CGA-CANADA FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 1 EXAMINATION March 2004 Marks
9
Time: 3 Hours
Question 1 Select the best answer for each of the following unrelated items. Answer each of these items in your examination booklet by giving the number of your choice. For exa
CGA-CANADA FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 1 EXAMINATION December 2003 Marks
9
Time: 3 Hours
Question 1 Select the best answer for each of the following unrelated items. Answer each of these items in your examination booklet by giving the number of your choice. For
CGA-CANADA FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 1 EXAMINATION June 2003 Marks
12
Time: 3 Hours
Question 1 Select the best answer for each of the following unrelated items. Answer each of these items in your examination booklet by giving the number of your choice. For exa
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 1 [FA1] EXAMINATION
Before starting to write the examination, make sure that it is complete and that there are no printing defects. This examination consists of 8 pages. There are 10 questions for a total of 100 marks.
READ THE QUESTI
CGA-CANADA FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 1 EXAMINATION June 2004 Marks
9
Time: 3 Hours
Question 1 Select the best answer for each of the following unrelated items. Answer each of these items in your examination booklet by giving the number of your choice. For exam
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 15 9 May 2004
Solutions to Problem Set 6
Problem 1. 1(a) Your optimal bid is 0. If you bid any positive value and you win the object then the value was between 0 and your bid b. Hence the expe
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 12.5 9 May 2004
Solutions to Problem Set 5
Problem 1. 1(a) Omitted. 1(b) The trust game has a unique SPE. Player 2 sends no money back and, anticipating this strategy, player 1 sends no money
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 11 28 April 2004
Solutions to Problem Set 4
Problem 1. There is no right answer to this one. We have shown in previous problem sets that the Nash equilibrium (NE) is stronger than iterated del
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 6 20 March 2004
Solutions to Problem Set 3
Problem 1. The following game matrix shows a generic way to capture the gist of the story in a 2 by 2 game. The teacher gets utility l from the stude
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 4 10 March 2004
Solutions to Problem Set 2
Problem 1. Assume, that both lawyers can order the appetizer or the main course, and that they both have utility 10 and 15 over both dishes respectiv
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 2 24 February 2004
Solutions to Problem Set 1
Problem 1. For this exercise it is necessary to assume that all utility is counted in Dollar terms. 1(a) Your roommate can choose between two acti
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 14 18 April 2004
Problem Set 6
Due: Saturday, May 8 (Irit's folder)
Challenging problems are marked with one star. Double-starred questions do NOT count towards the grade. They are very hard a
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 12 18 April 2004
Problem Set 5
Due: Thursday, 29 April (in class).
Challenging problems are marked with one star. Double-starred questions do NOT count towards the grade. They are very hard an
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 10 23 March 2004
Problem Set 4
Due: Saturday, 10 April, 5pm sharp (Irit's folder at Littauer)
Challenging problems are marked with one star. Double-starred questions do NOT count towards the g
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 5 6 March 2004
Problem Set 3
Due: Friday, 19 March 2004
Challenging problems are marked with one star. Double-starred questions do NOT count towards the grade. They are very hard and simply fo
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 3 21 February 2004
Problem Set 2
Due: Saturday, 6 March (Irit's mail folder on the second floor of Littauer up the stairs and to your left). Challenging problems are marked with one star. Doub
Ec1052: Introduction to Game Theory Harvard University
Handout 1 12 February 2004
Problem Set 1
Due: Thursday, 19 February (in class).
This problems set requires knowledge of von-Neumann Morgenstern decision theory. Challenging problems are marked with on
Lecture XVI: Auctions
Markus M. Mbius o April 14, 2002
Readings for this class: P. Klemperer - Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature (especially parts of the appendix - the main text provides an excellent introduction to auction theory but is optional
Lecture IV: Nash Equilibrium II - Multiple Equilibria
Markus M. Mbius o February 24, 2004
Gibbons, sections 1.1.C and 1.2.B Osborne, sections 2.6-2.8 and sections 3.1 and 3.2
1
Multiple Equilibria I - Coordination
Lots of games have multiple Nash equilib
Lecture IV: Nash Equilibrium
Markus M. Mbius o February 19, 2004
Readings: Gibbons, sections 1.1.C and 1.2.B Osborne, sections 2.6-2.8 and sections 3.1 and 3.2 Iterated dominance is an attractive solution concept because it only assumes that all players a
Lecture XVIII: Games with Incomplete Information II - More Examples
Markus M. Mbius o May 6, 2004
Gibbons, section 4.2 Osborne, chapter 10
1
Introduction
This lecture gives more examples of games of incomplete information, in particular signalling games.
Lecture XVII: Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
Markus M. Mbius o May 6, 2004
Gibbons, sections 4.1 and 4.2 Osborne, chapter 10
1
Introduction
In the last two lectures I introduced the idea of incomplete information. We analyzed some important si
Lecture XVI: Auctions
Markus M. Mbius o May 6, 2004
Gibbons, chapter 3 Osborne, chapter 9 Paul Klemperer's website at http:/www.paulklemperer.org/ has fantastic online material on auctions and related topics.
1
Introduction
We already introduced a privat
Lecture XV: Games with Incomplete Information
Markus M. Mbius o April 28, 2004
Gibbons, chapter 3 Osborne, chapter 9
1
Introduction
Informally, a game with incomplete information is a game where the game being played is not common knowledge. This idea is
Lecture XIV: Applications of Repeated Games
Markus M. Mbius o April 28, 2004
Gibbons, chapter 2.3.D,2.3.E Osborne, chapter 14
1
Introduction
We have quite thoroughly discussed the theory of repeated games. In this lecture we discuss applications. The sel
Lecture XIII: Repeated Games
Markus M. Mbius o April 19, 2004
Gibbons, chapter 2.3.B,2.3.C Osborne, chapter 14 Osborne and Rubinstein, sections 8.3-8.5
1
Introduction
So far one might get a somewhat misleading impression about SPE. When we first introduc
Lecture XII: Analysis of Infinite Games
Markus M. Mbius o April 7, 2004
Gibbons, chapter 2.1.A,2.1.B,2.2.A Osborne, sections 14.1-14.4, 16 Oxborne and Rubinstein, sections 6.5, 8.1 and 8.2
1
Introduction - Critique of SPE
The SPE concept eliminates non-c
Lecture IV: Nash Equilibrium
Markus M. Mbius o March 3, 2003
Readings for this class: Osborne and Rubinstein, Chapter 2.12.3; FT has a good section on the connection to IDSDS. Iterated dominance is an attractive solution concept because it only assumes th
Lecture I-II: Motivation and Decision Theory
Markus M. Mbius o February 7, 2004
1
Two Motivating Experiments
Experiment 1 Each of you (the students in this course) have to declare an integer between 0 and 100 to guess "2/3 of the average of all the respon