)o t3 -t Ll'
#1. Find all prue and mixed strategy Nashequilibria (if any) in the following game.
f), d-,l*s*aa +t-*
4 1 o 2 6r7
st\do-r of d,ralecfw_-Jo,^*
#1. Find all pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria (if any) in the following game.
U 1, 10 2, 1 3, 8
S 4, 1 5, 2 6, 7
D 2, 5 6, 3 1, 4
#2. Find all pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria (if any) in the followi
(Due in class on Monday, October 15, 2012)
#1. Consider the following entry game. There are 3 rms. The cost of entering a market is
equal to 0.4 for a rm. These 3 rms decide simultaneously whether or not to enter the ma
(Due in class on Thursday, November 15, 2012)
#1. Consider the following rst-price, sealed-bid private value auction. There are 5
bidders. Each bidders valuation (vi for bidder i) for the object follows the standard uni
(Due in class on Monday, November 26, 2012)
#1. Consider the following Positive Selection (not Adverse Selection) model. Suppose that
the reservation wage for a worker of productivity is r() which is a strictly decreasi
fl: Player strategy givenby:playA in period1; if (A,D) the outcome period
thenplayB in periods and3; if (A,D) not the outcome period1,then