EC111-4-FY
1
UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX
FIRST YEAR EXAMINATIONS 2014
INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS
Time allowed:
3 hours
Candidates are permitted to bring into the examination room:
Calculators (hand held, containing no textual information)
Section A: True/False/Unc
Multiple Regression Analysis: Estimation
EC 252 Introduction to Econometric Methods
Abhimanyu Gupta
February 9, 12, 2015
1 / 46
Outline
More on interpretation
The Expected Value of the OLS Estimators
Assumptions
Result: OLS is unbiased
Potential bias from
Multiple Regression Analysis: Estimation
EC 252 Introduction to Econometric Methods
Abhimanyu Gupta
February 3, 6, 2015
1 / 25
Outline
Limitations of the simple linear regression model
The multiple linear regression model
Denition
Estimation
Interpretatio
The Simple Regression Model
EC 252 Introduction to Econometric Methods
Abhimanyu Gupta
January 26, 29, 2015
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Outline
What is Econometrics?
The simple linear regression model
Forming an estimator for the parameters of interest
Algebraic properties of
Review of Statistics
EC 252 Introduction to Econometric Methods
Abhimanyu Gupta
January 19, 22, 2015
1
This weeks lecture: Review of Statistics
This weeks lecture proceeds in the following steps:
1. Key concepts: What is an estimator?
2. Criteria for judg
Review of Probability
EC 252 Introduction to Econometric Methods
Abhimanyu Gupta
January 12, 15, 2015
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Todays lecture: Review of Probability
Random variables
Distribution functions
Features of Probability Distributions
Expected value
Variance and st
Lecture 2: More advanced notions of linear
algebra
Christian Ghiglino
Why study matrices?
So far the motivation was to solve systems of linear equations,
which usualy come up in static economic models:
Consider the following macroeconomic model
Consumers
Lecture 1: Linear algebra
Christian Ghiglino
Why study matrices?
Consider the following macroeconomic model
Consumers expenditure: C
Investment: I
Equilibrium: Y
= C0 + bY ,
= I0 + aY ,
= C + I,
where the endogenous variables are C , I and Y .
The system
Lecture 7: Comparative statics
Christian Ghiglino
Examples
The general Objective is: To know how the underlying parameters aect
the equilibrium of an economic system.
Example 1:
Suppose that we have a market where the demand and supply functions
are given
Lecture 5: Unconstrained optimization
Christian Ghiglino
A motivating example
A monopolist faces a demand curve p = 100 q and has production
costs given by c(q) = q 2 . If the monopolist is interested in maximizing
prots, how much should he produce?
A rm
Lecture 4: Multivariate calculus
Christian Ghiglino
Partial derivatives
This section studies functions where the input consists of many
variables. Such functions are common in economics. We want to extend
the calculus tools studied earlier to such functio
Lecture 3: Real analysis
Christian Ghiglino
Functions
A function is a rule which converts an input (denoted typically by x)
into an output (denoted typically by y ).
More formally, a function f : X Y maps elements of X (the domain)
to elements of Y .
The
Lecture 0: Review of basic concepts
Christian Ghiglino
Sets
A set X is a collection of objects with a common property, e.g.,
the set of all students in this class,
the set of all students in this class born in 1990,
the set of natural numbers N,
the set o
Lecture 6: Constrained optimization
Christian Ghiglino
Motivating examples
Consumers problem: Suppose that a consumer has a utility function
U(x, y ) = x 0.5 y 0.5 , the price of x is $2, the price of y is $3 and the
consumer has $100 in income. How much
EC 202
Lecture notes 20
Asymmetric Information II
Hidden Actions
Mahmoud Fatouh
1
Moral Hazard versus Adverse
Selection
In an adverse selection situation, certain relevant
characteristics that are beyond anyones control
are known to one party but not the
EC 202
Lecture notes 19
Asymmetric Information I
Hidden Characteristics
Mahmoud Fatouh
1
Hidden Characteristics: Screening
When there is asymmetric information because of
hidden characteristics, the uninformed party may
sometimes be able to infer the oth
EC 202
Lecture notes 18
Uncertainty II
Mahmoud Fatouh
1
Mean-Variance Analysis
Risk averse individuals dislike risk but this doesnt
mean they are never prepared to take any risks. It just
means they need to be compensated for the risk they
take by way of
EC 202
Lecture notes 17
Uncertainty
Mahmoud Fatouh
1
Uncertainty
Until now, we have assumed that each agent
knows perfectly the payoffs that correspond to
any given action or combination of actions.
But often a given action can yield a variety of
result
EC 202
Lecture notes 16
Inter-temporal Decisions
Mahmoud Fatouh
1
Inter-temporal Decisions
Inter-temporal means across different time periods
Having more than one time period introduces
several new aspects. For instance:
1. Inter-temporal choices of sav
EC 202
Lecture notes 14
Oligopoly I
Mahmoud Fatouh
1
Oligopoly
When only a small number of firms compete in the
same market, each firm has some market power.
Moreover, their interactions cannot be ignored.
Each firm recognises that its decisions influen
EC 202
Lecture notes 15
Oligopoly II
Mahmoud Fatouh
1
Commitment: Burning Ones Bridges
Commitment can help a player achieve a
higher payoff.
Red
Army
Green
Army
2
Burning Ones Bridges
Green Army
Fight
Red Army
Flee
Fight
2,2
6,3
Flee
3,6
4,4
3
Burning One
EC 202
Lecture notes 13
Introduction to Game Theory
Mahmoud Fatouh
1
Strategic Interaction
In perfect competition, all buyers and sellers are
price takers. So each agent can make her
decisions without worrying about what others
are doing.
In monopoly, the
EC 202
Lecture notes 12
Price Discrimination
Mahmoud Fatouh
Hunting for Surplus
We saw that compared to
the total surplus available
when P = MC, the total
surplus under monopoly is
lower.
P
MC
Pm
Ps
A
B
D
MR
0
Qm
Qs
Q
A profit-maximising
monopolist would
EC 202
Lecture notes 11
Monopoly
Mahmoud Fatouh
1
Monopoly
So far we have studied firms that take prices as given.
This may be a reasonable approximation when
there is a large number of firms in an industry
they all produce very similar goods
However, i
1
IA156 : Methods of Economics
analysis
Lecture 2 (week 29)
Quadratic Functions
Anyarath Kitwiwattanachai (akitwi)
OUTLINE
2
1. Demand and Supply
2. Total Revenue Function
3. Total Cost Function
4. Profit Function
5. Rectangular Hyperbola
6. Average Cost
University of Essex
Session 2014-2015
Department of Economics
George Symeonidis
EC 366
Market Structure and Strategic Behaviour
Module Supervisor: George Symeonidis
Office Hours: TBA
Office number: 5B.215
Email: [email protected]
Module Description
Thi
EC366_7
The Determinants of Market Structure
George Symeonidis
Why are some industries more concentrated than others?
What is the link between competition and concentration, and between technology and
concentration?
Should we expect that economic integrat
EC366_6
Vertical Relations and Vertical Restraints
George Symeonidis
So far we have made the simplifying assumption that firms produce goods which they then
sell directly to the final consumers. In this lecture, in contrast, we focus on situations where
EC366_5
Product Differentiation and Non-Price
Competition
George Symeonidis
In many markets products are differentiated. Consumers care not only about product price, but
also about product characteristics, quality, the location of the seller, pre-sale or