Problem Set 1
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, 2011
Note. Just a couple of problems to get the hang of Expected Utility calculation and
some of its implications. Solutions will be taken up during Lecture 2.
Problem 1. Consider an urn lled with 100 balls, col
Problem Set 3 (Lecture 4, March 23)
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Exercise 1. Do all the end of chapter problems from the chapter titled Rationalizability
and Iterated Dominance.
Solution. See the last two pages of this le. I think the m
Ecos3012 Strategic Behavior
Midterm Exam, Semester 1, 2011
NOTE: This exam consists of 20 multiple choice questions and 2 problems. Each multiple
choice question is worth 3 points and each problem is worth 20 points. Therefore, you can score
a maximum of
Quiz 2 Questions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note.
Print out this le.
Work our your solutions to the questions below.
Log back into Blackboard, access Quiz 2 under Online Quizzes Tab and
click Submit to submit your answers .
Questio
Ecos3012 Strategic Behavior
Midterm Exam Details, Semester 1, 2011
Admin details
Time
Date
Location
Duration
Format
Weighting
6:20 p.m.
4 May
Wallace Theatre
2 hours
Section 1: 20 MCQ, worth 60 points in total
Section 2: Two Problems worth 40 in total
You
1
Quiz 1 Solutions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note. Here is the sketch of solutions to Quiz 1. I will put up the explanation for Q7 a bit later it is easiest to explain with
a couple of pictures and I am not able to draw those on this
Quiz 2 Questions and Solutions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
You can retake this Quiz for practice and then compare your answers
with the solutions by downloading the other version made available on
Blackboard.
Begin Quiz
Q1. Consider a
Ecos3012 Strategic Behavior
Final Exam Details, Semester 1, 2011
Admin details
Time and date check University Exam timetable
Duration 2 hours
Format
Section 1: 20 MCQ, worth 60 points in total
Section 2: Choose any TWO of THREE Problems
These require answ
In this lecture
Strategic (or Normal) form games
1. Knowledge vs. Common knowledge.
2. Formal description of a strategic form game.
3. Mixed strategies and corresponding payos. (ch 4n / ch 5o).
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior
4. Best response, weakly and st
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
ECOS3012
Strategic Behavior
Semester 1, 2011
Unit Coordinator & Instructor: A/P Murali Agastya
Email: murali.agastya@sydney.edu.au
Office: Room 364, Merewether Building
Consultation times: 3 4 p.m. T
Bargaining Problems
Exercises
i ch simplifies to I = 1 7,000. (We g et the s ame r esult by looking at R osery's payoff.) In the end, the standard bargaining solution predicts that Jerry
I R osemary will agree to put h im in charge o f b oth the d rama c
Chapter Seventeen
Auctions
Who Uses Auctions?
Owners of art, cars, stamps,
machines, mineral rights etc.
x Q: Why auction?
x
Who Uses Auctions?
Owners of art, cars, stamps,
machines, mineral rights etc.
x Q: Why auction?
x A: Because many markets are
impe
Quiz 1 Questions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note.
Print out this le.
Work our your solutions to the questions below.
Log back into Blackboard, access Quiz 1 under Online Quizzes Tab and click Submit to submit
your answers .
Questio
18
Bargaining Problems
1.
(a) v = 50, 000; u = u = 25, 000; t = 15, 000.
J
R
(b) Solving maxx 60, 000 x2 + 800x yields x = 400. This implies v =
220, 000, u = u = 110, 000, vJ = 100, 000, and vR = 320, 000. Thus,
J
R
t = 210, 000.
(c) From above, x = 400
Problem Set 4 (Week of May 9)
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
1. Work through all the end of chapter problems in the chapter Backward Induction and
Subgame Perfection in Watsons text.
2. (Stackelberg Competition) In a certain market with tw
Problem Set 4 (Week of May 9)
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
1. Work through all the end of chapter problems in the chapter Backward Induction and
Subgame Perfection in Watsons text.
2. (Stackelberg Competition) In a certain market with tw
Problem Set 3 (Lecture 4, March 23)
1
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Exercise 1. Do all the end of chapter problems from the chapter titled Rationalizability
and Iterated Dominance in Watsons text.
Exercise 2. (Price Competition with dier
Problem Set 2 (Lecture 2, March 9)
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note. I have given a number of problems here concerning the Nash Bargaining Solution and on
taking a non-cooperative game situation and representing it as a strategic/norma
Problem Set 2 (Lecture 2, March 9)
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note. I have given a number of problems here concerning the Nash Bargaining Solution and on
taking a non-cooperative game situation and representing it as a strategic/norma
Problem Set 1
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, 2011
Note. Just a couple of problems to get the hang of Expected Utility calculation and
some of its implications. Solutions will be taken up during Lecture 2.
Problem 1. Consider an urn lled with 100 balls, col
Ecos3012 - Strategic Behavior
Semeter 1, 20011
Lecture Note on Mixed Strategies
Note. Complement the reading of the Chapter titled Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
from Watsons text with this lecture note.
1
Mixed Strategies
We have so far dealt with a num
7 RATIONALIZABILITY AND ITERATED DOMINANCE
7
Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance
7.
Yes. If s1 is rationalizable, then s2 is a best response to a strategy of
player 1 that may rationally be played. Thus, player 2 can rationalize
strategy s2 .
1.
(a)