Managers face ecomomic decisions for the companies they work for. One of these
decisions is procurement of inputs, and the least cost or feasable way of acuiring them.
Managers can use several different approaches to get the optimal input procurment.
Thes

Suppose that the total Benefits and total costs from and activity are, respectively, B(Q)= 150+28Q-5Q^2 and C(Q)
a.
Net Benefits
N(Q)=
n(Q0
N(Q)=
N(Q)=
b
When Q=1
When Q=5
N(1)=
N(5)
c.
d.
e.
f.
MNB(Q)=
MNB(Q)=
MNB(Q)=
When Q=1
When Q=5
MNB(1)
MNB(5)
MB(Q

a) What level of ouput should this frim produce in the short run
MC=MR at 7
b)What price should this firm charge in the short run?
Ar=MR
charge $28
c) what is the firms total cost at this level of output?
ATC*Q
$ 224.00
d) what is the firms total varibale

Suppose Qsx=
a
-50 (+).5px
(-) 5pz
How much of product X is produced when Px= 500 and Pz=30
50 units
just plugged the numbers into the QSX
b. How much of product X is produced when Px=50 and Pz=30
-175 units
This is not posibible, so the amount of product

a)
The horizontal distance between Dm and Dr is 16 units. Therefore, the monopolist firm
needs to produce 16 units of output.
b)
The profit earned that generates the residual demand curve is:
$ 320.00
c)
They should produce a minimum of 16 units to deter

Industry
Firm
sales
A
B
200000
C
500000
Total
400000 1100000
a. what is the HHI
0.0330578512 0.206612 0.132231
0.3719008264
HHI
3719.01
b.
HHI=10000Ew2i
The firm firm concentration ratio is 100% or 1.
c.
HHI
change
0.2975206612
0.5041322314
5041.322314 if

Qdx=1000(-) 2Px + .02Pz
Pz=
A.
QDX
EPX=
400
What is the price elastivity of demand Px=154.
700 Units
-0.44
Since EPX is less than one demand is inelastic at this price
If the firm charged a lower price, total revenue would decrease.
B.
Qdx
Epx=
What if th

A) Whats is the firms optimal output?
MC=MR
7 units
B) What is the firms optimal price?
AR=D
$ 130.00
c) what the firms max profits?
TR
TC
Total Profit
$ 910.00
$ 770.00
$ 140.00
ATC=
d) What adj should the manager be anticipating.
Demand will decrease as

Player 1
A)
B)
C)
strategy
A
B
C
Player 2
D
E
F
100,125 300,250 200,100
250,0
500,500 750,400
0,-100
400,300 -100,350
Players 1 dominat strategy is B, and player 2 doesn't have a dominat strategy
P1 secure strategy is B, and P2 secure strategy is E.
Nash