The Colonel Blotto Game
o You are a commander of an army during wartime, which is about to do battle with the
enemys army
o Each commander decides how to allocate his 120 troops across 6 battlefields
o In a particular battlefield, the commander who assign
Bayesian Games (O 9, OR 2.6)
Imperfect information

Bargainers may not know each others valuations of the object

Firms may not know each others cost functions

Combatants may not know each others strengt
Bargaining (O 16, OR 7)
We start with an extension of the ultimatum game to two periods and alternating offers:
 A pie of size 1 is to be divided between two players.
 Player 1 proposes a division x=(x1,
Extensive form games with imperfect information
Players are often imperfectly informed when making their decisions.
We would like to allow players to have partial information about the history of actions.
Therefore,
Repeated Games (O 14 & 15, OR 8)
Let G be a strategic game.
Denote the set of players by N and the set of actions and payoff function of each
player i by Ai and ui respectively.
The Tperiod repeat
Game Theory Epistemology
Behavioral Game Theory
Irrational Players
The Levelk Model of NonEquilibrium Play
Econ 104: Advanced Microeconomic Theory
Behavioral Game Theory
April 16, 2013
Game Theory Epistemology
Behavioral Game Theory
Irrational Players
T
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)
The story
 Members of a single population (people, animals) occasionally interact
 Pairwise interaction
 Actions taken: Inherited mode of behavior or mutation
 The function u m
Asymmetric InformationIntroduction
Evidence for and Types of Information Projection
The Winners Curse
Learning
Econ 104: Advanced Microeconomic Theory
Behavioral Game Theory, cont.
April 18, 2013
Asymmetric InformationIntroduction
Evidence for and Types o
Definitions from Class 1
Best response
For any list of strategies ai Ai
Bi(ai) = cfw_ai Ai : ui(ai, ai) ui(ai, ai), ai Ai
is the set of player is best actions given ai (the list of the other players a
Strategic Tournaments
A tournament is built on top of a symmetric twoplayer game G.
Roundrobin method: each player is matched against each of the other players once.
In each match the players play t
Strictly Competitive Games (O 11.111.2, OR 2.5)
Only in limited classes of games can we say something about the qualitative character of the
equilibria. One such class of games is that in which there are two players,
Social Preferences
Pure altruism and distributional preferences
SocialImage Concerns
IntentionsBased Preferences
Social Preferences and Competition
Econ 104: Advanced Microeconomic Theory
Social Preferences: Overview and
Distributional Preferences
April
Extensiveform games with perfect information
Formalities (O 5.15.2, OR 6.1)
Definition
An extensive game with perfect information = <N, H, P, (i)> consists of:
A set of players N.
A finite
Extensive Form Games with Perfect Information
 Informal overview of the main ideas 
We would like to be able to analyze situations in which decisions are not made simultaneously.
For example, one firm decides
Mixed strategies
Motivation
We saw that in the Odd/Even game (matching pennies), there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
But if each player plays each action with probability 0.5, no one has incentive to deviate