January 9, 2015
Math 303 Assignment 1: Due Friday, January 16 at start of class
I. Problems to be handed in:
1. (a) Ross Chapter 4 #10
(b) Ross Chapter 4 #11
2. Ross Chapter 4 #30. Hint: formulate as a 2-state Markov chain.
3. Ross Chapter 4 #28. Hint: fo
January 30, 2015
Math 303 Assignment 4: Due Friday, February 6 at start of class
Reminder: Test 1 will be held in class on Wednesday February 11, and will be based on the material
covered in Assignments 14. No assignment will be given on February 6; Assig
10
Durable Goods Monopoly
Many goods are durable: cars, refrigerators, light bulbs, art, computers etc. all last for
some time. This durabilityintroduces some quite interesting issues concerning the market
power (or lack thereof) for a monopolist. The nov
February 13, 2015
Math 303 Assignment 5: Due Friday, February 27 at start of class
I. Problems to be handed in:
1. Consider the branching process in which an individual has either 0 or 3 ospring, each with prob1
ability 2 . Initially there is one individu
January 16, 2015
Math 303 Assignment 2: Due Friday, January 23 at start of class
I. Problems to be handed in:
1. Ross Chapter 4 #58
2. (a) For the gamblers ruin problem, let Mi denote the expected number of games that will be
played when Smith initially h
January 23, 2015
Math 303 Assignment 3: Due Friday, January 30 at start of class
I. Problems to be handed in:
1. Chapter 4 #13. Hint: use the ChapmanKolmogorov equation.
2. Consider the Markov chain with state space cfw_0, 1, 2, 3, 4. If the state is 0 th
7
7.1
Signaling Games
What is Signaling?
The concept of signaling refers to strategic models where one or more informed agents
take some observable actions before one or more uninformed agents make their strategic
decisions. This leads to situations where
16
16.1
Public Goods
Terminology
A good is called public if the consumption by one agent does not prevent from using it;
Denition 1 A Public good is a commodity for which use of one unit of the good does not
preclude its use by other agents.
Among the sta
19
Instrumentally Induced Political Correctness
Morris (2002). Political Correctness is in the paper identied as a situation where speakers
have an incentive to avoid to say the right thingbecause of concerns that others may make
negative inference about
MATH 303 Test 1
Wednesday, February 11, 2015
Dr. G. Slade
Please show all work and calculations. Calculators or other aids are not permitted.
Each question is worth 10 marks, for a total of 40.
1. Consider the Markov chain with state space cfw_0, 1, 2, 3,
March 6, 2015
Math 303 Assignment 7: Due Friday, March 13 at start of class
I. Problems to be handed in:
1. Let cfw_N (t) : t 0 be a Poisson process of rate , and let Sn denote the time of the nth event.
Find:
(a) E(N (5)
(b) E(S3 )
(c) P (N (5) < 3)
(d)
MATH 303 Test 2
Dr. G. Slade
Wednesday, March 25, 2015
Please show all work and calculations.
Calculators or other aids are not permitted.
Each question is worth 10 marks, for a total of 40.
1. Let p [0, 1]. Consider a branching process where the number o
March 27, 2015
Math 303 Assignment 9: Due Wednesday, April 8 at start of class
Note: Benjamin Wallaces MLC hours on Thursday April 9 are cancelled and replaced by Tuesday April 7,
12:303:30pm.
I. Problems to be handed in:
1. Particles are emitted by a rad
March 13, 2015
Math 303 Assignment 8: Due Friday, March 20 at start of class
Test 2 will be held in class on Wednesday March 25, and will be based on the material covered in
Assignments 58. No assignment is due March 27. Assignment 9, which is the last on
February 27, 2015
Math 303 Assignment 6: Due Friday, March 6 at start of class
I. Problems to be handed in:
1. Prove that the pivot algorithm, as dened in class, is reversible with respect to the uniform
distribution on the state space SN of N -step self-
A reprint from
American Scientist
the magazine of Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society
This reprint is provided for personal and noncommercial use. For any other use, please send a request Brian Hayes by
electronic mail to bhayes@amsci.org.
Computing
Self-Avoiding Walks
What Are They?
Self-avoiding walks are discrete paths without self
intersections. For our purposes they live in the cl-
dimensional integer lattice Zd, which consists of the
points in R1 whose components are all integers. Eleme
Econ 406: FINAL EXAM Practice
Jonathan L. Graves
17 April 2015
This is your final exam for Econ 406: it is 6 pages long.
This exam has X questions, and is worth 140 points total.
You have 3 hours to complete the exam.
This means you have 45 mins per q
Econ 406
November 2006
Peter Norman
Homework 7
Due November 14.
1. Consider an economy where a public good is voluntarily provided We assume that the world is inhabited
.
by two 2 agents, who have identical preferences given by ui xi ; y = ln xi + ln y an
PRELIMINARY
READING
LIST
Thereisnotextbookforthecourse.Iwill,however,assumethatyouread
thejournalarticlesthatIexplicitlyassign(whichwillbelessthanthewhole
list below, but still a fair bit of reading). The most central articles are
markedwith a *,butyou wi
12
The Problem of Social Choice
One can argue that social choice theory asks one of the most fundamental questions in
economics. One (imprecise) way of stating it verbally is Does there exist any reasonable
way to aggregate preferences? That is, you may t
6
Adverse Selection in Insurance and Competition
We maintain the assumptions;
Suppose that there are two typesof consumers. Call them fH; Lg
Type H has a probability of an accident given by
Type L has a probability of an accident gives by
H
L
For both typ
11
11.1
Bundling
Questions
Why do we observe monopolists selling two or more products as a package deal, rather
than selling each product separately?
Examples: music, travel, TV etc.
We may also ask whether this sort of pricing is desirable from the point
2
A First Example of Adverse Selection; The Market
for Lemons
A famous early contribution to the literature used the market for second hand cars as an
example to illustrate the implications of a situation where the seller knows better what the
value of th
1
Uncertainty and Insurance
Reading: Some fundamental basics are in Varians intermediate micro textbook (Chapter
12). A good (advanced, but still rather accessible) treatment is in Kreps A Course in
Microeconomic Theory
.
1.1
Expected Utility: Setup
Let;
Econ 406
September 2006
Peter Norman
Homework 1
Here is the rst homework installment. It is due in class September 15. Try to provide organized answers,
where you are careful to explain what you are doing.
1. Obviously there is a dierence between how peop
Econ 406
September 2006
Peter Norman
Homework 1: Suggested Answers
Here are some BRIEF answers to the rst homework.
1.
1. Let p and q be gambles with prizes given by $275,$240, or $0, where the probabilities are given by
p
$275 :33
$240 :66
$0 :01
q
0
1
0
Econ 406
September 2006
Peter Norman
Homework 2
1. Consider an investor with a wealth of $1000 to invest.1 There are only two nancial instruments available.
Either, the investor can buy a safe bond, which gives a (sure) return of .1 (that is, if x dollar
Econ 406
September 2006
Peter Norman
Homework 2: Suggested Answers
1. Consider an investor with a wealth of $1000 to invest. 1 There are only two nancial instruments available.
Either, the investor can buy a safe bond, which gives a sure return of .1 (tha
Econ 406
September 2006
Peter Norman
Homework 3
1. Consider a monopoly provider of a good on a market where there are two types of customers. The
customers have preferences given by
V (q) T
if paying the transfer T and consuming q units of the good. V ( )