Leo Reyzin. Notes for BU CAS CS 538.
1
1
Information-Theoretic Encryption: Perfect Secrecy and
the One-Time Pad
Consider the following scenario: Alice is sending Bob o on an important mission. Prior to Bobs leaving,
Alice gives him secret instructions on
Formalizing Human Ignorance:
Collision-Resistant Hashing without the Keys
Phillip Rogaway
Department of Computer Science, University of California,
Davis, California 95616, USA, and
Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Science,
Chiang Mai University
D
~ s | cfw_ z y e w hf n i i i nf u s r p h pfn l k i hf gfd
UQ ~ Qo77BU lr e2Sg xcty7$U7)217jqUvtQ"7qo22dm27jccceyU
i
dQ 0g 6RQ nn' FiI dEnil G r n nnrdnQnQ4ri!%Iig i !l'n QQnR nn F C0riu9!GQfwx `' ! @n 1d'nXddiG 0%Qd @n'd Ei 0Q0nl QdQ n nP' gQQG i n
A preliminary version of this paper appears in Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT '00, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science Vol. 1807, B. Preneel ed., Springer-Verlag, 2000.
Public-key Encryption in a Multi-User Setting:
Security Proofs and Improvements
Mihir
A Proposal for an ISO Standard for Public Key Encryption
(version 2.1)
Victor Shoup
IBM Zurich Research Lab, Sumerstr. 4, 8803 Rschlikon, Switzerland
a
u
[email protected]
December 20, 2001
Abstract
This document is an initial proposal for a draft for a
Instructor: Adam ONeill
[email protected]
COSC530, Georgetown University, Fall 2013
COSC530: Homework 1 - Solutions
Exercise 1. Fix a blockcipher E : cfw_0, 1 cfw_0, 1 cfw_0, 1 (for simplicity we assume the keylength k = here; the construction and pr
Message Authentication Codes
CLAIM 4.8
133
Pr[Mac-forgeA, (n) = 1 NewBlock] is negligible.
We construct a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who attacks
the xed-length MAC and succeeds in outputting a valid forgery on a
previously unauthenticated m
Leo Reyzin. Notes for BU CAS CS 538.
10
1
More on Signatures and the Public-Key Infrastructure
10.1
Random Oracle Model and Full-Domain-Hash
Very ecient stateless signatures seem to come from the so-called random oracle model, formally introduced
by Bella