Fairness and Classications
Adam Wierman
Computer Science Department
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15217
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
The growing trend in computer systems towards using scheduling
policies that prioritize jobs with small service req
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction:
Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
By BENJAMIN EDELMAN, MICHAEL OSTROVSKY,
AND
MICHAEL SCHWARZ*
We investigate the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, a new mechanism
used by se
Revenue Analysis of a Family of Ranking Rules for
Keyword Auctions
Sebastien Lahaie
David M. Pennock
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
Yahoo! Research
New York, NY 10011
[email protected][email protected]
Scheduling despite inexact job-size information
Adam Wierman
Misja Nuyens
California Institute of Technology
1200 E. California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
Statkraft
Lilleakerveien 6
Lilleaker, 0216 Oslo
[email protected][email protected]
ABSTRACT
Motivat
THESIS PROPOSAL
A Theoretical Scheduling Toolbox
Adam Wierman
CMU-CS-05-?
School of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
Abstract
Scheduling policies are fundamental components of a majority of modern computer systems. However,
Optimal scheduling of jobs with a DHR tail in the M/G/1 queue
TKK Helsinki University of Technology Department of Communications and Networking P.O.Box 3000 02015 TKK Finland
Samuli Aalto
[email protected]
LAAS-CNRS Universit de Toulouse 7 Avenue Colone
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play
Sherwin Doroudi
"Adapted" from
J. R. Marden, G. Arslan, J. S. Shamma, "Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for potential games," in Proceedings of the 44th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, December 2005, pp.
Paul Milgrom and Nancy Stokey
Journal of Economic Thoery,1982
Motivation
Model I
Model II
There are L commodities in each state of the world.
Assume consumption set is RL+.
a
Each trader i is described by:
his endowment, ei: RL+ his utility function, Ui
Eciency and Revenue in
Certain Nash Equilibria of
Keyword Auctions
Sbastien Lahaie
e
[email protected]
Yahoo Research
New York, NY 10018
SISHOO 2007 p.1
Sponsored Search
SISHOO 2007 p.2
Outline
Model for keyword auctions.
Eciency in pure-strategy Nas
Queueing Theory
Ivo Adan and Jacques Resing Department of Mathematics and Computing Science Eindhoven University of Technology P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands February 28, 2002
Contents
1 Introduction 1.1 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Foreground-Background queue: a survey
Misja Nuyens
Adam Wierman
September 12, 2007
Abstract
Computer systems researchers have begun to apply the Foreground-Background (FB) scheduling discipline to a variety of applications, and as a result, there has
CS/EE 147
Assigned: 03/30/10
HW 1: Probability Refresher
Guru: Raga
Due: 04/09/10, Ragas mailbox1 , 1pm
We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone.
At the top of your homework sheet, list al
HW 2: Practice with DTMCs
CS/EE 147
Assigned: 04/06/10
Guru: Lina
Due: 04/16/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm
We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone.
At the top of your homework sheet, list all th
CS/EE 147
Assigned: 4/13/10
HW 3: Practice with CTMCs
Guru: Raga
Due: 4/28/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm
We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone.
At the top of your homework sheet, list all the
CS/EE 147
Assigned: 04/27/10
HW 4: Queueing games
Guru: Lina
Due: 05/07/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm
We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone.
At the top of your homework sheet, list all the peo
CS/EE 147
Assigned: 05/06/10
HW 5: Queueing networks and PH distributions
Guru: Raga
Due: 05/14/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm
We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone.
At the top of your homework
CS/EE 147
Assigned: 05/13/10
HW 6: Transform world
Guru: Lina
Due: 05/26/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm
We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone.
At the top of your homework sheet, list all the pe
CS/EE 147
Assigned: 05/25/10
HW 7: Scheduling
Guru: Raga
Due: 06/04/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm
We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone. At the
top of your homework sheet, list all the people
Mediators
Slides by Sherwin Doroudi
Adapted from Mediators in
Position Auctions by Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer, and Moshe
Tennenholtz
Bayesian & Pre-Bayesian
Games
Consider a game where every player has
private information regarding his/her type
A player