Problem Set 1 ~ 23940
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DueApril27, 2016 w” é“ " 0“
1. Matching theory. Consider a matching market with a set F 2 {f1, . . . , fn} of ﬁrms, such
that q, = 1 for all i = 1,. . . ,n, and a set W of workers. Assume that preferences P are
strict.
(a
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permission. However, users may pri
RankOrder Tournaments as Optimum Labor
Contracts
Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen
University of Chicago and Natioml Bureau of Economic Research
This paper analyzes compensation schemes which pay according to
an individual’s ordinal rank in an organizat
Collusive Bidder Behavior at SingleObject
SecondPrice and English Auctions
Daniel A. Graham and Robert C. Marshall
Duke University
Models of collusive bidder behavior at singleobject secondprice and
English auctions are provided. The independent pri
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for
Design Economics
Authors(s): Alvin E. Roth
Source: Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Jul., 2002), pp. 13411378
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http:/www.j
Theoretical Economics 11 (2016), 4152
15557561/20160041
On the impossibility of coreselecting auctions
Jacob K. Goeree
Economics Discipline Group, University of Technology Sydney
Yuanchuan Lien
Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science an
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Author(s): D. Gale and L. S. Shapley
Source: The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Jan., 1962), pp. 915
Published by: Mathematical Association of America
Stable URL: http:/www.jstor.org/stable
Internet Advertising and the Generalized SecondPrice Auction:
Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
By Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz
August 1, 2006
Abstract
We investigate the generalized secondprice auction (GSP), a n
Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private
Evaluations
William Fuchs
May 18, 2006
Abstract
A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the
Agents output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting t
USING AND ABUSING ECONOMIC THEORY
PRELIMINARY; COMMENTS WELCOME
the latest version of this paper, and related material, will be at http:/www.paulklemperer.org
Paul Klemperer
Nuffield College, Oxford University, Oxford OX1 1NF, England
Int Tel: +44 1865 27
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
MATCHING WITH COUPLES:
STABILITY AND INCENTIVES IN LARGE MARKETS
Fuhito Kojima
Parag A. Pathak
Alvin E. Roth
Working Paper 16028
http:/www.nber.org/papers/w16028
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Camb
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
Author(s): W. Bentley MacLeod and James M. Malcomson
Source: Econometrica, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Mar., 1989), pp. 447480
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http:/www.jstor
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17, 229252, May 2000.
Collusive Bidding:
Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Peter Cramton and Jesse A. Schwartz*
University of Maryland and Vanderbilt University
Abstract
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) sp
Frontiers in Spectrum Auction Design
Martin Bichler and Jacob K. Goeree
Technical University of Munich and University of Technology Sydney
Abstract
Spectrum auction design has seen a number innovations in the recent years.
Regulators have used various typ
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MATCHING THEORY AND ITS
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
FUHITO KOJIMA
Abstract. In recent years, many developments have been made in matching theory and
its applications to market design. This paper surveys them and suggests possible researc
Moral Hazard and Observability
Author(s): Bengt Hlmstrom
Source: The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1979), pp. 7491
Published by: RAND Corporation
Stable URL: http:/www.jstor.org/stable/3003320
Accessed: 10052016 05:30 UTC
Your use
American Economic Association
Incentives in Organizations
Authors(s): Robert Gibbons
Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 115132
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http:/www.jstor.org/stabl
The PrincipalAgent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
Author(s): Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole
Source: Econometrica, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Mar., 1990), pp. 379409
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http:/www.jstor
Midterm

23940 (Market Design)
May 4, 2016
L. Matching theory. Consider a matching market with a set F : cfw_,., . . . , n of fi.rms, such
that q:1for all i:1,.,n, and asetW of workers. Assume that preferences P are
strict.
(a) Suppose that r and t' are
Market Design 23490
Introduction
Fall 2016
March 23, 2016
Market Design
March 23, 2016
1 / 38
What is Market Design?
Microeconomic engineering
Economics often takes markets (institutions) as given and predicts
behaviours or outcomes
Market design takes
The Nature of Tournaments
Robert J. Akerlof and Richard T. Holden
June 26, 2007
Abstract
This paper characterizes the optimal way for a principal to structure a rankorder
tournament in a moral hazard setting (as in Lazear and Rosen (1981). We nd that
it
Int J Game Theory (2008) 36:537569
DOI 10.1007/s0018200801176
ORIGINAL PAPER
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory,
practice, and open questions
Alvin E. Roth
Accepted: 19 July 2007 / Published online: 29 January 2008
SpringerVerlag 2008
Ab
Final Exam 23940 Market Design
June 22, 2016
Instructions: You have 2 hours to complete this exam. In order to receive full credit, you
must show your work and carefully justify your answers. The correct answer without any
work will receive little or no c
Moral Hazard in Teams
Author(s): Bengt Holmstrom
Source: The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 324340
Published by: RAND Corporation
Stable URL: http:/www.jstor.org/stable/3003457
Accessed: 02062016 08:09 UTC
Your use of the
HW2 Problem 3 : [0, 1] ; a cfw_0, 1; We only consider pure strategy equilibria.
Fix any equilibrium (b, a), where b : [0, 1] [0, ) describes the principals equilibrium
strategy and a : [0, ) cfw_0, 1 describes the agents equilibrium strategy. Note that 1)
Market Design 23940 Homework 2 (Due 08/06/2016)
May 30, 2016
1. Consider a principalagent problem where there are two eort levels, aL and aH ; and two
output levels xL = 1 and xH = 20. The production function is given by: P r(xH  aH ) = 0.75,
P r(xL  a
Lecture 5: Incentives in Organizations
Mengxi Zhang
Market Design 23940, Autumn 2016
Overview
Lecture 5: Incentives in Organizations (09/05, 11/05)
I
Presentation by Jonathan Livermore
Lecture 8: Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Motivations: The Informed
Princi