ECOS2201 Economics of
ECOS2201 Economics of
Competition and Strategy
Semester 1 2012
2012
Andrew Wait
(School of Economics)
ECOS2201 Lecture 1
1
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ECOS2201 Lecture 1
2
Introdu
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
ECOS2201
Economics of Competition and Strategy
Semester 1, 2015
Unit Coordinator: Suraj Prasad
Email: [email protected]
Office: Room 430 Merewether Building H04
Consultation times: Monday 10
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R. Preston McAfee
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, CA 91125
First Draft
Table of Contents
1:
Introductory Blather. 1
1.1: Monopoly Pricing . 1
2: Price Discrimination . 5
2.1: Single Purchase. 5
2.2: Selling n Goods. 6
2.3: R
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ECOS 2201 Economics of Strategy and Competition
Suraj Prasad
Session 1, 2015
Problem Set 10- Practice problems for signalling
1. Consider a signalling model similar to what we did in class, except
that education is now productive. A high ability type with
Introduction to
Economic Analysis
Version 2.1
R. Preston McAfee;Tracy Lewis;Donald J. Dale
Introduction to Economic Analysis
1-1
About the Authors
ABOUT R. PRESTON MCAFEE
R. Preston McAfee received his undergraduate degree in economics from the University
McAfee, R. Preston. Competitive Solutions : The Strategist's Toolkit. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 2005. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 9 May 2015.
Copyright 2005. Princeton University Press. All rights reserved.
McAfee, R. Preston. Competitive
Lecture 13
June 1, 2015
Outline
Auctions
Private Value Auctions
First Price Auction
Second Price Auction
Common Value Auctions and the Winners Curse
Examples
Auctions are used to sell many objects; houses, wine, art,
but are also used to buy or procure ob
Outline
Lecture 5
March 29, 2015
Outline
Outline
Firm Boundaries
The Hold Up Problem
Asset Ownership
Other Approaches to resolving the hold up problem
Other Factors inuencing rm boundaries.
See lecture notes 3 and 4 on the Robert Gibbons website. Also
rea
Lecture Notes on the Stackelberg Model
May 4, 2015
Suppose the inverse demand curve is given by P : 12Q and suppose there
are two rms in the market producing a homogeneous product and assume no
production costs. This is similar to the Cournot model we did
Lecture 7
April 20, 2015
Outline
Recap
Game Theory
Normal Form Games
Extensive Form Games
Repeated games
Normal Form Games
A game is mathematical formulation of strategic interaction.
A game lists
players (the people who interact)
strategies (what each pl
Lecture 8
April 27, 2015
Outline
Recap
Bertrand Competition
Hotelling model of product dierentitation
Lessons from the Cournot Model
Firms compete based on quantities.
There is strategic interaction only for the intermediate
case between monopoly and perf
Lecture 9
May 4, 2015
Outline
Recap
Price Discrimination
Examples of Price Discrimination
Price discrimination involves charging dierent consumers prices that they are
willing to bear. Two types of price discrimination.
Direct (prices based on observable
Lecture Notes on Price Discrimination
March 3, 2015
The purpose of these lecture notes is to supplement the lecture slides so
that you get some more practice with the methods used to solve the (second
degree) price discrimination problem where a monopolis
American Economic Association
Field Experiments with Firms
Author(s): Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay and Imran Rasul
Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 2011), pp. 63-82
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable U
Outline
Lecture 11
May 18, 2015
Outline
Outline
Signalling
The Economics of Contracts by Bernard Salanie (pages
99-107)
Outline
Recap
Last lecture we looked at a model of price discrimination. We
saw how a monopolist could extract information about the
bu
Lecture Notes on Signalling
May 15, 2014
The purpose of these lecture notes is to supplement the lecture slides on
signalling. A quick summary of the model. There are several competing rms,
all risk neutral. There are two types of potential workers that a
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Mas, Alexandre; Moretti, Enrico
Working Paper
Peers at work
I
Lecture Notes on Signalling
October 17, 2016
The purpose of these lecture notes is to supplement the lecture slides on
signalling. A quick summary of the model. There are several competing firms,
all risk neutral. There are two types of potential workers
Lecture 7
September 9, 2016
Outline
Recap
Game Theory
Normal Form Games
Extensive Form Games
Repeated games
Normal Form Games
A game is mathematical formulation of strategic interaction.
A game lists
players (the people who interact)
strategies (what each
Outline
Lecture 2
August 5, 2016
Outline
Outline
Recap
Theory of Incentives: Basic Model
Multitasking
Tutorial: Steps involved in solving the basic incentive
problem.
Todays class builds on Sections 5,6 and 7 of Lecture Note 1
by Robert Gibbons. These lec
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