AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Midterm Exam
February 11 2015
11:30 am 12:30 pm
Do all 3 questions. All questions count equally.
1. Show that a Condorcet winner must exist under pairwise majority rule if all voters preferences are singlepeaked.
2. Give an e
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Midterm Exam
Thursday July 12 2012
11:30 am 12:30 pm
Do all 3 questions. All questions count equally.
1. Suppose that there are 9 voters of type #1, 10 voters of type #2, 11 voters of type #3, 12
voters of type #4 and 13 vote
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Answers to Midterm Exam
July 2012
1. Suppose that there are 9 voters of type #1, 10 voters of type #2, 11 voters of type #3, 12
voters of type #4 and 13 voters of type #5, with the following preference orderings over 4
candid
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Final Exam
Monday August 13 2012
7 9 pm
Do any 5 of the following 8 questions. All questions count equally.
1. Give an example, involving at least 3 voters, and at least 3 dierent alternatives, in which
there is an alternativ
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Answers to Midterm Exam
May 2011
1. Show that a Condorcet winner must exist under pairwise majority rule if all voters preferences are singlepeaked.
answer : The proof of this result is sketched on page 86 of Muellers text.
T
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Final Exam
Thursday June 16 2011
2 4 pm
Do any 5 of the following 8 questions. All questions count equally.
1. Suppose that there are 5 voters of type #1, 6 voters of type #2, 7 voters of type #3, 8 voters
of type #4 and 9 vo
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Answers to Midterm Exam
February 2015
Do all 3 questions. All questions count equally.
1. Show that a Condorcet winner must exist under pairwise majority rule if all voters preferences are singlepeaked.
answer : The proof of
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Answers to Midterm Exam
February 2014
Do all 3 questions. All questions count equally.
1. What level of spending would be chosen in the following jurisdiction, if residents of the
jurisdiction voted directly over levels of sp
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Final Exam
Thursday April 10 2014
9 11 am
Do any 5 of the following 8 questions. All questions
count equally.
1. Give an example of a prole of voters, with preferences over several
alternatives, which has the following proper
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Midterm Exam
February 12 2014
11:30 am 12:30 pm
Do all 3 questions. All questions count equally.
1. What level of spending would be chosen in the following jurisdiction, if residents of the
jurisdiction voted directly over le
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950
(Brief) Answers to Final Exam
April 2014
1. Give an example of a prole of voters, with preferences over several alternatives, which has
the following property.
Some alternative (say x) is a Condorcet winner, but this alternativ
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Midterm Exam
Thursday May 19
11:30 am 12:30 pm
Do all 3 questions. All questions count equally.
1. Show that a Condorcet winner must exist under pairwise majority rule if all voters preferences are singlepeaked.
2. Suppose th
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Midterm Exam
February 11 2015
11:30 am 12:30 pm
Do all 3 questions. All questions count equally.
1. Show that a Condorcet winner must exist under pairwise majority rule if all voters preferences are singlepeaked.
2. Give an e
Decentralization
voters/movers : identical preferences u(c, g)
now not the Persson and Tabellini quasilinear form
u = c + H(g)
articial problem : people could buy both c and g on private
markets, at a price of $1 per unit for c, and at a price of pg
dolla
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950
(Brief) Answers to Final Exam
June 2011
1. Suppose that there are 5 voters of type #1, 6 voters of type #2, 7 voters of type #3, 8 voters
of type #4 and 9 voters of type #5, with the following preference orderings over candidat
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Final Exam
April 21 2015
2- 4 pm
Do any 5 of the following 8 questions. All questions
count equally.
1. For the following prole of peoples rankings of 5 dierent alternatives, what would be the overall rankings of the alternat
some sample exercises : Public Choice
1. The following table lists the way that 5 dierent voters rank ve dierent alternatives.
Is there a Condorcet winner under pairwise majority rule for this example?
Explain briey.
voter #1 voter #2 voter #3 voter #4 vo
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Final Exam
Thursday June 16 2011
2 4 pm
Do any 5 of the following 8 questions. All questions count equally.
1. Suppose that there are 5 voters of type #1, 6 voters of type #2, 7 voters of type #3, 8 voters
of type #4 and 9 vo
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Midterm Exam
Thursday May 19
11:30 am 12:30 pm
Do all 3 questions. All questions count equally.
1. Show that a Condorcet winner must exist under pairwise majority rule if all voters preferences are singlepeaked.
2. Suppose th
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Final Exam
Monday August 13 2012
7 9 pm
Do any 5 of the following 8 questions. All questions count equally.
1. Give an example, involving at least 3 voters, and at least 3 dierent alternatives, in which
there is an alternativ
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Final Exam
Thursday April 10 2014
9 11 am
Do any 5 of the following 8 questions. All questions
count equally.
1. Give an example of a prole of voters, with preferences over several
alternatives, which has the following proper
AP/ECON 4380 & GS/ECON 5950 : Midterm Exam
February 12 2014
11:30 am 12:30 pm
Do all 3 questions. All questions count equally.
1. What level of spending would be chosen in the following jurisdiction, if residents of the
jurisdiction voted directly over le
Proportional Income Tax Example
(similar to but not the same as example 1 [pg. 24] in
Persson and Tabellini)
Proportional Income Tax Example
(similar to but not the same as example 1 [pg. 24] in
Persson and Tabellini)
here : voters differ (only) in abilit
Two Types of Dictator
Person i is a Vickrey dictator for x over y if, whenever i prefers
x to y and every other person feels exactly the opposite way,
preferring y to x , then the social ordering ranks x above y .
Two Types of Dictator
Person i is a Vickr
distributive spending
(Persson and Tabellini, pp. 161 168)
whats new :
1. a (single) national legislature chooses public output in each
district
2. the level of public output does not have to be uniform : it can
vary across districts
BUT : taxes must be t
Decentralization
voters/movers : identical preferences u(c, g)
now not the Persson and Tabellini quasilinear form
u = c + H(g)
articial problem : people could buy both c and g on private
markets, at a price of $1 per unit for c, and at a price of pg
dolla
AP/ECON 4380 M W & GS/ECON 5950 M W
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
Winter 2014 15
S. Bucovetsky
oce : Vari Hall 1052
phone : (York extension) 77026
Teaching Assistant : Imran Aziz
oce : Atkinson 602
6479797727
e-mail : [email protected]
imran [email protected]
o
Plurality Voting : Example
type 1 voters
41 %
type 2 voters
30 %
type 3 voters
19%
type 4 voters
10%
w
y
z
x
x
y
z
w
y
z
x
w
z
y
x
w
Plurality Voting : Example
type 1 voters
41 %
type 2 voters
30 %
type 3 voters
19%
type 4 voters
10%
w
y
z
x
x
y
z
w
y
z
x
The Principle of Minimum Differentiation
(cf. Persson and Tabellini, 3.1 3.3)
The Principle of Minimum Differentiation
(cf. Persson and Tabellini, 3.1 3.3)
result : parties will choose the median of the voters preferred
policies
The Principle of Minimum D
some sample exercises
Public Choice : sections 4 8
1. What are the key assumptions needed to get the result that all parties will choose the median of the voters
mostpreferred policies?
2. Is the following an equilibrium in the HotellingDowns model of vot