YORK UNIVERSITY Final Examination
Faculty of Graduate Studies December 15, 2006 S. Bucovetsky
Economics 5010 AF3.0 : Applied Microeconomics time=2.5 hours
Do any 6 of the following 10 questions. All c
GS/ECON 5010
APPLIED MICROECONOMICS October 2005
Answers to Midterm Exam
Q1. State and prove Roys Identity (the relation between a consumers indirect utility function and her Marshallian demand functi
GS/ECON 5010 Midterm Exam
APPLIED MICROECONOMICS Answers to Midterm October 2004
Q1. Derive a consumers Marshallian (uncompensated) and Hicksian (compensated) demand functions for all three commoditie
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PART II
MARKETS AND
WELFARE
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CHAPTER 4
PAR
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PART I
ECONOMIC AGENTS
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CHAPTER 1
CONSUMER THEORY
I
GS/ECON 5010
section B
Midterm Exam
APPLIED MICROECONOMICS
October 24 2012
2:30 3:30 pm
Do all 3 questions. All count equally.
1. Derive the Slutsky equation, which shows the relationship between the
GS/ECON 5010
section B
Midterm Exam
APPLIED MICROECONOMICS
October 23 2013
2:30 3:30 pm
Do all 3 questions. All count equally.
1. What is a consumers expenditure function, if her (direct) utility func
Revealed Preference
W ARP : If a consumer is observed to make a bunch of choices, choosing xi when the prices are pi, then pi xi pi xj pj xj < pj xi for any distinct observations i and j (1)
SARP : Th
GS/ECON 5010 section B
Assignment 1
due : Wednesday October 2
F2013
before class (2.30 pm)
Do all 5 questions. Each counts 20%.
1. Are the preferences described below strictly monotonic? Convex? Expla
Basic Concepts
players : whoever are making the strategic choices .(firms, or consumers, or governments, or . . .) payoffs : what the players care about . (profit, or utility, or prestige, or . . .) a
Gambles
g (p1 a1, p2 a2, . . . , pn an) means : g is a gamble, in which the outcome a1 will arise with the probability p1, the outcome a2 will arise with the probability p2, and so on if, for example
Constant Elasticity of Substitution [CES] Preferences
u(x) = (x + x + + x )1/ n 2 1 where < < 1 and = 0
marginal utilities
1 u = (x1 + x + + x )1/1x1 n 2 i xi
Typeset by FoilTEX
1
rstorder conditio
CES : Expenditure Function and Hicksian Demands
expenditure minimization minimize p x subject to
n
[
i=1
x]1/ u i
(1)
so the Lagrangean is
n
p x + [u [
i=1
x]1/] i
(2)
with rstorder conditions
n
pi =
Cost Minimization
Given an output level y, what is the minimum cost of producing it?
minimize
wx
subject
to
f (x) y
(1)
the cost function C(w, y) is the cost of the input bundle x which solves minimiz
YORK UNIVERSITY
Faculty of Graduate Studies
Final Examination
December 12, 2013
Economics 5010 BF3.0 : Applied Microeconomics
S. Bucovetsky
time=2.5 hours
Do any 6 of the following 10 questions. All c
What is an Equilibrium Price Vector?
its a vector p such that Z(p) = 0 where Z(p) is a vector of excess demands in general equilibrium, we are looking for prices that clear all n markets there are n p
Cournot Oligopoly
quantities are strategic variables meaning : each firm chooses a quantity q i to produce each firm's price is then determined by the market demand "standard" case : homogeneous outpu
GS/ECON 5010
section B
Answers to Assignment 4
November 2013
Q1. What does the contract curve look like for a 2person, 2good exchange economy, with a
total endowment of E1 units of good 1 and E2 units
GS/ECON 5010
section B
APPLIED MICROECONOMICS
Answers to Midterm Exam
October 2012
Q1. Derive the Slutsky equation, which shows the relationship between the derivatives
of the Marshalllian and Hicksia
An Exchange Economy
no production : just reallocation of given aggregate quantities of goods e = (e1, e2, . . . , en) : aggregate endowment vector : aggregate quantities of each good I : number of peo
Coalitions and Blocking
"barter" exchange economy now people own the endowments so that
I
e
i=1
ei
ei is person i's endowment vector people could form coalitions to exchange their endowments if S cfw_
Solution Concepts for Games in Strategic Form
solution? prediction of what happens in the game so far. games with dominant strategy example : Prisoners' Dilemma (e.g. 3) : t is a strictly dominant str
Nash Equilibrium
terminology : let S be player 1s set of strategies (e.g. S = cfw_t, m, b), and let T be player 2s set of strategies let u1(s, t) be player 1s payoff, when she plays s S, and when play
Games in Extensive Form
the extensive form of a game is a "tree" diagram except that my trees grow sideways any game can be represented either using the extensive form or the strategic form but the ex
Games of Incomplete Information
complication : a player might not know which node she is at what? example : player 1 moves rst, but player 2 does not actually observe what action player 1 takes so he
Games in Strategic Form : Examples
Example 1 : A ZeroSum Game
1\2 t b
L
R
(4, 6) (6, 4) (6, 4) (4, 6)
Example 2 : A Coordination Game
1\2 t b
L (5, 5) (0, 0)
R (0, 0) (5, 5)
Example 3 : Prison
GS/ECON 5010
section B
APPLIED MICROECONOMICS
Answers to Midterm Exam
October 2013
Q1. What is a consumers expenditure function, if her (direct) utility function is
U (x1 , x2 ) = log (x1 ) + log (x2
GS/ECON 5010
section B
Answers to Assignment 1
F2013
Q1. Are the preferences described below strictly monotonic? Convex? Explain briey.
The person consumes only bread and cheese. Each kilo of bread co
GS/ECON 5010
section B
Answers to Assignment 3
November 2013
Q1. What is the equation of the shortrun supply curve of a rm which has a shortrun total
cost function with the equation
T C (q ) = (q 12)2