Game Theory Semester I, 2015
Professor Wooders
Final Exam
Monday March 30
1. Three identical rms each simultaneously choose a non-negative quantity of output. The payo to rm i as a function of the outputs is
(q1 + q2 + q3 )qi 10qi .
i (q1 ; q2 ; q3 ) = (9
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Game Theory — Semest
Professor Wooders
Quiz #6
Wednesday March 9
1. Consider the following extensive form:
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(a) Give the normal form representation of the garn
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e.
UTEOO 1 (b) Find all the pure-strategy N
Necessary and Sufficient Condition
Concavity and Convexity
(1) A function of 1 variable / Y = f(X)
f.o.c f(X) = 0 ,
s.o.c f(X) < 0 (Max)
f (X) > 0 (Min)
(2) A function of 2 variable / (Y = ( X1, X2)
a) f.o.c
f(X1) = f1 (X1, X2) = 0 ,
f(X2) = f2(X1, X2) =0
BUDGET EXAM QUESTIONS
Q1
Budget evaluate, factors taken into accounts.
(a) Budget and government economic development plan (How does annual budgeting
link to long integrated economic plan?)
(b) How does budget relate to long term economic plan?
(c) How bu
BUDGETING FOR PROFIT PLANNING AND CONTROL
REVIEW QUESTIONS
*NOTE FROM AUTHOR
THESE REVIEW QUESTIONS ARE NOT 100% COMPATIBLE WITH THE BOOK
BUDGETING BASICS AND BEYOND, 4TH EDITION. THEY ARE NOT INTENDED TO
MATCH THE BOOK, BUT ARE PROVIDED HERE FOR READERS
Working Capital
Policy
Chapter 17
1
LearningObjectives
n
n
n
n
Understandtheimportanceofworking
capital.
Theliquidityprofitabilitytradeoff.
Determiningtheoptimallevelof
currentassets.
Theriskandreturnimplicationsof
alternativeapproachestoworking
capitalfi
UNE PhD Completion Plan
Student Name:
_
Student Number:
_
School:
_
PhD Completion Tasks / Timeline proposed in order to complete the thesis:
Description
Statement of
Current Status
Time Frame for
Completion
Expected Outcomes
and Milestones
Chapter 1
Chap
Game Theory — Semester I, 2016
Professor Wooders
Quiz #6
Wednesday March 9
1. Consider the following extensive form:
,4} War 3'
(a) Give th
19/53
1
2 4
. 31- 1 e
1 R%}{‘
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636011;!an form representation of the game.
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Game Theory # Semester I, 2016
Professor Wooders
Quiz #5
Monday March 6, 2016
1. Consider the following extensive form:
L;\ \AZ.\ m .1 W1: i _,
6< \ ) «(w News X 2. Consider the following extensive form:
What is the behavioral str
Econ 23937 , Game Theory
Professor Wooders
Quiz 3
Wednesday February 17, 2016
Two players have to decide how to allocate an indivisible item that they jointly
own. Player i’s value for the item is denoted by vi, and is drawn from the U [0, 1]
distribution
Game Theory Semester I, 2015
Professor Wooders
Midterm
9:00-10:45am
1. Give the denition of a Bayes Nash equilibrium. (If you use nonstandard notation, please explain your notation.)
2. Prove the following claim:
(a) Claim: If ui ( i ; i )
ui (si ; i ) 8
Game Theory Semester I, 2016
Professor Wooders
Practice Final
1. A desirable oce is to be allocated to one of two professors according to the
following rule: Each professor i submits a bid bi for the oce. The professor
with the highest bid wins and pays h
Game Theory Semester I, 2016
Professor Wooders
Sample Midterm
1. Consider a duopoly in which two rms simultaneously and independently select prices, p1 0 and p2 0, where pi is the price of rm i.
Firm 1s demand is
q1 = 10 p1 + p2 ,
and Firm 2s demand is
q2
Game Theory, Semester I 2016
Professor Wooders
Final Exam
Friday March 18
1. Given an example of a (ﬁnite) extensive form game which has a unique
backward induction solution and which has a Nash equilibrium in which
the players obtain payoffs different fr
Game Theory — Semester I, 2016
Professor Wooders
Midterm
1. Consider the following three—player game in which each player simul—
taneously chooses X or Y. Payoffs are as follows: (i) If all the players
choose X then each player’s payoff is 8. (ii) If exac
Game Theory — Semester I, 2016
Professor Wooders
Quiz #4
Monday February 29, 2016
Revelation Principle and Mechanism Design
1. Consider again the trading game discussed in class. The seller of the good
may either have a high or low quality unit of the goo
Game Theory — Semester I, 2016
Professor Wooders
Quiz #5 / 9o A ,Zxanﬁ
Monday March 6, 2016
1. Consider the following extensive form:
What is the behavioral strategy representation of the mixed strategy
1 2
m(¢/A,’):/3
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0' (“/F‘ ) ‘ ﬁ
$P/V3 Mang,
(0
Econ 23937 ~ Game Theory
Professor Wooders
Quiz 1
Monday February 8, 2016
1. Complete the following deﬁnition: Pure strategy 31- is strictly dominated for
player 2' if there is a mixed strategy a; E 2i such that
kHCQ'); a) 7‘ mi<§z> $43 i i
1. Assignment 3 (10 points) :
2. Due date: 16th December, 2013 before 5:00pm. Please submit hard copy and sign your
submission form.
Many countries has adopted specific measures to address poverty problem among the low
income household and this measures r