Economics 485
Problem Set 1 - Fall 2015
University of Washington
Xu Tan
Due: October 20 by 10:30am. Late submission after class starts gets
2/10 o, and submission after the second half starts is not accepted.
Please put a box to highlight your nal solutio
Economics 485
Problem Set 1 - Solutions
University of Washington
Xu Tan
1. Gibbons exercise 1.2.
Answer:
Step 1: Strategy B is dominated by T for the row player.
Step 2: Strategy C is dominated by R for the column player.
cfw_T, M, L, R are the strategies
Economics 485
Problem Set 2 - Solutions
University of Washington
Professor Xu Tan
1. Consider the 2-person normal form game pictured in the matrix below. The row
players payos are the rst entry and the column players payos are the second.
U
M
D
L
C
R
3, 5
Economics 485
Questions on Repeated Games - Solutions
University of Washington
Xu Tan
1. Gibbons exercise 2.13.
Answer: The optimal collusion price is maximizing the total prot: (a p)(p c).
The FOC (taking the derivative equal 0) implies p = (a + c)/2. Th
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Course Outline
Normal Forms
Nash Equilibrium
Dominance and IteraCve Dominance
Extensive Forms
Subgame Perfect
Repeated Games
Bayesian Games
Perfect Bayesian
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Course Outline
Normal Forms
Nash Equilibrium
Dominance and IteraCve Dominance
Extensive Forms
Subgame Perfect
Repeated Games
Bayesian Games
Perfect Bayesian
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Course Outline
Normal Forms
Nash Equilibrium
Dominance and IteraCve Dominance
Extensive Forms
Subgame Perfect
Repeated Games
Bayesian Games
Perfect Bayesian
Economics 485
Problem Set 1 - Winter 2017
University of Washington
Xu Tan
Due: Jan. 25 by 12:30pm. Late submission after class starts gets 2/10
off, and submission after the second half starts is not accepted.
Please put a box to highlight your final solu
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Nash Equilibrium
Best Responses
Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Dominance and Itera<ve Dominance
Mixed Strategies
Existence of Equilibrium
2
Applying Nash Equilibrium
Economics 485
Questions on Repeated Games
University of Washington
Xu Tan
1. Gibbons exercise 2.13.
2. Harrington Chapter 13 Exercise 1.
There are three shermen, and each day they individually decide how many boats
to send out to catch sh in the local lak
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Course Outline
Normal Forms
Nash Equilibrium
Dominance and IteraCve Dominance
Extensive Forms
Subgame Perfect
Repeated Games
StaCc Bayesian Games
Perfect B
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Course Outline
Normal Forms
Nash Equilibrium
Dominance and IteraCve Dominance
Extensive Forms
Subgame Perfect
Repeated Games
StaCc Bayesian Games
Perfect B
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Course Outline
Normal Forms
Nash Equilibrium
Dominance and IteraCve Dominance
Extensive Forms
Subgame Perfect
Repeated Games
Bayesian Games
Perfect Bayesian
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Course Outline
Normal Forms
Nash Equilibrium
Dominance and IteraCve Dominance
Extensive Forms
Subgame Perfect
Repeated Games
Bayesian Games
Perfect Bayesian
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Course Outline
Normal Forms
Nash Equilibrium
Dominance and IteraCve Dominance
Extensive Forms
Subgame Perfect
Repeated Games
Bayesian Games
Perfect Bayesian
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
New OH:
Wed 1-3pm
2
Course Outline
Normal Forms
Nash Equilibrium
Dominance and IteraCve Dominance
Extensive Forms
Subgame Perfect
Repeated Games
Bayesi
Economics 485
Midterm Exam - Fall 2015
University of Washington
Xu Tan
You have 1 hour and 50 mins to complete this (closed book) exam. Please
clearly enter your nal solution to the desired place within the box. (That is the
part to be graded.)
Please wri
Economics 485
Problem Set 2 - Winter 2016
University of Washington
Xu Tan
Due: Feb 1st by 12:30pm. Late submission after class starts gets 2/10
o, and submission after the second half starts is not accepted.
Please put a box to highlight your nal solution
Economics 485
Midterm Exam - Fall 2014 - Solution
University of Washington
Xu Tan
1. 15pts Examine the 2-person normal form game pictured in the matrix below.
The row players payos are the rst entry and the column players payos are the
second.
w
x
y
z
a
1
Economics 485
Midterm Exam - Fall 2014
University of Washington
Xu Tan
You have 1 hour and 50 mins to complete this (closed book) exam. Please
clearly enter your nal solution to the desired place within the box. (That is the
part to be graded.)
Please wri
Economics 485
Midterm Exam - Fall 2015 - Solution
University of Washington
Xu Tan
1. 15pts Examine the 2-person normal form game pictured in the matrix below.
The row players payos are the rst entry and the column players payos are the
second.
w
x
y
z
a
2
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Administra;ve Details
Oce Hour:
MW 2:20-3:20pm or by appointment
Oce: 344 Savery Hall
Books:
Game Theory for Applied Economists, Robert
Gibbons, Princeton University Press.
OpGonal: Games,
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Nash Equilibrium
Best Responses
Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Dominance and Itera<ve Dominance
Mixed Strategies
Existence of Equilibrium
2
Best Responses
Game: (N, (Si), (ui)
si is a best r
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Nash Equilibrium
Best Responses
Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Dominance and Itera<ve Dominance
Mixed Strategies
Existence of Equilibrium
2
Todays Lecture
Mixed Strategies
Interpreta<on of m
Economics 485
Problem Set 2 - Winter 2017
University of Washington
Xu Tan
Due: Feb 1st by 12:30pm. Late submission after class starts gets 2/10
off, and submission after the second half starts is not accepted.
Please put a box to highlight your final solu
ECON 485 A: Game Theory with Applications to Economics
Winter 2017
Xu Tan
Office: 344 Savery Hall
OH: MW 2:20-3:20pm + appointment
Email: tanxu@u.washington.edu
Textbooks. The text for the course is:
Game Theory for Applied Economists, Robert Gibbons, Pri
Professor Haideh Salehi-Esfahani
Office: Savery 357
Email: haideh@uw.edu
Office hours:
M&W: 12:00-1:00 pm, F: 10-11 am
and by appointment
Economics 471B - International Trade
Winter 2017
Course Objectives:
This is an intermediate course in the theory of i
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Nash Equilibrium
Best Responses
Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Dominance and Itera<ve Dominance
Mixed Strategies
Existence of Equilibrium
2
Best Responses
Game: (N, (Si), (ui)
si is a best r
Econ 471B
Homework # 2
Winter 2017
This homeworkon the H-O model and its implications- is due on Tuesday, Jan. 31, class
time. Late submissions lose 25 points for each day after Jan. 31. Please write your answers
legibly in the spaces provided. You will n
Econ 471B
Homework # 1
Winter 2017
This homeworkon the Ricardian Principle of comparative advantage- is due on
Tuesday, January 17, class time. Late submissions lose 25 points for each day after
January 17. Please write your answers legibly in the spaces
Game Theory
Economics 485 U Washington
Xu Tan
1
Course Outline
Normal Forms
Nash Equilibrium
Dominance and Iterative Dominance
Extensive Forms
Subgame Perfect
Repeated Games
Bayesian Games
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
2
Todays Lecture
Definition
Economics 485
Problem Set 3 - Winter 2017
University of Washington
Xu Tan
Due: Feb 27 by 12:30pm. Late submission after class starts gets 2/10
off, and submission after the second half starts is not accepted.
Please put a box to highlight your final solut
Economics 485
Midterm Exam - Fall 2016
University of Washington
Xu Tan
You have 1 hour and 50 mins to complete this (closed book) exam. Please
clearly enter your final solution to the desired place within the box. (That is the
part to be graded.)
Please w
Economics 485
Midterm Exam - Winter 2016 - Solution
University of Washington
Xu Tan
1. 15pts Examine the 2-person normal form game pictured in the matrix below.
The row players payoffs are the first entry and the column players payoffs are the
second.
w
x