ECONOMICS 406
1.
(a)
SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM SET 7
The matrix of the subgame on the day that the tomato weighs 10 ounces is:
Player2
H D
Player H 5,5 10,0
1 D 0,10 0,0
This subgame has only one equilibrium, (H, H
A matrix of the subgame on the day that the t
Economics 406
Spring 2015
Solutions to Problem Set 1
1.
(a) Rock-Paper-Scissors has nine outcomes: (R, R), (R, P ), (R, S), (P, R), (P, P ),(P, S),
(S, R), (S, P ), (S, S).
(b)
Player 2
R
P
S
Player R 0,0 -1,1 1,-1
1
P 1,-1 0,0 -1,1
S -1,1 1,-1 0,0
(c) Th
Economics 406
Spring 2015
Solutions to Problem Set 6
1.
(a) Let a division of the cake into pieces called A and B be denoted by (a, b), where a
and b are nonnegative numbers that sum to 1. For a given (a, b), player 2s optimal
choice is to take piece A if
Economics 406
Spring 2015
Problem Set 1
Due Tuesday, February 3, by the end of class.
1. The game Rock-Paper-Scissors is popular in several countries around the world (sometimes under a dierent name). It is a game for two players, in which the players tak
CS112 Spring 2016: Problem Set 1
http:/www.cs.rutgers.edu/courses/112/classes/spring_2016_v.
Problem Set 1
Big O
1. Exercise 3.7 of the textbook.
An algorithm prints the following pattern:
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *
* * *
* * * *
a. What are the basic operations per
Economics 406
Spring 2015
Problem Set 7
Due Tuesday, April 7, by the end of class.
1. Two neighbors share a garden, in which is growing a prize tomato. The tomato currently
weighs 4 ounces. Every day that the tomato is not picked, it will grow by another
CS112 Fall 2015: Problem Set 3
http:/www.cs.rutgers.edu/courses/112/classes/spring_2016_v.
Problem Set 3 - Solution
Linked Lists, Recursion
1.
*Given the following definition of a circular linked list (CLL) class:
public class Node cfw_
public String data
Economics 406
Spring 2015
Problem Set 2
Due Tuesday, February 10, by the end of class.
1. A game with two players, Player 1 and Player 2, is represented in the matrix below.
Player 1 has two possible actions, U , M and D, and Player 2 has three possible a
Economics 406
Spring 2015
Solutions to Problem Set 2
1.
Player
L
C
Player U 1,0 4,2
1
M 3,1 4,2
D 4,3 5,4
2
R
7,1
3,0
0,2
(a) Action U is player 1s best response to R.
(b) When player 2 uses the mixed strategy 2 = (2 (L), 2 (C), 2 (R) = (2/3, 0, 1/3),
pla
ECONOMICS 406
ml
1.
SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM SET 5
(a) An outcome for an extensive game is any sequence of actions that ends the game.
(0)
(d)
(e)
In this game there are four such sequences: R, DR, DDR, and DDDR. In words,
these outcomes are, respectively, pl
Economics 406
Fall 2015
Problem Set 3
Due Tuesday, February 17, by the end of class.
1. There is a town with 99 residents. The residents must decide individually and simultaneously whether to spend time lobbying the local government for better trash colle
Economics 406
Spring 2015
Solutions to Problem Set 3
1.
(a) The only circumstance in which lobbying gives a resident a greater payo than not
lobbying is when exactly 49 other residents are lobbying, in which case the resident
gets a payo of 9 by lobbying
Economics 406
Spring 2015
Problem Set 5
Due Tuesday, March 24, by the end of class.
1.
The following game is called the magic refrigerator. It is a two-player
dynamic game. There is a magic refrigerator. The first time it is opened, it
contains two bottle
QSO 600 Module 9: Final Project
Darshak Shah
Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU)
Overview
Tesla Motors, Inc., which established on July 1, 2003 which involves in designs, develops,
manufactures and sells electric vehicles and energy storage products.
Prof. Campbell
Economics 406 Exam I Solutions
Spring 2015
1.
Player x1
1
y1
z1
Player
x2 y2
1,5 6,2
0,3 1,4
4,7 2,0
2
z2
3,3
4,6
1,1
(a) z2 strictly dominates y2 for player 2, since u2 (x1 , y2 ) < u2 (x1 , z2 ), u2 (y1 , y2 ) < u2 (y1 , z2 ), and
u2 (z1
IT500 Module 5: Group G Final Project Update
IT500 Module 5: Group G Final Project Update
Darshak Shah, Kyle Flynn, Victor Galvez, James Edgar
Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU)
Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to: IT500 Blac
IT500 Module 5: Group G Final Project Update
IT500 Module 5: Group G Final Project Update
Darshak Shah, Kyle Flynn, Victor Galvez, James Edgar
Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU)
Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to: IT500 Blac
IT500 Module 5: Group G Final Project Update
IT500 Module 5: Group G Final Project Update
Darshak Shah, Kyle Flynn, Victor Galvez, James Edgar
Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU)
Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to: IT500 Blac
Study Guide
Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, and pages 374-387
All lecture material from last exam until end of class on 4/27
This study guide is intended to be a way to help focus your studying. It does not
mean you should ignore anything not listed here and foc
Practice Test 2
Find the derivative.
1)
2
f ( t )=t + +
t
2)
f ( x )=
x+1
2 x1
3) Find
f ' ' (t )
4) Find
dy
dx
f ( t )=
t
t +4
2
by Implicit differentiation
3
2 x 3 xy =4
5) Find the equation of the tangent line to the
graph of
y= 4x 2
3
1,
at
6) The Cus
Homework 1
Economics 406
Solutions
1. (a) u is weakly (but not strictly) dominated. There are two Nash equilibria: (m,A) and
(d,B).
A
B
C
u
2; 1
2; 2
1; 4
m
3; 4
0; 1
2 ;1
d
2; 3
3; 9
1; 7
Consider rationalizability. u is never a best response, remove it.
Homework 2, Economics 406
Solutions
1. Player 1 has twelve pure strategies: (L,Up,A), (L,Up,B), (L,Down,A),(L,Down,B),
(M,Up,A), (M,Up,B), (M,Down,A), (M,Down,B), (R,Up,A), (R,Up,B), (R,Down,A) and
(R,Down,B). Player 2 has three pure strategies: L, R and
Homework 3, Economics 406
Solutions
1. (a) When x < 1, No strictly dominates Yes for both players, so Yes can not be a
best response. Therefore, (No, No) is the unique Nash equilibrium; there is no equilibrium
in mixed strategies. (b) Let player 1 use Yes
Economics 406: Simultaneous Move Games
Tomas Sjstrm
January 2014
Introductory Remark. In this class, we will do two things:
First point: we will learn basic game theory, as it was formulated by
John Nash and other pioneers. This will take up most of our t
Midterm 1, Economics 406
Solutions
1. (a) No. A dominant strategy must dominate all other strategies, but it can be seen that no such
strategy exists. (b) Only M and r are rationalizable. Explanation: Since m is dominated by `, remove
it:
`
r
U 3; 3 5; 0
Economics 406 Midterm 1
March 6, 2014
Tomas Sjstrm and Youngseok Park
Your Name
Instructions. Answer all four questions. You have 90 minutes. You can use a calculator,
but no books or notes. You cannot be logged into Sakai at any time during the exam. Alw
Economics 406
Spring 2015
Problem Set 5
Due Tuesday, March 24, by the end of class.
1. The following game is called the magic refrigerator. It is a two-player dynamic game.
There is a magic refrigerator. The rst time it is opened, it contains two bottles
Economics 406
Spring 2015
Problem Set 4
Due Tuesday, February 24, by the end of class.
1. Consider a Cournot game between two rms. The rms face an inverse demand function
described by the equation P (Q) = Q if Q , P (Q) = 0 if Q > , where P is the
price o
Homework 4
Economics 406
Due date: March 8
1. DRS 8.U2, parts a,b,c,d (but not parts e and f).
2. DRS 8.U3. (Hint: in part b, to calculate who gains and loses, compare the new
situation when the signal is unavailable with the old separating equilibrium wi
Homework 2
Economics 406
Due date: Feb 9
1. How many pure strategies does each player have in this game? Indicate the rollback
equilibrium by arrows on the appropriate branches, and by circling the payos the
players will receive in the rollback equilibriu
Joshua Halma
Extend the model that we just discussed (OPEC lecture 6) in one direction (see below).Build a new
game, explain what you did, justify the payoffs if you can find Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect
equilibrium, it is even better. I appreciate
Joshua Halma
Topics in Micro Theory
Assignment 2
March 3rd, 2017
5.7
Show that the best response to your rival posting a price of 6 dollars is to post the monopoly price of 3
dollars. What is the best response against a rival's price of 5 dollars? 4 dolla
Section 19.4
(Calculus problem) In the next few questions we turn to worker monitoring in the presence of
moral hazard. Work effort is measured by an index, e, that ranges between 0 and 1: 0 indicates
complete idleness, and a value of I indicates fully ef
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