National University of Singapore Department of Economics
EC2101 Microeconomic Analysis I Semester 1 AY 2012/2013
Homework 2 Cost of Production and ShortRun Perfect Competition
Question 1 A firm has production function q=KL+L+K. The price of labor is w=1
Suggested Solutions to EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 1, Week 3 (January 2529, 2010)
Question 1
(i) Let us set up the maximization problem for Mr. j , dropping the superscript j
for now. Mr. j wants to
max u(c1 ) + u (c2 )
c1 ;c2
y2
c2
= y1 +
s
EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 1, Week 3 (January 2529, 2010)
Question 1
Consider an economy which consists of only two individuals, Mr A and Mr B .
They each live for 2 periods only; they are both young in period 1 and old in period
2, and the
National University of Singapore Department of Economics
EC2101 Microeconomic Analysis I Semester 1 AY 2012/2013
Practice Problems 5 Production
Question 1 (P&R 6.5) For each of the following examples, draw a representative isoquant. What can you say about
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE Department of Economics EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I Instructor: Ho Kong Weng Tutorial 9 Question 1 Compare and contrast monetary and fiscal policies in terms of inside and outside lags. Suggested answer to Question 1:
National University of Singapore Department of Economics
EC2101 Microeconomic Analysis I Semester 1 AY 2012/2013
Practice Problems 8 ShortRun Perfect Competition
Question 1 (P&R 8.8) A competitive firm has the following shortrun cost function: STC(q) =
National University of Singapore
Department of Economics
EC2101 Microeconomic Analysis I
Semester 1 AY 2012/2013
Practice Problems 8  Solutions
ShortRun Perfect Competition
Question 1 (P&R 8.8) A competitive firm has the following shortrun cost functio
Suggested Solutions to EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 8, Week 11, March 29April 2, 2010
Question 1
(i) Suppose there is a persistent increase in current and all future T F P , so z1 %; z2 %;
z3 %; z4 %,:; (see gure 11.2 of your lecture notes)
d
EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 9, Week 12, April 59, 2010
Question 1 (This is part of the nal exam question of AY2008/9)
Due to the ongoing recession in Country S you have been hired as an Economic Advisor
to the Government due to your familiar
Suggested Solutions to EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 9, Week 12, April 59, 2010
Question 1, PART A
b
(i) Let W1 be xed at W 1 : Given price level P1 ; w1 =
bb
point on AS1 curve of Y1 ; P1
W1
b,
P1
b
b
know N1 and Y1 : So we have one
b
e
To de
EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 8, Week 11, March 29April 2, 2010
Question 1
(modied version of Question 2 in EC2102 Final Exam Sem I AY2006/2007)
Let us consider the monetary intertemporal model studied in class, where all prices are
fully
exi
EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 7, Week 10, March 2226, 2010
Question 1
(a) y and x are positively correlated. See gure 1
(b) y is a lagging variable w.r.t. x. See gure 2
(c) x and y exhibit persistence.
Question 2
Depending on exactly how you c
EC3312 Game Theory and Applications to
Economics
Satoru Takahashi
11 September 2013
Satoru Takahashi ()
EC3312  Lecture 5
11 September 2013
1 / 23
Dynamic Games of Complete Information
The goal of lecture 4 is
to introduce an extensiveform game (game tr
EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 10, Week 13, April 1216, 2010
Question 1:
(This question is Question 1 of EC2102 Final Exam, AY2007/2008, Semester 2)
Consider an economy with an innitelylived representative consumer, an innitelylived
represent
EC3312 Game Theory and Applications to
Economics
Satoru Takahashi
18 September 2013
Satoru Takahashi ()
EC3312  Lecture 6
18 September 2013
1 / 20
Games of Complete but Imperfect Information
We study games of imperfect information, which allow for player
EC3312 Game Theory and Applications to
Economics
Satoru Takahashi
21 August 2013
Satoru Takahashi ()
EC3312  Lecture 2
21 August 2013
1 / 17
Classication of Games
Static
Dynamic
Complete Info
Normalform game
Nash equilibrium
dynamic game
subgameperfect
EC3312 Game Theory and Applications to
Economics
Satoru TAKAHASHI
28 August 2013
Satoru TAKAHASHI ()
EC3312  Lecture 3
28 August 2013
1 / 21
Two Comments on Weak Dominance
L
C
R
T 2, 1 1, 2 0, 0
M 1, 2 2, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
B is weakly dominated by
EC3312 Game Theory and Applications to
Economics
Satoru Takahashi
4 September 2013
Satoru Takahashi ()
EC3312  Lecture 4
4 September 2013
1 / 19
Mixed Strategies
Todays goal is to introduce the notion of mixed strategies:
captures various ideas: randomiz
EC3312 Game Theory and Applications to
Economics
Satoru Takahashi
Satoru Takahashi
23 October 2013
()
EC3312  Lecture 9
23 October 2013
1 / 20
Static Bayesian Games
A static Bayesian game is
static (= oneshot, simultaneousmove)
a game of incomplete inf
1 of 2
DECEMBER 26, 2011, 1:30 PM
A Note On The Ricardian Equivalence Argument Against Stimulus (Slightly
Wonkish)
There have been a lot of shockingly bad performances among macroeconomists in this crisis;
but if I had to pick the one that is most startli
EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 7, Week 10, March 2226, 2010
Question 1:
Consider the following data, which are observations on x and y over several time periods:
Period x
y
1
100 500
2
200 500
3
200 1000
4
100 1000
5
50
500
6
50
250
7
100 250
(
Solutions to EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 5, Week 8, March 812, 2010
Scenario 1
G1 =
< 0 =) & in P V of govt expenditures =) & in P V of taxes as well, because from
government LBC:
s
G2
T2
G1 +
+ : = T1 +
+ :
1 + r1
1 + r1

cfw_z

cfw_z
P
EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Tutorial 5, Week 8, March 812, 2010)
Time goes on forever. An economy consists of an innitelylived individual who values consumption and leisure, and has h units of time each period; an innitely lived representative rm wh
EC2102 Lecture 1; January 13, 2010
1
EC2102 Macroeconomic Analysis I
Wednesdays, 24pm
LT11
Dr Serene Tan
O ce Hours: Wednesdays 121 and 45pm
or by appointment
O ce: AS2/0526
EC2102 Lecture 1; January 13, 2010
Course Grade
15%
35%
50%
Tutorial particip
EC2102 Lecture 2; January 20, 2010
1
An Individual Utility Max. Problem:
s
An Analytical Example (1/7)
Let U (c1; c2) = ln (c1) +
ln (c2).
Individual maximization problem is
s
c2
=!
max U (c1; c2) s.t. c1 +
c1 ;c2
1+r
Using the trick of expressing c2 in t
EC2102 Lecture 3; January 27, 2010
1
Competitive Equilibrium: An example (1/2)
Assume all individuals are identical (with the same preference and same income
process).
Then all agents will choose to save the same amount in each period.
P
It must be that S