Problem Set 1
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, 2011
Note. Just a couple of problems to get the hang of Expected Utility calculation and
some of its implications. Solutions will be taken up during Lecture
Ecos3012 Strategic Behavior
Midterm Exam, Semester 1, 2011
NOTE: This exam consists of 20 multiple choice questions and 2 problems. Each multiple
choice question is worth 3 points and each problem is
Problem Set 3 (Lecture 4, March 23)
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Exercise 1. Do all the end of chapter problems from the chapter titled Rationalizability
and Iterated Dominance.
Sol
Quiz 2 Questions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note.
Print out this le.
Work our your solutions to the questions below.
Log back into Blackboard, access Quiz 2 under Online Quizze
1
Quiz 1 Solutions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note. Here is the sketch of solutions to Quiz 1. I will put up the explanation for Q7 a bit later it is easiest to explain with
a cou
In this lecture
Strategic (or Normal) form games
1. Knowledge vs. Common knowledge.
2. Formal description of a strategic form game.
3. Mixed strategies and corresponding payos. (ch 4n / ch 5o).
ECOS30
Quiz 2 Questions and Solutions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
You can retake this Quiz for practice and then compare your answers
with the solutions by downloading the other version m
Ecos3012 Strategic Behavior
Final Exam Details, Semester 1, 2011
Admin details
Time and date check University Exam timetable
Duration 2 hours
Format
Section 1: 20 MCQ, worth 60 points in total
Section
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
ECOS3012
Strategic Behavior
Semester 1, 2011
Unit Coordinator & Instructor: A/P Murali Agastya
Email: [email protected]
Office: Room
Bargaining Problems
Exercises
i ch simplifies to I = 1 7,000. (We g et the s ame r esult by looking at R osery's payoff.) In the end, the standard bargaining solution predicts that Jerry
I R osemary w
Chapter Seventeen
Auctions
Who Uses Auctions?
Owners of art, cars, stamps,
machines, mineral rights etc.
x Q: Why auction?
x
Who Uses Auctions?
Owners of art, cars, stamps,
machines, mineral rights et
Quiz 1 Questions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note.
Print out this le.
Work our your solutions to the questions below.
Log back into Blackboard, access Quiz 1 under Online Quizze
18
Bargaining Problems
1.
(a) v = 50, 000; u = u = 25, 000; t = 15, 000.
J
R
(b) Solving maxx 60, 000 x2 + 800x yields x = 400. This implies v =
220, 000, u = u = 110, 000, vJ = 100, 000, and vR = 320
Problem Set 4 (Week of May 9)
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
1. Work through all the end of chapter problems in the chapter Backward Induction and
Subgame Perfection in Watsons text.
2
Problem Set 4 (Week of May 9)
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
1. Work through all the end of chapter problems in the chapter Backward Induction and
Subgame Perfection in Watsons text.
2
Problem Set 3 (Lecture 4, March 23)
1
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Exercise 1. Do all the end of chapter problems from the chapter titled Rationalizability
and Iterated Dominance in
Problem Set 2 (Lecture 2, March 9)
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note. I have given a number of problems here concerning the Nash Bargaining Solution and on
taking a non-cooperative
Problem Set 2 (Lecture 2, March 9)
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note. I have given a number of problems here concerning the Nash Bargaining Solution and on
taking a non-cooperative
Problem Set 1
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, 2011
Note. Just a couple of problems to get the hang of Expected Utility calculation and
some of its implications. Solutions will be taken up during Lecture
Ecos3012 - Strategic Behavior
Semeter 1, 20011
Lecture Note on Mixed Strategies
Note. Complement the reading of the Chapter titled Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
from Watsons text with this lecture n
7 RATIONALIZABILITY AND ITERATED DOMINANCE
7
Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance
7.
Yes. If s1 is rationalizable, then s2 is a best response to a strategy of
player 1 that may rationally be playe