ECO 105 (2015 Spring)
Homework 2 Solutions
1. Dene p1 , p2 , p3 and p4 as the following:
p1 =Pr(Rain on Saturday & No rain on Sunday)
p2 =Pr(No rain on Saturday & Rain on Sunday)
p3 =Pr(No rain on Saturday & No rain on Sunday)
p4 =Pr(Rain on Saturday & Ra
Chapter 7
Nash Equilibria in Mixed
Strategies
0
Overview
Recall that there was no equilibrium in games
of pure conflict (outguessing game) such as
rock-paper-scissors or penalty kick.
There does exist an equilibrium, however, if we
allow for randomized
EconS 424 - Dominated Strategies and Nash
Equilibrium
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Washington State University
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February 5, 2014
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EconS 424 - Recitation 2
February 5, 2014
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Harrington, Ch. 4 # 5
Consider the two-player game dep
EconS 424 - Randomized Strategies
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Washington State University
[email protected]
February 19, 2014
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EconS 424 - Recitation 4
February 19, 2014
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Watson, Ch. 11 # 11
The famous spy, 001, has to choose one of four route
EconS 424 - Backward Induction and Subgame
Perfection
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Washington State University
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March 24, 2014
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EconS 424 - Recitation 5
March 24, 2014
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Watson, Ch. 15 # 1
Consider the extensive-form game on the
EconS 424 - Bargaining Games and an Introduction to
Repeated Games
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Washington State University
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March 25, 2014
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EconS 424 - Recitation 6
March 25, 2014
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Watson, Ch. 19 # 8
In experimental tests of t
EconS 424 - Games with Incomplete Information I
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Washington State University
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April 28, 2014
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EconS 424 - Recitation 8
April 28, 2014
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Harrington, Ch. 10 Exercise 6
Two U.S. senators are considering
EconS 424 - Nash Equilibrium in Games with
Continuous Action Spaces.
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Washington State University
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February 7, 2014
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EconS 424 - Recitation 3
February 7, 2014
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Watson, Ch. 10 # 1
Consider a more gene
PART I: Introduction
Ch 1 Introduction to Strategic Reasoning
Ch 2 Building a Model of Strategic
Situation
0
Chapter 1
Introduction to Strategic
Reasoning
1
Motivation
Life is full of strategic situations
My payoff is affected by others action (and vice
Practice in Class 10 pt 2
Submit your work via our website to Mini Quiz 2.
Due Oct 12th 2015
Forward Contract
A contract that obligates one counter party to buy and the other to sell a specific
underlying asset at a specific price, amount and date in the
EconS 424 - Signalling Games III
Flix Muoz-Garca
Washington State University
[email protected]
April 28, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 12
April 28, 2014
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Watson, Ch. 29 Exercise 9
A manager and a worker interact as follows:
The mana
A-'.7x I
t^w
jd,*-^-s
ECO 232 (Fall 201-5)
Quiz 1".
Supposethat the following IS-LM equations describethe equilibrium of the goods/servicemarket
and the money market of the U.S. economy:
IS
: Y:500-408
LM
: R:0.1Y-10
where Y is real output in $billion and
Chapter 6
Nash Equilibria in Continuous
Games
0
Overview
In this chapter, we consider Nash equilibria in
continuous games
Continuous games are games in which a
strategy set is an interval of real numbers.
Example: firms choosing the price of their
prod
GAME THEORY
Thomas S. Ferguson
University of California at Los Angeles
Contents
Introduction.
References.
Part I. Impartial Combinatorial Games.
1.1 Take-Away Games.
1.2 The Game of Nim.
1.3 Graph Games.
1.4 Sums of Combinatorial Games.
1.5 Coin Turning G
Chapter 4
Nash Equilibria:
Discrete Games with Two or
Three Players
0
Motivation
There are many strategic situations in which
IDSDS has no say.
Can we say something meaningful in this case?
Yes, if we assume not only that players are
rational but also
Chapter 2
Building a Model of Strategic
Situation
0
Two Ways to Present Game Situations
Strategic form game
Extensive form game
1
Strategic Form Game
Strategic form game (=normal form game)
Players move simultaneously
Equivalently, players move witho
EconS 424 - Repeated Games II
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Washington State University
[email protected]
March 25, 2014
Flix Muoz-Garca (WSU)
EconS 424 - Recitation 7
March 25, 2014
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Harrington, Ch. 14 "Check your Understanding" 1
Recall the Christie and Sotheby in
Chapter 5
Nash Equilibria:
Discrete Games with Many
Players
0
Overview
In this chapter, we consider games with many
players with the same strategy set.
In some cases, nothings different.
In other cases, the number of players alters
their behavior drast
MATLAB exercise (extra credit).
ECO 3091
Due Oct 29th
Use MATLAB and data in phillips.txt or phillips.xls to answer the following questons.
1. Recall the classical Phillips curve from class:
t = 0 + 1 ut + vt
(1)
where t and ut are the ination and unemplo
MATLAB Introduction
1
Interface
Current Folder Access files.
Command Window Enter commands at the command line, indicated by
the prompt (>).
Workspace Explore data that you create or import from files.
2
Simple Operation
If you end a statement with a
Chapter 3
Eliminating the Impossible:
Solving a Game when Rationality
is Common Knowledge
0
Overview
We begin to solve the game
There are some strategies that a rational player
will never choose
Then we can safely eliminate those bad
strategies, which