EconS 424 - Games with Incomplete Information I
Flix Muoz-Garca
Washington State University
fmunoz@wsu.edu
April 28, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 8
April 28, 2014
1 / 37
Harrington, Ch. 10 Exercise 6
Two U.S. senators are considering
EconS 424 - Bargaining Games and an Introduction to
Repeated Games
Flix Muoz-Garca
Washington State University
fmunoz@wsu.edu
March 25, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 6
March 25, 2014
1 / 44
Watson, Ch. 19 # 8
In experimental tests of t
EconS 424 - Backward Induction and Subgame
Perfection
Flix Muoz-Garca
Washington State University
fmunoz@wsu.edu
March 24, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 5
March 24, 2014
1 / 48
Watson, Ch. 15 # 1
Consider the extensive-form game on the
EconS 424 - Randomized Strategies
Flix Muoz-Garca
Washington State University
fmunoz@wsu.edu
February 19, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 4
February 19, 2014
1 / 33
Watson, Ch. 11 # 11
The famous spy, 001, has to choose one of four route
EconS 424 - Dominated Strategies and Nash
Equilibrium
Flix Muoz-Garca
Washington State University
fmunoz@wsu.edu
February 5, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 2
February 5, 2014
1 / 32
Harrington, Ch. 4 # 5
Consider the two-player game dep
Chapter 7
Nash Equilibria in Mixed
Strategies
0
Overview
Recall that there was no equilibrium in games
of pure conflict (outguessing game) such as
rock-paper-scissors or penalty kick.
There does exist an equilibrium, however, if we
allow for randomized
EconS 424 - Nash Equilibrium in Games with
Continuous Action Spaces.
Flix Muoz-Garca
Washington State University
fmunoz@wsu.edu
February 7, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 3
February 7, 2014
1 / 31
Watson, Ch. 10 # 1
Consider a more gene
PART I: Introduction
Ch 1 Introduction to Strategic Reasoning
Ch 2 Building a Model of Strategic
Situation
0
Chapter 1
Introduction to Strategic
Reasoning
1
Motivation
Life is full of strategic situations
My payoff is affected by others action (and vice
Chapter 2
Building a Model of Strategic
Situation
0
Two Ways to Present Game Situations
Strategic form game
Extensive form game
1
Strategic Form Game
Strategic form game (=normal form game)
Players move simultaneously
Equivalently, players move witho
Chapter 4
Nash Equilibria:
Discrete Games with Two or
Three Players
0
Motivation
There are many strategic situations in which
IDSDS has no say.
Can we say something meaningful in this case?
Yes, if we assume not only that players are
rational but also
GAME THEORY
Thomas S. Ferguson
University of California at Los Angeles
Contents
Introduction.
References.
Part I. Impartial Combinatorial Games.
1.1 Take-Away Games.
1.2 The Game of Nim.
1.3 Graph Games.
1.4 Sums of Combinatorial Games.
1.5 Coin Turning G
Chapter 6
Nash Equilibria in Continuous
Games
0
Overview
In this chapter, we consider Nash equilibria in
continuous games
Continuous games are games in which a
strategy set is an interval of real numbers.
Example: firms choosing the price of their
prod
A-'.7x I
t^w
jd,*-^-s
ECO 232 (Fall 201-5)
Quiz 1".
Supposethat the following IS-LM equations describethe equilibrium of the goods/servicemarket
and the money market of the U.S. economy:
IS
: Y:500-408
LM
: R:0.1Y-10
where Y is real output in $billion and
EconS 424 - Signalling Games III
Flix Muoz-Garca
Washington State University
fmunoz@wsu.edu
April 28, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 12
April 28, 2014
1 / 24
Watson, Ch. 29 Exercise 9
A manager and a worker interact as follows:
The mana
Practice in Class 10 pt 2
Submit your work via our website to Mini Quiz 2.
Due Oct 12th 2015
Forward Contract
A contract that obligates one counter party to buy and the other to sell a specific
underlying asset at a specific price, amount and date in the
Practice in Class 9 pt2: Mini Quiz
Solve the following differential equation numerically by using
forward and central differences, and submit the solution
before Wednesday Class via our website.
dy
5 y
dt
y (0) 3
Conditions:
1. The interval of t, [0 10]
EconS 424 - Repeated Games II
Flix Muoz-Garca
Washington State University
fmunoz@wsu.edu
March 25, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 7
March 25, 2014
1 / 28
Harrington, Ch. 14 "Check your Understanding" 1
Recall the Christie and Sotheby in
Chapter 5
Nash Equilibria:
Discrete Games with Many
Players
0
Overview
In this chapter, we consider games with many
players with the same strategy set.
In some cases, nothings different.
In other cases, the number of players alters
their behavior drast
EconS 424 - Games with Incomplete Information II and
Auction Theory
Flix Muoz-Garca
Washington State University
fmunoz@wsu.edu
April 28, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 9
April 28, 2014
1 / 28
Watson, Ch. 26 Exercise 2
Two players have t
Chapter 3
Eliminating the Impossible:
Solving a Game when Rationality
is Common Knowledge
0
Overview
We begin to solve the game
There are some strategies that a rational player
will never choose
Then we can safely eliminate those bad
strategies, which
MATLAB Introduction
1
Interface
Current Folder Access files.
Command Window Enter commands at the command line, indicated by
the prompt (>).
Workspace Explore data that you create or import from files.
2
Simple Operation
If you end a statement with a
MATLAB exercise (extra credit).
ECO 3091
Due Oct 29th
Use MATLAB and data in phillips.txt or phillips.xls to answer the following questons.
1. Recall the classical Phillips curve from class:
t = 0 + 1 ut + vt
(1)
where t and ut are the ination and unemplo
Linear Algebra
Consider a general linear system of m equations in n
unknowns.
, are some given numbers. We call them coefficients.
Solution of this system is which satisfies all the equa
tions.
Linear Algebra
Main Questions:
1) Does a solution exist?
Linear Algebra
Now,
we move to functions with multiple variati
ons.
Recall a one-variable, linear function takes the f
ollowing form: .
An equation is linear if it takes the following for
m:
Note all the terms are to their first power.
In above equat
Exponents and Logarithm
So far, we worked with polynomial fu
nctions and rational functions.
Today, we consider two more types of
functions
Exponential and logarithm functions des
cribe many important economic relation
ships.
Learn how to find a deriv
Functions of Several Variables
Lets look at multivariable functions (pot
entially non-linear).
A function from a set A to a set B: a rule
that assigns only one object in B to each
object in A:
f(x): the element of B assigned to the ele
ment x of A.
Fun
Quadratic Forms and Definite Matric
es
A
quadratic form on is a real-valued f
unction of the form
Q can be represented by a symmetri
c matrix A.
Quadratic Forms and Definite Matric
es
Quadratic Forms and Definite Matric
es
Definiteness of Quadratic