Part A: Multiple Choice Questions
Question 1
The owner of the Krusty Krab is considering selling his restaurant and retiring. An
investor has offered to buy the Krusty Krab for $350,000 whenever the o
Exercises: you can be asked to work these out; you are invited to prepare them before class.
Please note that the Weekly Quiz is during the first 10 minutes of the tutorial.
Micro 2 EBE / ECO Tutorial
Tutorial 2 Finance for premasters
Question 1
Giacomo Forza,Capo of the infamous Forza family in New York City is working on
legalizing his family's activities. Therefore, he decides to reassign his nu
WELFARE ECONOMICS: LECTURE 6
MARKET STRUCTURE AND
MARKET POWER
Eric van Damme
14, 15 March 2016
Market Structure and Market Power
1
TODAYS QUESTIONS
How does the government intervene in markets?
Doe
Tutorial 2
Econometrics for EBE/ECO
In-class exercises, 12/13 September 2016
1. Suppose that you are asked to conduct a study to determine whether smaller class sizes
lead to improved student performa
Tutorial 1 Finance for premasters
Question 1
Hugo Joss, a company that sells luxury jackets, wants to build a new facility in India. The
investment needed is estimated to cost $100 mln. The output fro
WELFARE ECONOMICS: LECTURE 8
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
IN PRODUCTION
Eric van Damme
4, 5 April 2016
Welfare Economics Lecture 8
1
TODAYS QUESTIONS
Given that, for some goods and services, there is
exte
Tutorial 3 Finance for premasters
Question 1
You have the opportunity to invest in risky assets Y and Z and the riskfree alternative. The
expected return of the marketportfolio is 9% with a standard d
GAME THEORY: LECTURE 1
PART 2: STRATEGIC GAMES
Eric van Damme
5 January 2015
Game Theory Lecture 1.2
1
CONTENTS STRATEGIC
Introduction: Non-cooperative game models
GAMES
Strategic games:
Nash Equilibr
GAME THEORY: LECTURE 4.3
BAYESIAN GAMES; PART 3
AUCTIONS
Eric van Damme
26 January 2015
Game Theory Lecture 4.3
1
CONTENTS PART 3
Introduction
Auction forms
The English auction
The Dutch auction
The 1
GAME THEORY: LECTURE 4
BAYESIAN GAMES
Eric van Damme
26 January 2015
Game Theory (2015) Lecture
1
CONTENTS
Part1: Bayesian Games
Motivating examples
Formalization of a Bayesian Game
Introduction
Forma
WELFARE ECONOMICS: LECTURE 7
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY
Eric van Damme
21, 22 March 2016
Welfare Economics Lecture 7
1
TODAYS QUESTIONS
Can society choose between two different Pareto
efficient outcomes?
1
Internalities
the third reason why markets may fail
Micro 2
Spring 2016
2
The big picture
o Problem. Free market may fail to achieve efficient outcome,
because of externalities, public goods
o Solu
1
Externalities
Micro 2
Spring 2016
2
Please note: this week, we have a
combined tutorial on Wednesday
We will conduct an in-class experiment related to
what you will be taught this lecture
Your prese
1
Markets and efficiency
Micro 2/Welfare economics
Spring 2016
The microeconomics 2 team
Lecturers
Teaching assistent
ECO
Yadi Yang
[email protected]
EBE
Mirthe Boomsma
[email protected]
1
Public goods
the second reason why markets may fail
Micro 2
Spring 2016
2
Note on what to study
I focus on certain things and not others in the textbook
If there are issues in the textbook that I
1
Cultural heritage
It has been argued that the growth of cities is increasingly
determined by the presence of amenities. We study the
economic effects of large scale subsidised investments in
histori
1
Internalities
the third reason why markets may fail
Micro 2
Spring 2016
2
The big picture
o Problem. Free market may fail to achieve efficient outcome,
because of externalities, public goods
o Solu
WELFARE ECONOMICS: LECTURE 6
MARKET STRUCTURE AND
MARKET POWER
Eric van Damme
14, 15 March 2016
Market Structure and Market Power
1
TODAYS QUESTIONS
How does the government intervene in markets?
Doe
EXERCISES LECTURE 6
1. We consider a market in which demand is given by () = 100 . There are two firms
that can supply this market. Each of these firms has the same cost function, given by
() = 1000 +
1
What we do in the tutorial
Micro 2
Spring 2016
2
Overview
1. QUIZ (10 minutes)
2. EXERCISES (rest of the first hour)
3. DEBATE (second hour)
For details, see also the syllabus on Blackboard
3
Exerc
EXERCISES LECTURE 6 WITHOUT COURNOT
Question 2
The demand function is given by () = 14 . The cost function of each firm is () =
3
4
2 . The firms take prices as given. Equilibrium is given by supply
GAME THEORY LECTURE 10.1:
COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
(2):
GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE
Eric van Damme
UTILITY
16 March 2015
Game Theory Lecture 10.1
1
CONTENTS
Today, we focus on two classes of cooperative
ga
GAME THEORY: LECTURE 4.2
BAYESIAN GAMES; PART 2
Eric van Damme
26 January 2015
Game Theory Lecture 4.2
1
CONTENTS PART 2
In this short part, we discuss an example:
A trading game
The trading game illu
GAME THEORY LECTURE
5.3:
SIGNALING GAMES
Eric van Damme
2 February 2015
Game Theory (2015) Lecture
1
SIGNALING GAMES
2 February 2015
Game Theory (2015) Lecture
2
SIGNALING GAMES:
APPLICATIONS
There ar
GAME THEORY LECTURE 7:
BAYESIAN MECHANISM
DESIGN:
AN Eric van Damme
INTRODUCTION
23 February 2015
Game Theory (2015) Lecture
1
CONTENTS
Lecture 7.1
An example to provide motivation
Introduction
The Re
LECTURE 2 (PART 3)
RUBINSTEINS BARGAINING
MODEL
Eric van Damme
12 January 2015
Micro 2 Lecture 2.3
1
RUBINSTEINS BARGAINING
MODEL
In this part of the lecture, we describe and analyze 2
variants of Ari
BEHAVIORAL
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
LECTURE 2
Eric van Damme
CentER and TILEC
17 April 2014
CentER Honors Program
1
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
How do markets function when consumers are
boundedly rational?
GAME THEORY: LECTURE 2
EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH
PERFECT INFORMATION
Eric van Damme
12 January 2015
Game Theory Lecture 2.1
1
CONTENTS (PARTS 1 AND 2)
Extensive games with perfect information
Definition; e
GAME THEORY: LECTURE
3.3
REPEATED GAMES
Eric van Damme
19 January 2015
Game Theory Lecture 3.3
1
19 January 2015
Game Theory Lecture 3.3
2
SKETCH OF PROOF (MAIN
IDEA)
19 January 2015
Game Theory Lectu