Answer for Problem 2.14
19th April
Game Theory for Applied Economists
Jinquan Gong
Abstract
That is a innitely repeated game. Depend on the value of , we
will have dierent subgame-perfect Nash equilib
Answer for Problem 2.8
1st April
Game Theory for Applied Economists
Jinquan Gong
Abstract
That is a two stage games of complete but imperfect information
problem. For subgame perfect outcome, we have
Answer for Problem 2.16
5th May
Game Theory for Applied Economists
Jinquan Gong
Abstract
First part is to show one shot game, second part is to show a
innitely repeated game. Find out conditions that
2.1 Proof: we should show that A maximizes I c ( A) + I p ( A) , this is equivalent to
show I c ( A) + I p ( A) = 0 .
Solving the game by backward induction:
At stage 2, given I c and I p , parent cho