Econ 467 S10
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Econ 467
Summer 2006
M. Muniagurria
Midterm 1 (Total Points: 90)
(I) ( 6 pts) Define Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
(II) Consider a game with 2 players that make their moves simultaneously and can choose
between 2 actions :
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Theory and Practice of Econometrics I
Michaelmas Term 2014: Supervision Example Sheet 4
I  Analysing time series data and testing for nonstationarity
Question 1
An investigator analysing the time series properties of con
Economics Tripos Part IIA Paper 3
Theory and Practice of Econometrics I
Michaelmas Term 2014: Supervision Example Sheet 2
Interpreting regression equations
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An investigator analysing the relationship between food expenditure, disposable income and price
Economics Tripos Part IIA Paper 3
Theory and Practice of Econometrics I
Michaelmas Term 2014: Supervision Example Sheet 1
1.
Fifteen male economists are in a life raft with a maximum carrying capacity of 2850 pounds. If the
distribution of weights of male
I NTRODUCTION TO E CONOMETRICS II:
M ACROECONOMETRICS
Vasco M Carvalho
University of Cambridge
8/8 Lectures
March 11, 2015
A UTOREGRESSIVE D ISTRIBUTED L AG M ODEL : ADL
MODEL
R ECAP
yt = 0 + 1 yt
I
1
+ 1 xt + 2 xt
1
+ ut
This is an Autoregressive Distrib
I NTRODUCTION TO E CONOMETRICS II:
M ACROECONOMETRICS
Vasco M Carvalho
University of Cambridge
Lecture 7
F ORECASTING
I
Given a model and historical data want to forecast future
values of y
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Todays lecture:
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Forecasts and Forecast Errors
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I NTRODUCTION TO E CONOMETRICS II:
M ACROECONOMETRICS
Vasco M Carvalho
University of Cambridge
Lecture 6
VAR S CONTINUED
I
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yt
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I NTRODUCTION TO E CONOMETRICS II:
M ACROECONOMETRICS
Vasco M Carvalho
University of Cambridge
Lecture 3
PARTIAL A DJUSTMENT R EVISITED
L EVELS VS . G ROWTH R ATES
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lt = lt
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lt
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I NTRODUCTION TO E CONOMETRICS II:
M ACROECONOMETRICS
Vasco M Carvalho
University of Cambridge
1/8 Lectures
February 17, 2015
M ACROECONOMETRICS
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Distinctive features
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I
I
I
I
focus on relationships representing behaviour of economic
aggregates (consump
I NTRODUCTION TO E CONOMETRICS II:
M ACROECONOMETRICS
Vasco M Carvalho
University of Cambridge
Lecture 5
C AUSALITY AND E XOGENEITY IN
M ACROECONOMETRICS
I
In the bivariate regression
yt = 0 + 1 xt + t
there is no statistical denition of causality; we mus
I NTRODUCTION TO E CONOMETRICS II:
M ACROECONOMETRICS
Vasco M Carvalho
University of Cambridge
Lecture 2/8
ADL M ODELS
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Last class we introduced the general class of Autoregressive
Distributed Lag (ADL) models and discussed:
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Autoregressive models (
Econ 467
Summer 2006
V
Topics/readings exam 3
Intraindustry Trade , Monopolistic Competition
Handouts on Monopolistic Competition (web page).
Martin: Ch.7: pp. 148156.
International Trade: Theory and Evidence, by J. Markusen, J. Melvin, W. Kaempfer, K. M
Econ 467
Summer 2006
M. Muniagurria
Exam 3 (Total Points:90 )
(I)
Consider two countries (1 and 2) and two firms. Firm 1 produces in country 1 and Firm 2
produces in country 2. Both firms produce a homogenous product that can be sold in both
countries. Th
Econ 467
Spring 2005
M. Muniagurria
Exam 3
(I) Consider the following two stage game between two firms (Firms 1 and 2) that produce a
homogeneous product under constant marginal costs. In stage I, Firm 2 decides whether to
invest in cost reducing R&D (the
Econ 467
Spring 2005
M. Muniagurria
Midterm 1 (Total Points: 90)
(I) NE /SPNE
Suppose Players 1 and 2 can use the strategies specified below and their payoffs are as shown
(the first number in each cell corresponds to Player 1's payoff, the second one to
Econ 467
Summer 2008
M. Muniagurria
Midterm 1 (Total Points: 100)
(I) NE /SPNE
Suppose Players 1 and 2 can use the strategies specified below and their payoffs are as shown
(the first number in each cell corresponds to Player 1's payoff, the second one to
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You are not allowed to consult any notes or books. You have to write your answers in the blue book that the
persons proctoring the exam give you. Your answers should reﬂect only your knowledge. Attempting to
consult with others or to look at someone else’
Econ 467 M. Muniagurria
Summer 2006
Exam 2 (Total Points: 90)
(I) (8 pts) Bertrand
Consider a market with two ﬁrms (ﬁrms 1 and 2). The (inverse) demand curve is:
' p = 65 <1/3)q,
where q is the sum of q1 and q2 .
Suppose Firm 1 has a marginal cost equal
Econ 467 M. Muniagurria
Spring 2005
Exam 2 (Total Points: 90)
(I) (12 pts) Consider a market with two ﬁrms (ﬁrms 1 and 2). The (inverse) demand curve is:
p = 80  q,
where q is the sum of q1 and q2 .
Suppose Firm 1 has a marginal cost equal to zero and Fi
M. Muniagurria
Econ 467
Summer 2008
Midterm 2 (Total Points: 90)
I)
Consider two countries (Country I and Country 2) and two finns (Finn I and Finn 2) that
produce a homogeneous product. Finn I is from country 1 (i.e. produces in country 1 and its
owners