Problem Set #1
Economic Growth
Spring 2005
Professor Todd Keister
[email protected]
Due: February 2
1) Consider the optimal growth problem from class, with u (c) = ln (c) and n = 0, and compare
the following two situations. In the baseline case, the island
Problem Set #2
Economic Growth
Spring 2005
Professor Todd Keister
[email protected]
Due: February 14
1) Consider the optimal growth problem with the CIES utility function
u (c) =
c1 1
1
and the Cobb-Douglas production function Y (t) = BK (t) N (t)1 , where
Practice Questions for Final Exam
Economic Growth
Spring 2005
Professor Todd Keister
[email protected]
Second Exam from Fall 2004
Question I. (25 points) Consider the model of human capital. Output is produced according to
the production function Y = K (huL
Solutions to Problem Set #2
Economic Growth
Spring 2005
Professor Todd Keister
[email protected]
1) Consider the optimal growth problem with the CIES utility function
c1 1
u (c) =
1
and the Cobb-Douglas production function Y (t) = BK (t) N (t)1 , where B >
Practice Questions for Midterm Exam
Economic Growth
Spring 2005
Professor Todd Keister
[email protected]
Midterm Exam from Fall 2004
Part I. (45 points) Consider the Robinson Crusoe model. The harvest function is given by
Y (t) = F [K (t), N (t)] ,
where F
instance, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2007, 2008) reconduct the
contemporary variation of social capital in Italy to the experience of
free-city-state in the Middle Ages, Tabellini (2005, 2008a, 2008b) links
cross-country variation in measures of trust
and children) of type i 2 cfw_a, b at time t. At time t, children of type i
choose x 2 X to maximize Ei;tux; y Y ux; ydpi t : They then
observe the realization of a signal of y, z i and update to the posterior
pi t1, which they enter time t 1 with. Let Vi
ideologies. That is, preferences are identical across agents, but
different cultural types have a different model of the socio-economic
environment.33 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) build a simple
model of the transmission of beliefs about trustwort
389 Author's personal copy e.g., 2.6% for Greeks, 2.2% for Jamaicans,
15.3% for Italians and 22.6% for Mexicans in the 1970 Census.
Similarly, he documents a large variation in first-second generation
differences in segregation rates: Italians go from 15.
chosen randomly in the population (i.e., he/she picks trait i with
probability q i and trait j 6 i with probability q j 1 q i ). The cultural
transmission mechanism introduced by Cavalli Sforza and Feldman
(1981) is then summarily represented by the follo
dimensions. The first distinguishes population dynamics studies from
socialization studies; while the second one distinguishes structural
and non-structural methodologies. Population dynamics studies aim
at measuring directly the resilience of cultural tr
traits that prevails in such society. Similarly, in strategic and matching
interactions contexts, the payoffs that an individual may obtain are
likely to be influenced by the distribution of cultural traits in the
population. In all of these situations, i
is instead increasing in q i , socialization efforts of parents of type i are
typically larger the more frequent their trait in the population. Direct
vertical and oblique transmissions are linked in some degree by
cultural complementarity in this case. S
the share of the ethnic group in the neighborhood, for those
neighborhoods in which the share is above 20%, a result consistent
with cultural distinction, see Figure 20. 62 The structural analysis of
identity formation exploits the identity formation choi
definition of second generation and of country of origin. 390 Alberto
Bisin and Thierry Verdier Author's personal copy is a second
generation immigrant from country of origin k (and 0 otherwise).52 In
this case, the regression is: yi b0 b1Xi X k dk g1;k a
segregation in Census 1970 and NLSY data. He documents a large
variation in segregation rates across ethnic groups (first generation):
48 See e.g., the following classic studies, with no claims to
exhaustivity whatsoever, W. C. Smiths Americans in the Mak
is a continuous, strictly decreasing function in qi , and, moreover, di (1,
DVi ) 0. We say that direct vertical transmission acts as a cultural
substitute to oblique transmission, when parents have fewer
incentives to socialize their children the more wi
Along these lines is also the work in progress of Panebianco (2010)
and Vaughan (2010). 358 Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier Author's
personal copy for some map f. Conditions for existence and
uniqueness of a non-degenerate ergodic distribution in cultur
reform after destruction of the Temple in 70 CE and, as such, have
been directly transmitted across generations. Botticini and Eckstein
(2004) provide a wealth of historical evidence for the transmission of
preferences for education by Jews from the first
studies of population dynamics, migration and epidemiological
studies. 3.3 Population dynamics Let t 0, 1, . , 1 index discrete time.
The population dynamics equation for the leading cultural
transmission model we have discussed, in the discrete time
form
includes Middle East and Central Asia. b Followers of local tribal,
animalistic, or shamanistic religions. c Followers of primarily crisis or
syncrotistic religions and movements, all founded since 1800 and most
since 1995. Muslims Atheists and nonreligio
Richerson (1985). Extending the analysis to the case of endogenous
cultural transmission is a non-trivial exercise. Keeping track of the
time evolution of the mean and the variance of the distribution of
continuous traits, a central insight of these appro
well as direct socialization rates (di d j ) from a discrete time version of
the population dynamics as in equation (3). The time series of the
population dynamics qi t is obtained from archeological anthropology
and/or historical and ethnographic data. M
transmission models with a discrete number of traits were presented.
There is however, a well-established tradition in evolutionary biology
and anthropology to consider continuous traits models of cultural
transmission. These models postulate a dynamics o
Civic Participation of Immigrants: Cultural Transmission and
Assimilation. mimeo, Universita Bocconi. Alesina, A., Angeletos,
G.M., 2005. Fairness and Redistribution: US versus Europe. Am. Econ.
Rev. 95 (4), 960980. Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E., 2000. Part
the stationary states of the population dynamics are culturally
homogeneous. Moreover, qi t; qi 0 ! 1, for any qi 0 2 0; 1. If instead
di d j ; qi t; qi 0 qi 0, for any t 0. In other words, the selective
mechanism of cultural transmission, as modeled by C
and teachers). The parents direct socialization effort is denoted ti 1 2
0; 1, and controls the childrens internalization of the parents trait.
If the two traits match (i.e., if the child internalizes his parent trait, i,
and the trait of the individual i
(2010)s model. Assume parents of type i face a disutility which
increases in the distance between the value of the trait of their
children, Bi , and the socialization target they set. Assume also that
socialization costs are higher the larger the distance
Author's personal copy yi b0 b1Xi X k gkYk eij identifies the
effects of country ks culture with gk, the coefficient of Yk. 54 Data
regarding several behavioral traits of interest are have been collected
and analyzed using the epidemiological approach; se