Fall 2013
GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Problem Set 3
(Due at the start of Lecture Thursday, October 17)
Question 1 (from the F2010 midterm but somehow still seems timely): It is January 2011 and
the midterm elections are over. A new Congress has beg
Fall 2013
GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Problem Set 3
(Due at the start of Lecture Thursday, October 17)
Question 1 (from the F2010 midterm but somehow still seems timely): It is January 2011 and
the midterm elections are over. A new Congress has beg
NAME_
ECON 110: Game Theory in the Social Sciences
HW#1: Due date Thursday June 30th 2016
1)
Suppose that Speedy Bike and Power Bike are the only two bicycle manufacturing firms serving the
market. Both can choose large or small advertising budgets. Assum
ECON 110: Game Theory in the Social Sciences
HW#3 KEY: Due date Thursday July 21st 2016
1) Consider the following extensive form game.
a) Number of subgames are _4_
b) SPNE in the following game is (Show your paths of equilibrium on each subgame on the ex
Chapter: Incomplete
Information Games
Econ 110
Incomplete Information Vs Imperfect Information Game
Incomplete information games are not same as imperfect
information games.
Imperfect information games: Players know what game
they are playingbut at some
Natalia Garbiras D
az
Econ 110 PS 135
Section Notes (105 and 106)
Section 2, Fall 2015
September 9, 2015
Before starting.
1. Problem set submission:
Problem sets must be submitted during the last 5 minutes of the lecture in the Hall outside 245 Li Ka
Shin
NAME_
ECON 110: Game Theory in the Social Sciences
HW#2: Due date Wednesday July 6th 2016
1) Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in
the market. Their costs are given by C1 10Q1 and C2 10Q2, where Q1 is the out
Todays Agenda
1. National Saving: Sources and Uses
Saving and Investment
in Closed and Open
Economies,
Part 1
2. The Determinants of National Saving
3. The Determinants of Investment
4. Saving and Investment in a Closed Economy
5-1
5-2
The Sources of Nati
Todays Agenda
1. Measuring Economic Activity
2. The Product Approach to GDP
Measuring Macroeconomic Data:
Gross Domestic Product
3. The Expenditure Approach to GDP
4. The Income Approach to GDP
5. Nominal and Real GDP
2-1
2-2
Measuring Economic Activity
Chapter: An Application of
Backward Induction to
Research and Development
Econ 110
Introduction
Major source of economic growth
Technological Advances
Some studies show that up to 87% of economic
growth is a result of technological advances
What drive
ECON 110: Game Theory in the Social Sciences
HW#5 KEY: Due date Wednesday August 10th 2016
1) Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction in which a bidders valuation
can take one of three values: 5, 7, and 10, occurring with probabilities .2,
.5, and .3,
ECON 110: Game Theory in the Social Sciences
HW#4 KEY: Due date Thursday August 4th 2016
1) Greg is deciding whether to ask Marcia out on a date. However, Greg isnt sure whether Marcia likes
him, and he would rather not ask if he expects to be rejected. W
Chapter 7: The
Commons Problem
Econ 110
Characteristics of Commons
(1) Access to everyone:
It is infeasible or undesirable to restrict access
(2) Resource depletability
More people and more intense usage by each person
can lead less resource availabil
Chapter 4: Dominance
Solvability
Econ 110
Dominance Solvability
Dominance Solvability also known as iterated
elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS)
What is the problem with (drawback of)dominant
strategy solution?
All players may not have a dominan
Example 1: The Grade Game":
Without showing your neighbor what you are doing, write down on a form either the
letter or the letter . Think of this as a `grade bid'. We will randomly pair your form
with one other form. Neither you nor your pair will ever k
Chapter: Repeated
Games
Econ 110
Repeated Game
Players interact many time over the
course of the game.
Intuition in solving the game: If
players believe that the nature of current
interaction affects future behavior, they
may change their current behavi
Game Theory in the
Social Sciences
Econ 110
Contacting Me
The best way to get in touch with me is by
email spatlolla@berkeley.edu.
In order to ensure that I dont accidentally
delete your emails, please put Econ 10 in
the subject.
Office Hours
Tuesday a
NAME_
ECON 110: Game Theory in the Social Sciences
HW#1: Due date Thursday June 30th 2016
1)
Suppose that Speedy Bike and Power Bike are the only two bicycle manufacturing firms serving the
market. Both can choose large or small advertising budgets. Assum
ECON 110: Game Theory in the Social Sciences
HW#2 KEY: Due date Wednesday July 6th 2016
1) Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in
the market. Their costs are given by C1 10Q1 and C2 10Q2, where Q1 is the outpu
Chapter 6: An
Application
Cournot Duopoly
Econ 110
Classification of Market
Market classification based on number of sellers:
Two extreme cases
(i) Monopoly (one seller)
(ii) Pure Competition (Many many seller)
Both are extensively studied and both c
Course Description
Welcome to UGBA 101B:
Macroeconomic Analysis
for Business Decisions
This is a course in intermediate macroeconomics, with an emphasis on real world
applications.
Professor Steven Wood
Haas School of Business
2. We will apply the models
ECON C110 / PS C135
SECTION SYLLABUS
Fall 2015
Prof. Robert Powell
794 Barrows Hall
rpowell@berkeley.edu
GSI: Natalia Garbiras D
az
Oce hours: Wednesday 8:00-10:00 AM
216 Moses
nataliagarbirasdiaz@berkeley.edu
General Information
Lectures: Tuesday-Thursda
GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Political Science 135/Economics 110
Hand out on:
The Prisoners Dilemma.
The prisoners dilemma is used to model many different things. The original story,
which gives the game its name, goes something like this: Two suspe
ECONOMICS 131: PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Fall Term 2015
Professor Danny Yagan
Email: yagan@berkeley.edu
Office Hours: Mondays 12-2pm each week (except that it will be Mondays 2-4pm on 10/12, 10/26, and
11/9). Location: 647 Evans Hall.
Graduate Student Instructors:
Problem 2
(a)
9.24% Annual yield compounded semian
9.45% Annual yield for bond B
D1=
0.913636
D0.5=
0.813636
PC=
(b)
491.3636
Problem 3
NPV=
($6,604.00)
9.45% Effective annual yield notice that it is equal to the annual yield calculated directly and given
Name: _
(Last name, first name)
SID: _
GSI: _
Econ 100B
Macroeconomic Analysis
Professor Steven Wood
Spring 2013
Problem Set #1
Due: February 12, 2013 in class at 2:10 p.m.
(The grace period ends promptly at 2:20:01 p.m.)
Place your completed problem set
Natalia Garbiras D
az
Econ 110 PS 135
Section Notes1 (105 and 106)
Section 9, Fall 2015
November 4, 2015
Today
1. Bargaining Games
2. Repeated Games
1
Bargaining
So far in our class, players have had discrete options available to them: for example, a play
Natalia Garbiras D
az
Econ 110 PS 135
Section Notes1 (105 and 106)
Section 8, Fall 2015
October 28, 2015
Announcements
Some things to take into account (based on midterms):
1. How to correctly write down the SPE. Dierence between SPE and other concepts li
Natalia Garbiras D
az
Econ 110 PS 135
Section Notes (105 and 106)
Section 7, Fall 20151
October14, 2015
Announcements
1. Midterm is on October 20th.
2. There wont be section the day after the midterm.
3. You can already nd posted the solution key for prob
Natalia Garbiras D
az
Econ 110 PS 135
Section Notes (105 and 106)
Section 6, Fall 20151
October 6, 2015
Announcements
1. Problem set 3 is due next Tuesday (!) in lecture.
2. I will give your second problem sets 2 back next Wednesday in Section.
Today
1. Q
Chapter: Infinitely
Repeated Games
Econ 110
Infinitely Repeated Game
Stage game is played infinite number of
times.
Discount factor becomes more important
in this case compared to finitely repeated
game
Without discount factor payoffs may go
to infinit
Chapter: Asymmetric
Information
Econ 110
Asymmetric Information Games
Similar to incomplete information games but
applied to market
Involves informed and uninformed players
Informed agent (player) trading in the markets with
uninformed agent
Agent in
Chapter: Extensive Form
Games
Econ 110
Extensive Form Game
A game that is pictured as a Game tree
A game tree starts at a unique node known as Root node
Several branches come from the Root node and
each branch represents a decision node
Decision node
NAME_
ECON 110: Game Theory in the Social Sciences
HW#3: Due date Thursday July 21st 2016
1
Consider the following extensive form game.
2
3
a) Number of subgames are _
4
b) SPNE in the following game is (Show your paths of equilibrium on each subgame on t