CS 573: Algorithmic Game Theory
Instructor: Chandra Chekuri
1
Lecture date: April 2, 2008
Scribe: Pratik Worah
Recap and Notation
In the last class it was seen that reserve prices can increase expected revenue. This prompted the
question of an optimal mec
CS 573: Algorithmic Game Theory
Instructor: Chandra Chekuri
Lecture date: 29th February, 2008
Scribe: Rajhans Samdani
In the last lecture, we looked at the VCG mechanism and realized that the Winner determination(WD) problem is NP-Hard even in a case as s
CS 573: Algorithmic Game Theory
Instructor: Chandra Chekuri
1
Lecture date: Feb 27, 2008
Scribe: Tae Hyun Kim
Review: VCG Mechanism for Combinatorial Auction
1.1
Notations
m - number of items
S - set of items
N - set of bidders
n - number of bidders (
CS 573: Algorithmic Game Theory
Instructor: Chandra Chekuri
Lecture date: 18 January 2008
Scribe: Mark Richards
Strategic full-information game
Game denition: (N, Si , ui )
1. N = cfw_1, 2, . . . , n is the nite set of n players.
2. Si is the strategy spa
CS 573: Algorithmic Game Theory
Instructor: Chandra Chekuri
Lecture date: January 25th, 2008
Scribe: Bolin Ding
Contents
1 Introduction to Ineciency of Equilibrium
1.1 Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability . . . .
1.2 Example: Load Balancing Games . . .
CS 573: Algorithmic Game Theory
Instructor: Chandra Chekuri
Lecture date: January 30th, 2008
Scribe: Afsaneh Shirazi
Contents
1 Price of Anarchy (PoA) of Load Balancing on Related/Uniform Machines
1
2 Coordination Mechanism: Change the Game to Make Player
CS 573: Algorithmic Game Theory
Instructor: Chandra Chekuri
1
Lecture date: Feb 1st , 2008
Scribe: Ramakrishna Gummadi
Introduction
A proof of Brouwers xed point theorem using Sperners Lemma is discussed below. To recap from
a previous lecture, Brouwers t