PS 274
Problem Set #1
1.
(a)
V PR C
V PR E
V PR A
C IR E
C PR A
E PR A
(b)
They are, because you can write it down as E P R C IR E PR A, and it still makes sense.
(c)
Not enough information to answer because we dont know the theoretical utility of vetoing
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