Tuesday Total Points: 100
For full credit, please be formal, precise and tidy. If your answer is illegible and not well
organized and/or if your arguments are informal and imprecise, you will lose
1. Assume the following model of the economy, with the price level fixed at 1.0:
C = 0.8(Y T)
T = 1,000
Y=C+I+G
I = 800 20r
G = 1,000
Ms = 1,200
Ms/P = Md/P = 0.4Y 40r
a) Write a numerical formula for the IS curve, showing Y as a function of r alone.
(Hin
ECO 5341 Strategic Behavior
SMU, Fall 2015
Instructor: Bo Chen
Homework Assignment 6
Due in class on 11/11/2015
Instructions. This assignment will be due on Wednesday, November 04, 2015 at the beginning of class.
If you cannot make it to class that day, t
ECO 5341: Strategic Behavior
Problem Set 3: Solutions
1
Find the NE
Primo
L
C
Secundo
Secundo
A
B
50
70
R
90
50
C
D
100
50
-20
10
Secundo
E
-15
12
F
50
100
a.
List all strategies available to each player.
For Primo his strategy set contains three items an
ECO 5341: Strategic Behavior
Problem Set 6
Auction Basics
Consider an auction environment that matches the symmetric independent private values specication discussed in class. This means that all of the bidders in the auction know their own
values for the
ECO 5341: Strategic Behavior
Problem Set 7: Solutions
Electoral Reform
There is a mechanism that has been proposed by many people to replace the one currently used
for electing the President in the US. This new mechanism is called the single transferable
Midterm Exam: Solutions
ECO 5341 Spring 2017
February 14, 2017
Name_
Instructions. Please read all questions carefully and clearly explain both the solution you get
and how you got it. Algebra mistakes may be forgiven or at least not punished severely but
ECO 5341: Strategic Behavior
Problem Set 4: Solution Set
1
Principal Agent Problem with Monitoring
There is someone who we will refer to as B.B. who has just invented a wonderful new device for
monitoring the eort level of employees. This device will take
ECO 5341: Strategic Behavior
Problem Set 6 Solutions
Auction Basics
Consider an auction environment that matches the symmetric independent private values specication discussed in class. This means that all of the bidders in the auction know their own
valu
Dynamic Games
Overview
In this unit we study:
Combinations of sequential and simultaneous
games
Solutions to these types of games
Repeated games
How to use dynamics to build self-sustaining
agreements
Sequential and Simultaneous Games
There are many
ECO 5341 Strategic Behavior
Southern Methodist University, Fall 2015
Instructor: Bo Chen
Answer Key to Homework 5
Question 1.
(a) The complete extensive form can be represented as follows (Crepresents
continue and S represents stop for simplicity, here th
ECO5341 Strategic Behavior Lecture Notes 5
Mixed Strategy and Mixed NE
Bo Chen
SMU
Spring, 2016
(SMU)
Lecture Notes 5
Spring, 2016
1 / 19
Mixed Strategies and Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
An Introduction
For some simultaneous-move games, there is no p
CISB 5397: STARTING A BUSINESS
Fall 2016 Case 1
ATOM ENERGY, Inc.
Business Overview
As you know, Texas has de-regulated its electricity markets to create competition and lower costs to the
consumer. The electricity value-chain runs from generation to tran
Practice Exam for Midterm
(Wednesday, 10/05/16, 6:30pm - 9:20pm (Umphrey Lee 0242)
ECO 5341 Strategic Behavior
Fall 2016
Southern Methodist University
Instructor: Dr. Bo Chen
Instructions. This exam consists of
questions, with the weight of each question
ECO 5341 Strategic Behavior
SMU, Fall 2016
Instructor: Bo Chen
Answer Key to Homework 3
Question 1. (A Price Competition Duopoly Game)
A Nash equilibrium in this game is a prole of prices for the two rms, p1 and
p2 such that p1 is a best response to p2 fo
ECO 5341 Strategic Behavior
SMU, Fall 2016
Instructor: Bo Chen
Answer Key to Homework 2
Question 1. Nash Equilibrium and Weak Dominance.
Part I. A 2 2 example that satises the requirement in the question is the
following:
L
R
U 0,4 2,4
D 1,1 2,0
There are
ECO 5341 Strategic Behavior
SMU, Fall 2016
Instructor: Bo Chen
Homework Assignment 4
Due in class on 10/19/2016
Instructions. This assignment will be due on Wednesday, Oct. 19, 2016 at the beginning of class. If
you cannot make it to class that day, then
ECO 5341 Strategic Behavior
SMU, Fall 2016
Instructor: Bo Chen
Homework Assignment 5
Due in class on 10/26/2016
Instructions. This assignment will be due on October 26, 2016 at the beginning of class. If you cannot
make it to class that day, then you must
MA3600/2014-2015-solution
4. (a) Provide denitions for the following terms:
Normal form game.
A N player normal form game consists of:
A nite set of N players;
Strategy spaces for the players: S1 , S2 , S3 , . . . SN ;
Payo functions for the players:
Lecture 8: Game Theory (homework solutions)
Julia Collins
13th November 2013
The pirate problem
There are ve pirates, labelled 1 to 5 with Pirate 5 being the most senior. Pirate 5 has 100
gold coins. He can choose to share some of it with the others. If a
ECO 5341: Strategic Behavior
Problem Set 2: Solution Set
1
Finding Nash Equilibria
Find the all of the pure Strategy NE in the following games:
a.
T
M
B
L
0,0
44,0
31,0
C
0,44
14,14
16,2
R
0,31
2,16
1,1
NE at (B,C), (M,R)
b.
Up
Down
L
10,0
10,15
C
7,9
5,1
Midterm Exam II: Solutions
ECO 5341 Spring 2017
March 30, 2017
1. Basic Concepts
a.
Dene and explain the meaning of the term strategy as it applies to game theoretic modeling.
(5 pts)
A complete and contingent plan for playing a game. This means a strateg
ECO 5341: Strategic Behavior
Problem Set 1: Solutions
1
The Saga of Big Monkey and Little Monkey
Big Monkey (BM) and Little Monkey (LM) live on a deserted island in the South Pacic. Their
normal diet consists of berries from ground-level bushes, but an im
1
Sales Revenue versus Profit Maximization
Suppose that two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) face an industry demand
P = 150 Q
where
Q = q1 + q2
is the total industry output. Both firms have the same unit production cost c = 30. The
firms are competing by simult
ECO 5341 Elections and Voting
Saltuk Ozerturk (SMU)
Saltuk Ozerturk (SMU)
Elections and Voting
Elections and Voting
Elections and Voting
Consider a population of voters uniformly distributed along
the ideological spectrum from left (x = 0) to right (x = 1
ECO 5341 Price Competition with Differentiated
Products
Saltuk Ozerturk (SMU)
Saltuk Ozerturk (SMU)
Price Competition
Price Competition
Price Competition with Differentiated Products
Suppose two firms produce differentiated products at a unit
cost c = 0.
Example 1: Finding Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Find all the pure and mixed strategy equilibria of the following game by
constructing the best response correspondences of the players:
T
B
L
2, 1
1, 2
R
0, 2
3, 0
Answer: First let us consider best respo
ECO 5341 Sequential Bargaining
Saltuk Ozerturk (SMU)
Saltuk Ozerturk (SMU)
Sequential Bargaining
Sequential Bargaining
Three Period Sequential Bargaining
Player 1 (P1) and Player 2 (P2) are bargaining over one dollar.
They alternate in making offers. Firs