212.339 Game theory and Applications 2009 Autumn
In Ho Lee
Problem Set 1
(Due date : Sep, 22)
1. Suppose that the information partitions of two agents, A and B, are given as
follows:
P A 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
P B 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Suppose that 3, that is, 3 is
212.339 Game theory and Applications 2009 Autumn
In Ho Lee
Problem Set 3
(Due date : Oct, 20)
1. Suppose that two players play each other for two periods. In the rst period they play
the rst game below, and in the second period they play the second game b
Problem set 3
(Due December 7th, Wednesday)
1.
Show graphically that if a firms MC=AC=a constant, it will produce a product if it is
socially desirable for that product to be produced.
2.
The inverse market demand curve for a certain commodity is p=85-10Q
2016-09-26
Industrial Organization (Fall, 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
I. Basic
1. The History of Industrial Organization
1) Beginnings
Development of the theory of the firm after the Industrial Revolution:
2016-11-30
Industrial Organization (Fall, 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
III. Strategies & Business Practices
4. Predatory Pricing
Table of Contents
1. Predatory Pricing
1) Classical Model
2) When do Low Prices
Industrial Organization (Fall, 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
I. Basic
3. Competition, Monopoly, Economic Efficiency
1. PERFECT COMPETITION l1)assumption
Perfect competition provides a benchmark against which
212.339 Game theory and Applications 2008 Autumn
In Ho Lee
Problem Set 4
(Due date : October 18th)
1. We have two partners who simultaneously invest in a project, where the level of
investment can be any non-negative real number. If partner i invests x i
GAME THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS
In Ho Lee
School of Economics
Seoul National University
*Based on lecture notes taken by Kiyoung Lee, Jawon Choi,
Hayeon Joo, and Yeonjoon Lee
*Updated by Soyeon Choi, Juhyun Kim and Namhoon Kim
Contents
1 Introduction
1
1.1
B
2016-12-09
Industrial Organization (Fall, 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
VI. Economics of R&D
1. Logic of Patent Protection
Table of Contents
1. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
1) Patents
2) Copyrights
3) Tr
Problem set 4
(Due Dec 9th, Friday)
1.
Figure 12.5 in the text (Chapter 14) illustrates the concept of the double markup. The
test also shows that in markets with linear demand curves and constant marginal
cost, the double monopoly markup totals one and a
Industrial Organization (Fall 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
II. Oligopoly
1. Game Theory
Table of Contents
1. Game Theory
1) The Basics of Game Theory
2) Nash Equilibrium
3) Iterated Strict Dominance and Ratio
2016-10-10
Industrial Organization (Fall 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
II. Game Theory
2. Cournot Model and Bertrand Model
Table of Contents
1. Cournot and Bertrand Model
1) Characteristics of Oligopolistic Ma
2016-11-07
Industrial Organization (Fall 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
II. Game Theory
4. Stackelberg Model & Applications
Table of Contents
1. Stackelberg Model
2. Applications
2
Industrial Organization
Prof.
Industrial Organization (Fall 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
II. Game Theory
3. Collusion
Table of Contents
1. Collusion
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Iso-profit Curves
One-Period Model of Collusion
An Infinitely Repeated
2016-11-30
Industrial Organization (Fall, 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
III. Strategies & Business Practices
3. Barriers to Entry
Table of Contents
1. Barriers to Entry
1) Introduction
2) Limit Pricing
3) Comm
2016-11-30
Industrial Organization (Fall, 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
. Strategies and Business Practices
2. Non-Uniform Pricing
0. Non-uniform Pricing l1)Price Discrimination
A firm may set different price
2016-11-07
Industrial Organization (Fall, 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
. Strategies and Business Practices
1. Product Differentiation
0. Product Differentiation
In previous chapters, we concentrated on indus
Problem set 1
(Due October 17, Monday)
1. Can you draw a monopoly supply curve? If so, what does it look like?
2. If single firm with constant marginal costs of $8 monopolizes a market
with demand Q=100-2p, how large is the deadweight loss from
monopoly?
Problem set 2
(Due November 2, Wednesday)
1. Can the combined profits of oligopolistic firms ever be higher than
those of a monopoly with the same costs as those of the firms
combined?
2. An industry consists of three firms with identical costs C q
18q
q
2016-09-26
Industrial Organization (Fall, 2016)
Prof. Sung-Jin Cho
Department of Economics, Seoul National University
I. Basic
2. Industry Structure and Firms
1) Empirical Evidence of U.S. Industries
In 1987, the U.S. economy has about 7 million firms, ne
212.339 Game theory and Applications 2014 Autumn
In Ho Lee
Final Exam
(2014, December 9)
1. (50 points) Consider Hotellings beach where two ice cream shops are located at two ends
of a beach with distance 1. Consumers are continuously distributed uniforml
212.339 Game theory and Applications 2003
In Ho Lee
Final Examination
December 8, 2003
1. Consider the following adaptation of Akerlofs lemons model. Used cars are of three
possible quality levels cfw_L, M, H . Let the buyers valuations be b(L) = 14, b(M
212.339 Game theory and Applications 2007
In Ho Lee
Midterm Examination
October,30 2007
1. Consider the following game :
a1
a2
b1
b2
10; 5 3; 6
x; 6 0; 0
Here x can be any real number.
(a) For what values of x is the game dominance solvable?
(b) For what
212.339 Game Theory and Applications 2007
In Ho Lee
Final Examination
December 6, 2007
1. The market demand for a good is given by the following inverse demand function: P (Q) =
Q; whereby Q denotes the overall supplied quantity, and P(Q) denotes the mar-
212.339 Game theory and Applications 2008 Autumn
In Ho Lee
Final Exam
(December 9, 2008)
1. Two firms compete in a market. Let q 1 and q 2 be the production quantities of firm 1
and firm 2 respectively. Assume that firm 1 can only choose q 1 10 or q 1 5,
212.339 Game theory and Applications 2008 Autumn
In Ho Lee
Problem Set 2
(Due date : Oct, 7)
1. Find the set of Nash equilibria of each player in the two-player game in the
following figure.
a1
a2
a3
a4
b1
b2
0, 7 2, 5
5, 2 3, 3
7, 0 2, 5
0, 0 0, 2
b3
b4
212.339 Game theory and Applications 2008 Autumn
In Ho Lee
Problem Set 3
(Due date : Oct, 21st)
1. Answer the following questions.
Pic. a
Pic. b
(a) Find the SPE of the game for "Pic. (a)" by backward induction.
(b) Find all Nash and all subgame perfect N
212.339 Game theory and Applications 2008 Autumn
In Ho Lee
Problem Set 5
(Due date : December 4)
1. Consider the following adaptation of Akerlofs lemons model. Used cars are of three
possible quality levels L, M, H. Let the buyers valuations be bL 14,
bM