10th
Econometrics
of September 2013
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ID number:
Exercise 1
A problem of interest to health ocials (and others) is to determine the eects
of smoking during pregnancy on infant health. One measure of infant health is
birth weight; a birth rate that is
Econometrics
26 April 2013
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ID number:
Exercise 1
Consider the following multiple regression model, that measures the connection
between wages and education (measured in years) together with some other
factors. In particular we observe the following
Econometrics
September 3, 2014
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1. Exercise
Suppose the following multiple regression model represents a reasonable representation of reality.
The model aim at explaining the standardized outcome on a nal exam in
Econometrics (stndf nl) in
Exercise 1 OKwith corrections, tell me if I can delete other parts
Sleep =
+
1
totwrk +
2
educ +
3
age +
4
age2 +
5
male + u
1.1) All other factors being equal, is there evidence that men sleep more than women? How strong is
the evidence? (Hint: Compute t
Econometrics - Problem set 1
Bugra Altintas (0000760439)
Giulia Speranza (0000758446)
Francesca Torelli (0000757729)
Question 1
The theory states that the percentage of vote of the incumbent party depends on the economic growth
(positive, linear relation)
Auctions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior
School of Economics, FASS
University of Sydney
Lecture 13, June 1, 2011
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior (USYD)
Auctions
Lecture 13, June 1, 2011
1 / 11
Two basic auctions I
First price auction (FPA)
Consider a symmetri
Extensive Form Games - continued
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior
School of Economics, FASS
University of Sydney
Lecture 8, April 20, 2011
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior (USYD)
Extensive Form Games - continued
Lecture 8, April 20, 2011
1/9
In this lecture . (
Games of Incomplete Information
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior
School of Economics, FASS
University of Sydney
Lecture 10, May 18, 2011
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior (USYD)
Games of Incomplete Information
Lecture 10, May 18, 2011
1/7
Games of Incomplete Inf
In this lecture
Nash Equilibrium
1. Nash Equilibrium.
2. Relation between Nash Equilibrium & Rationalizability
and Nash Equilibrium and IEDS.
3. Characterization of Nash equilibria
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior
School of Economics, FASS
University of Sydn
In this lecture
Strategic (or Normal) form games
1. Knowledge vs. Common knowledge.
2. Formal description of a strategic form game.
3. Mixed strategies and corresponding payos. (ch 4n / ch 5o).
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior
4. Best response, weakly and st
In this lecture
Representing games and Nash Bargaining Solution
1. How to represent a game?
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior
1.1 Cooperative vs. Non-cooperative games.
1.2 Static (Normal or Strategic form) games vs. Dynamic games
2. Two person Bargaining Pro
Introduction
Microeconomics studies aggregate implications of individual behavior of economic
agents.
Introduction and Choice & Uncertainty
What is needed is a mathematical theory of individual choice to provided
(quantitative) predictions.
The standard c
Bargaining Problems
Exercises
i ch simplifies to I = 1 7,000. (We g et the s ame r esult by looking at R osery's payoff.) In the end, the standard bargaining solution predicts that Jerry
I R osemary will agree to put h im in charge o f b oth the d rama c
Chapter Seventeen
Auctions
Who Uses Auctions?
Owners of art, cars, stamps,
machines, mineral rights etc.
x Q: Why auction?
x
Who Uses Auctions?
Owners of art, cars, stamps,
machines, mineral rights etc.
x Q: Why auction?
x A: Because many markets are
impe
Quiz 2 Questions and Solutions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
You can retake this Quiz for practice and then compare your answers
with the solutions by downloading the other version made available on
Blackboard.
Begin Quiz
Q1. Consider a
Quiz 2 Questions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note.
Print out this le.
Work our your solutions to the questions below.
Log back into Blackboard, access Quiz 2 under Online Quizzes Tab and
click Submit to submit your answers .
Questio
1
Quiz 1 Solutions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note. Here is the sketch of solutions to Quiz 1. I will put up the explanation for Q7 a bit later it is easiest to explain with
a couple of pictures and I am not able to draw those on this
Quiz 1 Questions
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note.
Print out this le.
Work our your solutions to the questions below.
Log back into Blackboard, access Quiz 1 under Online Quizzes Tab and click Submit to submit
your answers .
Questio
18
Bargaining Problems
1.
(a) v = 50, 000; u = u = 25, 000; t = 15, 000.
J
R
(b) Solving maxx 60, 000 x2 + 800x yields x = 400. This implies v =
220, 000, u = u = 110, 000, vJ = 100, 000, and vR = 320, 000. Thus,
J
R
t = 210, 000.
(c) From above, x = 400
Problem Set 4 (Week of May 9)
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
1. Work through all the end of chapter problems in the chapter Backward Induction and
Subgame Perfection in Watsons text.
2. (Stackelberg Competition) In a certain market with tw
Problem Set 4 (Week of May 9)
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
1. Work through all the end of chapter problems in the chapter Backward Induction and
Subgame Perfection in Watsons text.
2. (Stackelberg Competition) In a certain market with tw
Problem Set 3 (Lecture 4, March 23)
1
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Exercise 1. Do all the end of chapter problems from the chapter titled Rationalizability
and Iterated Dominance in Watsons text.
Exercise 2. (Price Competition with dier
Problem Set 3 (Lecture 4, March 23)
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Exercise 1. Do all the end of chapter problems from the chapter titled Rationalizability
and Iterated Dominance.
Solution. See the last two pages of this le. I think the m
Problem Set 2 (Lecture 2, March 9)
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note. I have given a number of problems here concerning the Nash Bargaining Solution and on
taking a non-cooperative game situation and representing it as a strategic/norma
Problem Set 2 (Lecture 2, March 9)
ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011
Note. I have given a number of problems here concerning the Nash Bargaining Solution and on
taking a non-cooperative game situation and representing it as a strategic/norma
Problem Set 1
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, 2011
Note. Just a couple of problems to get the hang of Expected Utility calculation and
some of its implications. Solutions will be taken up during Lecture 2.
Problem 1. Consider an urn lled with 100 balls, col
Problem Set 1
ECOS3012- Strategic Behavior, 2011
Note. Just a couple of problems to get the hang of Expected Utility calculation and
some of its implications. Solutions will be taken up during Lecture 2.
Problem 1. Consider an urn lled with 100 balls, col
Ecos3012 - Strategic Behavior
Semeter 1, 20011
Lecture Note on Mixed Strategies
Note. Complement the reading of the Chapter titled Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
from Watsons text with this lecture note.
1
Mixed Strategies
We have so far dealt with a num
Ecos3012 Strategic Behavior
Midterm Exam Details, Semester 1, 2011
Admin details
Time
Date
Location
Duration
Format
Weighting
6:20 p.m.
4 May
Wallace Theatre
2 hours
Section 1: 20 MCQ, worth 60 points in total
Section 2: Two Problems worth 40 in total
You