Tutorial 3 Questions
Q1: Consider the Prisoners dilemma below
B
N
A
C
N
3, 3
10, -2
C
-2, 10
8, 8
Find the threshold value for discount factor in which the pair of trigger strategies
sustain cooperati
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Degrees of M.A. (Soc.Sci.), M.A., B.Sc., LLB with Honours
Business Economics
Microeconomic Analysis: Games and Industry
In-c
1
Degrees of M.A. (Soc.Sci.), M.A., B.Acc., B.Sc., LLB with
Honours Economics
Degrees of M.A. (Soc.Sci.), M.A., B.Sc., LLB with Honours
Business Economics
Microeconomic Analysis: Games and Industry
In
Tutorial 2 Questions, Fall 2013
Q1: Consider the game below.
A
B
K
15
4
L
8
7
M
5
20
N
B
100
15
s
X
A
s
Y
s
B
(i) Write down the normal-form expression of this extensive-form game and nd all
pure-stra
Tutorial 2 Questions, Fall 2013
Q1: Consider the game below.
A
B
K
15
4
L
8
7
M
5
20
N
B
100
15
s
X
A
s
Y
s
B
(i) Write down the normal-form expression of this extensive-form game and nd all
pure-stra
Tutorial 1 Questions
Q1: Consider the game below.
B
F
H
I
X
0, 2
3, 1
0, 2
5, 3
Y
2, 1
0, 3
2, 4
1, 1
Z
1, 3
2, 0
1, 1
3, 2
V
2, 1
4, 1
1, 3
4, 1
W
A
G
3, 4
1, 3
3, 0
2, 2
(1) Find the set of strategi
1: (a) There is no dominance between any strategies for any player, so all X,Y,Z,U
for A and E,F,G,H for B survive.
Two pure-strategy NE, (Y,H) and (U,F).
(b)
A
0.9
0.1
0
0
0.5
0.5
0
Y
B
B
0
w
G
N
w
A
1: (1) Step 1: X is never best response for A, hence eliminated.
Step 2: G is never best response for B, hence eliminated.
Step 3: U is never best response for A, hence eliminated.
Step 4: E is never
Problem set for exam prep Part 2
Usual disclaimer: This is just to help your example prep, and is not a prediction
of the actual exam.
Q1: Consider the game below.
B
F
H
I
X
0, 2
3, 1
0, 2
5, 3
Y
2, 1