Part B
Nash equilibria will consist of a strategy for each player where he is best responding by taking into
account his preferences and the actions of the other four players. In this case the Nash equilibria are:
All 5 voters vote for A
4 voters vote for

University of Calgary
Department of Economics
Econ373
Midterm: Answer Key
Question 1:
As the textbook.
Question 2:
(a) Let M denote the number of people other than a representative person who donate 0
day of labor to assemble the ride. For each person, th

University of Calgary
Department of Economics
Econ373
Assignment 2: Answer Key
Question 1:
Part A:
Because the two firms collude in their production decision, we can consider the sum of
their production as q, that is, = + , then we can get
= = (100 0.002

University of Calgary
Department of Economics
Econ373
L. Yuan
Assignment 2: Due date is at 11:00 am in class on February 10, 2016. You are
encouraged to work in pairs. The two students working together may hand in one
assignment and get the same mark. Ple

reg @Jél'QQm-ﬁf (EV?
f
76% 3
Quiz 1
Econ 373, Fall 2015
Student’s Name:
Answer both questions in the space provided.
The Game: This game involves two players, a brother, BRO, and sister,
SIS. BRO and SIS are fanatical hockey fans. Their dad has two ti

University of Calgary
Department of Economics
Econ373
L. Yuan
Assignment 4: Due date is at 11:00 in class on April 6, 2016. You are
encouraged to work in pairs. The two students working together may hand in one
assignment and get the same mark. Please wri

University of Calgary
Department of Economics
Econ373
Assignment 3: Answer Key
:
.
Problem 1:
Let pL and pR be the probabilities which Row player choose L or R, qL and qR be the
probabilities which Column choose L or R
Choices
Row player's expected payoff

Econ 373: Midterm II Solutions
L. Yuan
Winter 2016
Prof.
1. Two pure strategy Nash equilibria (R, R) and (L, L).
L (q)
R (1-q)
L (p)
12, 12
2, 2
R (1-p)
2,2
8,8
Find mixed strategy:
Let p=probability of playing L for player 2 (then Prob(R) = (1-p)
Let q=p

University of Calgary
Department of Economics
Econ 373
L.Yuan
Assignment 1: Due Date is January 29, 2016 at 11 AM (in class). You are encouraged to work
in pairs. Two students working together may hand in one assignment and get the same mark.
Please inclu

21 INVESTMENT AND HOLD UP
130
10.
(a) S = x + 2y. According to the standard bargaining solution,
uP = P S+uP = g(x+2y)x2 +w, uA = A S+uA = (1g)(x+2y)y 2 w.
Since uA = y 2 + t w in the game, t = (1 g)(x + 2y).
(b) The principal chooses x to solve maxx (g(x

Models and Model Building
Introductory
Lecture 1
Reading Assignments: Chapters 1,2 (except Section 2.2), and 3
.
Models
What is a model anyway?
A model is an abstract representation of some real situation. In
this course, we use the language and tools of

ECON 373 Game Theory & Strategic Thinking for Social Sciences
Handout on Mixed Strategies
Instructor:
Ben
Polak, Akio
Econ Yamazaki
159a/MGT522a
October 4, 2007
Strategies
The main lesson of the last class was theMixed
following:
Main Lesson If a mixed st

ECON 373 Game Theory & Strategic Thinking for Social Sciences
Instructor: Akio Yamazaki
Partnership Game
In this weeks classes, we talked about Partnership game. And in the beginning of todays
lecture, my hope was to discuss about the negative externality

ECON 373 Game Theory & Strategic Thinking for Social Sciences
Instructor: Akio Yamazaki
Why Derivatives and How
In this supplementary note, I will briefly explain why we need to deal with derivatives to analyze
a game and show you a technique to take deri

ECON 373 Game Theory & Strategic Thinking for Social Sciences
Instructor: Akio Yamazaki
Some definitions
Pareto efficient an outcome is Pareto efficient if it is not possible to improve the pay-off of one
player without lowering the pay-off of another
Par

ECON 373 Game Theory & Strategic Thinking for Social Sciences
Instructor: Akio Yamazaki
Mathematical Notations for Class 1
Math notation
English
in (an element of)
for all
actions of players other than
player
AB
A = cfw_,
I strictly prefer A over B
set

10
Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting
2.
1
(a
m
pi )[pi c]
if pi = p
where m
0
if pi > p,
denotes the number of players k cfw_1, 2, . . . , n such that pk = p.
(a) Si = [0, ], ui (pi , pi ) =
(b) The Nash equilibrium is: pi = c for all i. For n > 2, t

14
Details of the Extensive Form
2.
Suppose not. Then it must be that some pure-strategy profile induces
at least two paths through the tree. Since a strategy profile specifies an
action to be taken in every contingency (at every node), having two paths
i

Econ 373
L. Yuan
Lecture notes 3
Today I want to talk about Pareto-optimality, and Nash equilibrium.
Both are very important concepts add them to your glossary of terms. Ill use
the Next-Lecture Questions to structure my discussion.
Pareto-optimality
N-LQ

Econ 373
Notes for Lecture 8
L. Yuan
Reading Assignment: Chapter 5.
Today we will rst deal with the troop contribution probelm and the CFC problem. Then,
we will look into the famous prisoners dilemma
game by analysing the original prisoners dilemma
probl

Economics 373
Game Theory & Strategic Thinking for Social Sciences
Summer 2016
Instructor: Akio Yamazaki
Solution for Assignment 2
Question 1: NE vs. BIE (15 points)
Consider the following game: Player 1 makes a choice of either U or D. After observing pl

Economics 373
Game Theory & Strategic Thinking for Social Sciences
Summer 2016
Instructor: Akio Yamazaki
Assignment 1
Due date: July 20th, 2016
Work alone or in groups of TWO (maximum). Turn in the assignments individually.
Please write down how you ar

Midterm: Answer Key
March 16, 2017
Question1:
As the textbook
Question 2:
(a) Let M denote the number of people other than a representative person
who donate 0 day of labor to assemble the ride. For each person, the best
outcome is when the ride is assemb

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Department of Economics
Faculty of Arts
Economics 373(01) Game Theory & Strategic Thinking for Social
Sciences
Instructor:
Phone:
Email:
L. Yuan
403 220 5863
yuan@ucalgary.ca
Office:
Office Hours:
SS 416
MW 12:00 12:50
Lecture Location:
Lecture Days/Time:

University of Calgary
Department of Economics
Econ373
L. Yuan
Assignment 4 : Due date is at 10:00 in class on April 3, 2017. You are
encouraged t o work in groups. No late assignments are allowed.
Question 1 (20 marks). Imagine a one-dimensional city one

University of Calgary
Department of Economics
Econ373
Assignment 3: Answer Key
Problem 1:
If Ana choose to be legal aid, her expected utility is
EUL = u(50000) 223.61
if she choose to be actress, the expected utility is
EUA = 0.1u(1000000) + 0.9u(16000) 2