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Term Test for Economics 4010
Instructor: Professor Kin Chung Lo
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There are seven questions.
Please answer, with explanation,
all of them.
l. (10 marks) Suppose that a consumer's preference relation (, on JR~ is represented by
the utilit
July 2014
Term Test for Economics 4010
Instructor: Professor Kin Chung Lo
Please answer, with explanation,
all the questions below.
1. (10 ~arks). Prove ~at ~_~a&reterer:c;i~tio~en
relation > IS transitive.

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Term Test for Economics 4010
Instructor: Professor Kin Chung Lo
Please answer, with explanation,
all the questions below.
1. (lO marks) Let u(x) represent some consumer's monotonic preferenc
FINAL EXAM MATERIAL 4010: 2010
Following sections are OMITTED
CHAPTER 8
Incomplete Information 268
Simultaneous Bayesian Games 268
Signaling Games 273
Experimental Games 281
Evolutionary Games and Learning 282
Extensions 288
CHAPTER 9
Extensions 320
CHAPT
IR 401: International Political Economy
Lecture 4
Review of the Multilateral Trade System
Ali Fisunoglu
[email protected]
March 4, 2016
1
Administrative Stuff
Midterm: March 18, in
class.
Next week: I will review
what we have done so far
for
IR 401: International Political Economy
Lecture 2
Introduction to IPE & Perspectives of IPE
Ali Fisunoglu
[email protected]
February 11, 2016
This Class (and the next)
What is International Political Economy (IPE)?
The Global Economy in Histo
IR 401: International Political Economy
Lecture 3
Perspectives of IPE
Ali Fisunoglu
[email protected]
February 19, 2016
Administrative Stuff
Response papers
Kindleberger article for next week.
Warning: This one is pretty tough.
Quiz next we
1
Sample Questions: Uncertainty and Imperfect Information
1. Show that expected utility is invariant with respect to linear transformations, but
not with respect to monotonic transformations in general.
2. Discuss the possibility of a pooling equilibrium
Definitions of Quasiconcave and Quasiconvex Functions
QUASICONCAVITY: Consider the function f : D R, where D is a convex subset of Rn and
let c be a number in the range of f .
Define the upper level set of f for c to be the following subset of D:
Pc cfw_x
IR 401: International Political Economy
Lecture 5
International Trade and Development
Ali Fisunoglu
[email protected]
March 11, 2016
1
Review Study Guide
Following are some materials we will review
today. This doesnt mean that we exclude
other
ADVANCED MICROECONOMICS
Econ 201
Preferences & Utility
Bas.ak Altan
Ozyegin
University
Goods & Services
Consumers purchase variety of goods and services.
Lecture 2
2 / 37
Bundles
A market basket/bundle of goods is a collection of goods and services that
a
IR 401: International Political Economy
Lecture 4
Review of the Multilateral Trade System
Ali Fisunoglu
[email protected]
March 26, 2015
1
https:/www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/inflationpovertyfoodshortagesvenezuelaheadstowarddisaster/20
ADVANCED MICROECONOMICS
Econ 201
Introduction
Bas.ak Altan
Ozyegin
University
Method
Method
The main purpose of this class is to give tools so you will be able to
think like an economist.
We will learn tools  main concepts adoptable for different purpose
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE
ROLE OF EDUCATON
Econ 420
Alpay Filiztekin
2
Economic Growth in a Cross Section of
Countries (Barro, 1991)
Data from 98 countries.
Positive correlation between human capital and
growth.
Negative correlation between human capital an
1
Sample Questions: Partial Equilibrim, GE and
Welfare
1. Consider two duopolists with dierentiated products, who compete in prices. Their
demand and cost functions are given by qi = a bpi + dpj , C = cqi , where qi and
pi are their quantities and prices
Faculty of Liberal Arts & Professional Studies
Department of Economics
Course: AP/ECON 4010 3.0A  Advance Microeconomics
Term: S2 2017
Prerequisite / Corequisite:
Prerequisites: AP/ECON 2300 3.00, AP/ECON 2350 3.00, and AP/ECON
3530 3.00, or equivalents
1
Introduction
1.1
Methodology
The methodology in economics (and many other sciences) can be shown in the following diagram:
1.2
Models of Individual Behaviour
Individuals make decisions.
These give rise to behavioural rules.
Thus, behaviour is based
Expected Utility
1
We now generalize consumer choice theory by allowing the set of possible alternatives facing a consumer to
include uncertain alternatives.
The uncertain alternatives (some, but not all need to be uncertain) can be though of as being c
1
Nash Bargaining
There are two types of bargaining models in the literature:
Cooperative bargaining and noncooperative bargaining.
The cooperative bargaining approach is axiomatic, whereas the noncooperative bargaining approach is game
theoretic.
O
SU17 ITEC1010
Assignment #2 Excel Spreadsheets
Due: July 19, 11 PM  No late submissions uploads accepted.
When we create a worksheet model using a spreadsheet program such as Excel, we instruct the
computer by providing steps it can take to solve the pro
1
Sample Questions: Consumer Theory
1. Show that if the utility function is homothetic, the individuals demand functions are linear in income.
2. Define and discuss the properties of the indirect utility function, (you may, but you do not have to prove
th
1
Sample Questions: Production Theory
1. Define the short run profit function, discuss its properties (no need to prove them).
2. Show how we can use Hotellings Lemma to obtain a firms input demand and output supply functions.
3. What is the relationship
Asymmetric Information
1
We will consider the following problems:
I. Principal Agent Problems with:
(i) hidden actions moral hazard
(ii) hidden information adverse selection
II. Signalling
III. Markets for lemons and warranties a signals
IV. Dele
Consumer Theory
1
1.1
Preference
Consumption set, +
We introduce preferences, or an ordering: % (weak).
These preferences rank bundles.
1.1.1
Assumptions
1. rational:
complete: for all either % or % or both
transitive: for all if % and % then %
we
1
Welfare
1.1
1.1.1
The utility possibilities set
A Simple Example: Two Individuals (no markets)
Consider two individuals with endowments: (11 12 ) and (21 22 )
Let their utility functions be given by: 1 2
Let their consumption bundles be (11 12 ) and
1
Duopoly
Usually the firm is not passive and its strategies are important.
We have to examine both long run and short run strategies and constraints.
Normally, in the short run it is easier to change prices than quantities.
In the long run the firm c
Production
1
In the previous section we looked at the problem:
maxcfw_ () :
Note that the constraint was a simple linear function, so we focused on the properties of the objective function,
namely, utility. Now, we face the opposite situation: the object
ADVANCED MICROECONOMICS
Econ 201
The Theory of Demand
Bas.ak Altan
Ozyegin
University
Demand
Derivation
Optimum bundle Demand schedule
Remember John consuming two goods: coffee and donut.
Johns demand schedule for coffee represents the optimum cups of cof