University of Toronto
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
ECE1657 Game Theory and Evolutionary Games
Fall 2014-2015
Problem Set #4 - Due November 16, 2014
1. Consider the two-player zero-sum continuous-kernel game where each of the two playe
University of Toronto
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
ECE1657 Game Theory and Evolutionary Games
Fall 2014-2015
Problem Set #5 - Due November 26, 2014
1. Exercise 6.1.
2. Exercise 7.1.
3. Exercise 7.2.
4. Consider the replicator dynamics
University of Toronto
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
ECE1657 Game Theory and Evolutionary Games
Fall 2014
Problem Set #3 - Due October 26, 2014
1. Consider the two-player bimatrix game with the following cost matrices
A=
2
1
B=
1
2
University of Toronto
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
ECE1657 Game Theory and Evolutionary Games
Fall 2014
Problem Set #2 - Due Oct 19, 2014
1. Consider the two-player zero-sum matrix game with the following cost matrix
1 3
3 2
A=
Find t
University of Toronto
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
ECE1657 Game Theory and Evolutionary Games
Fall 2014
Problem Set #1 - Due October 5
1. Consider the two-player zero-sum matrix
1
5
A=
2
game with the following cost matrix
4
2 3
2 1
Game Theory and Evolutionary Games
Lacra Pavel
Systems Control Group
Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Toronto
2014
2
Contents
1 The Name of the Game
5
1.1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DescriptionofprojecttopicCooperativeGames
WenyangLiu
Topic: Cooperative Games
A cooperative game is defined as a game where groups of players may enhance
cooperative behaviors compete with each other, rather than individual competition.
One significant fo
Chapter
7
Replicator Dynamics
Chapter Summary
This chapter introduces dynamic concepts in EGT using the continuous-time Replicator Dynamics (RD) that models selection of the ttest strategies in the population. We discuss stability properties of RD equilib
Chapter
4
Continuous-Kernel Games
Chapter Summary
This chapter focuses on noncooperative (Nash) games with continuous-kernel i.e., with continuous action spaces
and cost functions. Basic concepts and results are reviewed, mostly adapted from [18].
4.1 Int
Chapter
3
Matrix Games: N-player Nonzero Sum
Chapter Summary
This chapter considers normal-form games with nite action sets, hence matrix games, in the general nonzero sum
case. Two-player or bimatrix games are treated rst followed by N-player matrix game
Chapter
6
Evolutionary Games and Evolutionary Stability
Chapter Summary
This chapter introduces evolutionary games and the concept of evolutionary stability in a large population of agents.
We start by introducing the concept of evolutionary stable strate