Econ 171 Fall 2012
Problem Set 1
Solutions to the two-star problems
In some cases Ive provided more explanation than was asked of you.
* Problem 3
Find the rationalizable strategies for this game. For each iteration, list the eliminated
A
B
C
W
5, 6
4, 3
Solutions to Chapter 4 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES
S1. False. A dominant strategy yields you the highest payoff available to you against each of your
opponents strategies. Playing a dominant strategy does not guarantee that you end up with the highest of a
Econ 171 Fall 2008
Final Exam - Solutions
December 10
You have three hours to take this exam. Please answer all questions. Each question is worth
15 points, with the exception of number 3, which is worth 10 points. Point subtotals are in
brackets. To obta
Solutions to Chapter 2 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES
S1. (a) Assuming a sufficient supply of yogurt is available for all shoppers, each shopper is
simply making a decision. If some flavors of yogurt were in short supply, then it would be a game, because shop
Solutions to Chapter 11 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES
S1. False. The players are not assured that they will reach the cooperative outcome. Rollback
reasoning shows that the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a finitely played repeated prisoners dilemma will enta
Solutions to Chapter 15 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES
S1. (a) In the pure-threat case, the unions expected payoff is 50(1 p) 100p = 50 150p. The
unions expected payoff goes to zero for p = 1/3 and is negative for p > 1/3. Thus the pure threat is too big from
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Problem Set 2
Due May 6
Important: hand in only the two-star problems. The notation a.b denotes problem number
b from Chapter a in Watson.
* Problem 1
1
L
R
2
a
b
0, 0
Figure 1: An extensive game
In the game in Figure 1, solve for the
Solutions to Chapter 3 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES
S1. (a) There is one initial node (I) for Hansel making the first move; three decision nodes (D)
including the initial node, which represent the points where either Hansel or Gretel make a decision; and si
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Some student questions about PS1 and my responses
Problem 4)
Student question omitted. Here is the response, though:
You are right that there are no PSNE, but there still can be MSNE. It is a good idea to
look for dominated strategies
Solutions to Chapter 9 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES
S1. (a) Your neighbor has a sure income of $100,000. In addition, under the insurance
contract, he will receive x when you have a good year and pay you $60,000 when you have a bad year. The lowest value of
Professor Rod Garratt
ECON 171
Midterm
April 27, 2011
This exam is worth a total of 40 Points. You have 1 hour and 15 minutes to complete
this exam. Good Luck!
1. Consider the game of Marienbad which, like the game of Nim, is zero-sum (there
is a winner a
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Problem Set 3 - Solutions
Due Tuesday, June 1
Important: hand in only the two-star problems. There are no one-star problems on this
problem set. The notation a.b denotes problem number b from Chapter a in Watson.
* Problem 1
Consider
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Problem Set 3
Due Tuesday, June 1
Important: hand in only the two-star problems. There are no one-star problems on this
problem set. The notation a.b denotes problem number b from Chapter a in Watson.
* Problem 1
Consider a two-player
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Problem Set 1
Solutions to the two-star Problems
In some cases Ive provided more explanation than was asked of you.
* Problem 3
Find the rationalizable strategies for this game. For each iteration, list the eliminated
A
B
C
W
5, 6
4,
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Problem Set 1
Due April 13
Important: hand in only the two-star problems. (Read the syllabus for the meaning of onestar, two-star, etc.) The notation a.b denotes problem number b from Chapter a in
Watson.
* Problem 1
(a) Create a larg
Econ 171 Fall 2008
Practice Questions & Solutions - Part III: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium practice questions with solutions below:
28.2, 28.3, 29.1, 29.3, 29.4
28.2 (a) No.
(b) Yes. The strategy prole is (AA , Y ), with belie
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Notes on Applications of Nash Equilibrium1
April 16
Overview
These notes explore some applications of Nash equilibrium and are intended to supplement
Chapter 10 of Watson. The rst section presents an extension of the Cournot and Bertr
Lecture 4: Nash Equilibrium
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Overview
Nash equilibrium
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
1
Nash Equilibrium
Begin with three
A
C
X
4, 0
4, 2
games that are not dominance solvable:
22
Y
0, 2
4, 0
O
2, 1
0, 0
O
B
B
0, 0
1, 2
H
1, 1
1, 1
H
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Notes for Lecture 2
April 1
Note: we will begin class by playing some in-class games and by continuing to go through the
Handout on Normal Form Games
Overview
In these notes we will continue looking at games in the normal (or strategi
Repeated Games
Repeated Games
This week we examine the effect of repetition on strategic
behavior in games with perfect information.
If a game is played repeatedly, with the same players, the
players may behave very differently than if the game is
playe
Complete vs. Incomplete Information Games
All games can be classified as complete information games or
incomplete information games.
Complete information games the player whose turn it is to move
it
knows at least as much as those who moved before him/her
How to Negotiate a Pay Raise with Game Theory
http:/www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikE1pn034WA
?
?
Signaling Games
?
?
In incomplete information games, one player knows
more information than the other player
more information than the other player.
So far, we h
Important Announcement
Monday is a holiday, no class on Wednesday either! So this is it. I
hope you enjoyed the course!
I will hold a review session the night before the final.
Date: Sunday, June 5.
Time and location will be announced on the class web sit
b) The player who wins is going to be the one that can leave just one stick in one of the
piles. If player 2 takes exactly the same amount of sticks [as] player one, from the
opposite pile, and when a pile gets to 1 stick he just takes all the sticks from
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Bayesian Games & Incomplete Information
In-class game: variant of BoS (w/ incomplete information)
Consider a variant of BoS in which Player 1 is unsure whether Player 2 wants
to go out with her or avoid her, and thinks that these two
Handout on Normal Form Games
Econ 171 Fall 2008
Player 1
Player 2
C
D
2, 2
0, 3
3, 0
1, 1
C
D
a)
Game a) is typically called
. The solution concept we apply (today) to solve it is called
Games that we can solve this way, i.e. for which we can derive a uni
Econ 171 (Grossman) Spring 2010
Exam 1
April 20
You have 75 minutes to take this exam. Please answer all 6 questions, each of which is worth
5 points. Point subtotals are indicated. Show your work to obtain full credit.
Part 1 4 questions, 20 points (5 ea
Class Info
Game Theory
Normal Form Games
Econ 171 Spring 2010
Class 1 - March 30, 2010
Index cards: Name, pronunciation, perm no.,major, native
language, Math background, Reason for interest in class,
Economics is. . .
Web: http:/econ.ucsb.edu/~grossman/E
NAME:
Econ 171 (Grossman) Spring 2010
Exam 2 Solutions
May 13
You have 75 minutes to take this exam. Please answer all 4 questions, each of which is worth
15 points. Point subtotals are indicated. Show your work to obtain full credit.
1. Consider the exte