Econ 302
Assignment 5 Solution
1. Part i:
Part ii:
1
Part iii:
2
2.
3
There are two subgames: everything that follows the branch B (which is a proper subgame),
and the whole game.
Clearly, in any SPE player 2 plays L if B is played. For the rest of the ga
ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
IRYNA
DUDNYK
Tutorial 1. Monopoly and Price Discrimination.
Question 1. Suppose there are 10 students in a class and teacher brings a bag with 10
candies. Assume all students have identical preference
ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
IRYNA DUDNYK
Tutorial 4. Imperfect Competition.
Solutions.
From EEA Ch. 16 do problems 4, 8 13, 14 and 15.
Additional Problems
Problem 1. There are N = 5 rms selling homogeneous product in a market wi
ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
IRYNA DUDNYK
Tutorial 7. Choice under Uncertainty (contd).
Solutions
Problem 1. Anas utility function is U = w, where w is her wealth. She owns a bakery that will be worth 69 or 0 dollars next year wi
ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
IRYNA DUDNYK
Tutorial 5. Repeated Games. Hotelling Model.
Solutions.
Problem 1. Firms A and B sell homogeneous product. Firms have an option to advertise,
which is costly. If none of the rms advertise
Simon Fraser University
Fall 2014
Econ 302 D100 Midterm Exam Solution
Instructor: Songzi Du
Tuesday October 28, 2014, 8:30 10:20 AM
The brief solutions suggested here may not have the complete explanations necessary for
full marks. They may also contain c
Econ 302
Assignment 7 Solution
1.
Part (i):
Suppose that the principal oers a at wage of w. The rst best problem is:
max 0.2 1000000 w subject to: (w)1/3 10 10
w
Clearly, the constraint binds at the optimum: w = (20)3 = $8000. By oering this wage the
prin
Simon Fraser University
Spring 2014
Econ 302 D200 Final Exam Solution
This brief solution guide does not have the explanations necessary for full marks.
NE = Nash equilibrium, SPE = subgame perfect equilibrium, PBE = perfect
Bayesian equilibrium
1. (10 po
ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
IRYNA
DUDNYK
Tutorial 2. Game Theory: Basic Concepts. Simultaneous-Move Games.
Solutions.
Warm-up questions: which of the following situations involve strategic thinking and can
be modeled as a game?
ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
IRYNA
DUDNYK
Tutorial 3. More Games. NE in Continuous Strategies. Sequential Games.
Solutions.
Problem 1. There are 2 students taking a game theory class, Zulu and Yva. Their teacher
suggests they pla
Simon Fraser University
Fall 2014
Econ 302 (D100) Quiz Solution
Instructor: Songzi Du
Thursday October 2 2014, 8:30 9:20 AM
1. (10 points) Consider the following game: Player 1 and 2 simultaneously guess an
integer between 1 and 3. If the numbers coincide
ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
IRYNA DUDNYK
Tutorial 10. Externalities.
Solutions
Problem 1. Alfred and Ben own cabins at a lake. Alfred has a Jet Ski that he loves to
ride on the lake, which understandably disturbs Ben. Alfreds ut
ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
IRYNA DUDNYK
Tutorial 11. Public Goods.
Solutions.
Problem 1. And now suppose that Alfred and Ben still live in the cabins on a lake and
this time they are married and have kids, so they are contempla
ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
IRYNA DUDNYK
Tutorial 9. Auctions.
Solutions.
Question 1. Suppose a variable V is uniformly distributed between zero and one. What is
the probability that a V drawn from this distribution will be smal
Econ 302-D1 Final Exam Greg Dow April 15, 2008
Be sure to answer all of the questions. Parts I and II have equal weight. No points will be given for answers without explanations, or where key mathematical steps are missing. Whenever you draw a graph, be s
Econ 302-D1
Second Midterm Exam
Greg Dow
March 10, 2008
Be sure to answer all of the questions. Parts I and II have equal weight.
No points will be given for answers without explanations, or where key mathematical
steps are missing. Whenever you draw a gr
Econ 302-D1 First Midterm Exam Greg Dow February 3, 2009
Be sure to answer all of the questions. Parts I and II have equal weight. No points will be given for answers without explanations, or where key mathematical steps are missing. Whenever you draw a g
Econ 302-D1 First Midterm Exam Greg Dow February 4, 2008
Be sure to answer all of the questions. Parts I and II have equal weight. No points will be given for answers without explanations, or where key mathematical steps are missing. Whenever you draw a g
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ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior
IRYNA DUDNYK
Tutorial 8. Games of Asymmetric Information.
Solutions.
Problem 1. Suppose that half of population drives carefully and will get into an accident
with probability 0.2. The other half of t
Econ 302-D1 Second Midterm Exam Greg Dow March 10, 2009
Be sure to answer all of the questions. Parts I and II have equal weight. No points will be given for answers without explanations, or where key mathematical steps are missing. Whenever you draw a gr