1) If the NPV of project A is + $120, that of project B is -$40, and that of project C is + $40, what is
the NPV of the combined project?
A) +$100
B) -$40
C) +$120
D) +$70
2) Which investment analysis
Exam
Name_
1) A perpetuity is defined as a sequence of
A) unequal cash flows occurring at equal intervals of time for a specific number of
periods.
B) equal cash flows occurring at equal intervals of
Japan in brief
1) INTRODUCTION
Japans steady economic growth for the past few years slowed down and went into a very
negative growth when the global crisis hit in September 2008. The latest data avail
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https:/www.coursehero.com/file/18006186/Campaign-Spending-Lecture-7/
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Game Theory
Simultaneous Move Games
Chapter 4 of Dixit, Skeath and Reiley
Chapter 2 of Carmichael
1
Our agenda.
Equilibrium means that each player is using
the strategy that is the best response to th
Game Theory
Sequential Move Games: An
Introduction
Chapter 3 of Dixit, Skeath and Reiley
Chapter 4 of Carmichael
1
A Sequential Move Game:
Century Mark
Played by fixed pairs of players taking turns
At
Selected Solved Exercises - Chapter 3 and chapter 6 of Dixit, Reiley and Skeath
S3. Chp.3. For each of the game trees illustrated below (note - same ones included in question S2 in our
03. Dixit Exerc
Exercise on Sequential Moves
The firm Alpha is deciding between opening up a subsidiary in another country, Jesmania (so Foreign
Direct Investment) or continuing to just export to that country.
Firm B
Game Theory
Simultaneous Move Games with
Mixed Strategies
Chapter 7 of Dixit, Skeath and Reiley
Carmichael, Chapter 6.1
1
Motivation
We have seen simultaneous-move games
with no pure strategy equilibr
Game Theory
Strategic Moves
Chapter 10 of Dixit, Skeath and
Reiley
1
Introduction
Classification: unconditional vs. conditional
strategic moves
Commitments
Threats and Promises
Credibility
2
Intr
The Prisoners Dilemma
and Repeated Games
Chapter 11 of Dixit, Skeath and Reiley
Chapter 8 of Carmichael
1
Outline
Motivation
Finite Games
Present Value
Infinitely Repeated Games
Games of unknown leng
Game Theory
Games with Incomplete Information
Part 2
Chapter 7 of Carmichael
1
Outline
Uncertainty
Imperfect vs. Incomplete Information
Static Games (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium)
informed player ha
Game Theory
Games with Incomplete Information
Part 1
Chapter 7 of Carmichael
1
Outline
Uncertainty
Incomplete Information
Static Games (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium)
Dynamic Games (Perfect Bayesian
Game Theory
An Introduction.
1
What is Game Theory?
It is the formal study of decision-making
where several players must make choices
that potentially affect the interests of
other players.
It is used
Exercises based on Dixit, Skeath and Reiley, Chapter 3 Solved exercises
S5. (part) Consider a game in which two players, Fred and Barney, take turns removing matchsticks
from a pile. They start with 2
Exercise - Golden Balls
In the final round of this Game Show, contestants make one last decision to determine the
final jackpot division. Each contestant chooses one of two final golden balls, one wit
Exercises based on Dixit, Skeath and Reiley, Chapter 4 (3rd Edition) Solved
exercises
Dominance
Q.S1 If a player has a dominant strategy in a simultaneous-move game, then she is sure to get her
best p
Selected Solved Exercises - Chapter 3 and chapter 6 of Dixit, Reiley and Skeath
S3. Chp.3. For each of the game trees illustrated below (note - same ones included in question S2 in
our 03. Dixit Exerc
Exercises based on Dixit, Skeath and Reiley, Chapter 4 (3rd Edition) Solved
exercises
Dominance
Q.S1 If a player has a dominant strategy in a simultaneous-move game, then she is sure to get her
best p
This problem set is on Static Bayesian Games.
Exercise 1
(a) Unlike the game seen in class between Joe and Una, here the payoffs are different for both
players depending on the game Nature will draw.
This problem set is on Repeated Games.
Exercise 1
Consider a two-player game between Child's Play and Kids Korner, each of which produces
and sells wooden swing sets for children. Each player can set
Solutions: problem set on Mixed Strategies and Evolutionary Game Theory.
Exercise 1
(a) There is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategy in this game.
(b) Best response for player Column if Row plays Up
Question 1: Matching Pennies
Two players, Row and Column, each has a penny and must secretly turn the penny to heads or tails.
The players then reveal their choices simultaneously.
If the pennies matc
Handout on game theoretic concepts
Strategic game: a scenario or situation where for two or more individuals their choice of action
or behaviour has an impact on the other (or others)
Strategic interd
The midterm test will be a multiple choice test (no negative marking). The questions will
be based on the material covered up until and including the last lecture prior to the test.
The questions will
The midterm test will be a multiple choice test (no negative marking). The questions will
be based on the material covered up until and including the last lecture prior to the test.
The questions will
This problem set is on Dynamic Bayesian Games.
Exercise 1
Consider the following game with nature, where p=1/2.
1. Does this game have any separating Perfect Bayesian equilibrium? Show your analysis.
Solutions: problem set on Strategic Moves.
Exercise 1
(i)
(a) There are two pure-strategy equilibria (Down, Left) and (Up, Right); (there is also a mixedstrategy equilibrium in which Row uses Up with
This problem set is on Mixed Strategies and Evolutionary Game Theory.
Exercise 1
The following table illustrates the money payoffs associated with a two-person simultaneous move
game.
Column
Row
Left
This problem set is on Static Bayesian Games.
Exercise 1
Consider the following game.
1. Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1 or as in Game 2. Game 1 can occur with
probability p.
2.