Simon Fraser University
ECON 302
S. Lu
Practice Problems on Nash Equilibria
To be completed before the quiz
1. For each of the games in question 3 of problem set 3, find all Nash equilibria that are not in
pure strategies (you found the pure-strategy ones
Simon Fraser University
Spring 2016
Econ 302 Assignment 1
Due: in Lecture, Tuesday January 19, 2016.
Show all your work.
1. (3 points) Suppose that the demand function for a good is D(p) = 100/p2 for p 0;
D(p) is the units (the number) of people willing t
Problem Set 3 Solutions
1. Prove that if expected utility function
([
])
represents preferences over lotteries , then expected utility function
([
])
also represents the same preferences if
for all , where
numbers.
Given
, where
([
])
and
are real
, we ha
Simon Fraser University
Fall 2015
Econ 302 Assignment 2
Due: in Lecture, Tuesday September 29, 2015.
Show all your work.
1.
(4 points) For each of the following games, (i) nd strategies that survive iterative
deletion of strictly dominated strategies (ISD
ECON 302 Tutorial 2
Todays business
Solutions to Assignment 1
H. K. Chen (SFU)
ECON 302 Tutorial 2
January 23, 2013
1 / 12
Assignment 1 Q1.a
Given: D(p) = 100/p 2 for p 0 and C (q) = 2q.
a. Calculate the price elasticity of demand, (p):
p
D(p)
p
D(p)
p
20
Econ 302
Assignment 3 Solution
1.
(a) The monopolist solves:
max (Q) = Q(a bQ) cQ.
Q
The rst order condition is
a 2bQ c = 0,
or equivalently,
ac
,
2b
which is the monopolists optimal quantity; the associated price is
Q=
P (Q) = a b
ac
2b
=
a+c
.
2
(b) Fix
Simon Fraser University
Spring 2013
Econ 302 Final Exam
Instructor: Songzi Du
Section D200
Wednesday April 24, 2013, 8:30 11:30 AM
This exam has two parts. Write your name, SFU ID number, and tutorial section number
on each part.
Suggested Solution
Name:
Simon Fraser University
Spring 2013
Econ 302 Quiz Solution
Instructor: Songzi Du
Section D200
Thursday Feb. 7, 2013, 8:30 9:20 AM
Name:
SFU ID number:
Tutorial section number:
1. This is a closed-book exam.
2. You may use a non-graphing calculator.
3.
Simon Fraser University
Fall 2012
Econ 302 Final Exam solution
Instructor: Songzi Du
Section D200
Thursday Dec. 6, 2012, 3:30 6:30 PM
This exam has two parts. Write your name, SFU ID number, and tutorial section number
on each part.
1. This is a closed-bo
Econ 302
Assignment 2 Solution
Problem 1
Part a) Note: I will explain everything only for question 1 part a. For the rest of
the answer key, I will give only short answers since they follow the same logic.
(i) ISD
Round 1 - B is strictly dominated by T
Gi
Simon Fraser University
Fall 2015
Econ 302 Assignment 1
Due: in Lecture, Tuesday September 22, 2015.
Show all your work.
1. (3 points) Suppose that the demand function for a good is D(p) = 100/p2 for p 0;
D(p) is the units (the number) of people willing t
Econ 302
Assignment 5 Solution
1. Part i:
Part ii:
1
2
2. Part i:
There are three Nash equilibria in the stage game: (A, D), (B, C), and (1/2A+1/2B, 1/2C +
1/2D). I omit the detail of verifying these equilibria. Note that the Nash equilibrium
(1/2A + 1/2B
Econ 302
Assignment 4 Solution
These three games are sequential games of perfect information. We solve them by backward
induction: start at the nodes/information sets one level above the terminal nodes, and solve
for the best responses; after solving thos
Simon Fraser University
Fall 2015
Econ 302 Assignment 7
Due: in Lecture, Tuesday November 24, 2015.
Show all your work.
1. (3 points) The principal is considering hiring a salesman to make to an important sale.
If the sale is successful, it will generate
Econ 302
Assignment 7 Solution
1.
Part (i):
Suppose that the principal oers a at wage of w. The rst best problem is:
max 0.2 1000000 w subject to: (w)1/3 10 10
w
Clearly, the constraint binds at the optimum: w = (20)3 = $8000. By oering this wage the
prin
Simon Fraser University
Spring 2014
Econ 302 D200 Midterm Exam Solution
Instructor: Songzi Du
Monday March 10, 2014, 8:30 10:20 AM
The brief solutions suggested here may not have the complete explanations necessary for
full marks.
1. (10 points) Consider
Econ 302, Spring 2013
Assignment 1 Solution
Problem 1
a) Price elasticity of demand
( p ) =
2 p p
dD ( p ) p
= 100( 4 )
=2
dp D( p )
p 100
p2
b) Monopolist quantity and price.
From the demand function, derive the inverted demand function knowing that in
Review - Pareto E ciency and Welfare Analysis
Economics 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
Shih En Lu
Simon Fraser University
ECON 302 (SFU)
Review
1 / 16
Topics
1
Utility and preferences
2
Pareto e ciency
3
Welfare analysis: consumer and p
Simon Fraser University
ECON 302
Spring 2015
S. Lu
Problem Set 7
Due on March 16, at 10:30am
1. Consider the following stage game, played twice, with discount factor 0 (for this
question, do NOT make the usual assumption that 1; that is, players might val
Simon Fraser University
ECON 302
Spring 2015
S. Lu
Problem Set 8
Due on March 23, at 10:30am
Remember to show your work on all questions.
1. Consider a profit-maximizing monopoly, and assume that there is no resale market, so that
the firm can charge each
Simon Fraser University
ECON 302
Spring 2015
S. Lu
Problem Set 9
Due on March 30, at 10:30am
Remember to show your work on all questions.
1. Consider a market for used cars with risk-neutral participants, like we did in lecture. Suppose
there are three qu
Adverse Selection
Economics 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
Shih En Lu
Simon Fraser University
(with thanks to Anke Kessler)
ECON 302 (SFU)
Adverse Selection
1 / 10
Most Important Things to Learn Today
1
Know what adverse selection is
2
Suppose two firms want to merge. In general, the cost function of a merged firm is given by
( )
[
( )
( )]
(1)
where
and
are potentially different cost functions for the pre-merger firms. Intuitively
condition (1) makes sense, as the merged firm will try
Simon Fraser University
Fall 2012
Econ 302 Final
Instructor: Songzi Du
Section D200
Thursday Dec. 6, 2012, 3:30 6:30 PM
This exam has two parts. Write your name, SFU ID number, and tutorial section number
on each part.
Part I (Questions 1 5):
Name:
SFU
Midterm
Examination
FALL 2013
ECON 302
D100 (LU)
MICROECONOMIC THEORY II:
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
N ove mber 4, 2013
IN ST RUCTIONS & FOR MAT
DO NOT OPEN THIS EXAM UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.
1. This exam has two (2) parts. Use one answer booklet for each part.
Quiz
SPRING 2015
ECON 302
D100 (LU)
MICROECONOMIC THEORY II:
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
Fe bru ar y 4 , 201 5
IN ST RUCTIONS & FOR MAT
DO NOT OPEN THIS EXAM UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.
1. On the cover of the answer booklet, write your name, SFU ID number and
tutor
Quiz
FALL 2013
ECON 302
D100 (LU)
MICROECONOMIC THEORY II:
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
Octo ber 7 , 201 3
IN ST RUCTIONS & FOR MAT
DO NOT OPEN THIS EXAM UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.
1. On the cover of the answer booklet, write your name, SFU ID number,
tutorial numb
Quiz
SPRING 2014
ECON 302
D100 (LU)
MICROECONOMIC THEORY II:
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
Fe bru ar y 6 , 201 4
INSTRUC TIO NS & FO RMA T
DO NOT OPEN THIS EXAM UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.
1. On the cover of the answer booklet, write your name, SFU ID number,
tutoria
Repeated Games
Economics 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
Shih En Lu
Simon Fraser University
(with thanks to Anke Kessler)
ECON 302 (SFU)
Repeated Games
1 / 19
Most Important Things to Learn
1
Understand why, in a repeated game, a NE migh
Signaling
Economics 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
Shih En Lu
Simon Fraser University
(with thanks to Anke Kessler)
ECON 302 (SFU)
Signaling
1 / 10
Most Important Things to Learn Today
1
Understand the economic intuition of signaling.
2