Nick Baigent, Game theory, Winter Semester 2006
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium: An Example
1
B
A
2
2
E
C
1
1
D
L
6
4
3
2
F
2
1
R
4
6
L
8
5
R
3
0
The extensive form game above has 3 subgames: One is the whole game, since any game is a
subgame of itself.
Game Theory
Lecturer: Tackseung Jun, tj32k@daum.net
Lecture Time and Location:
Friday 12:00PM 2:45PM, Room 111
Office Hours:
Friday 3:00PM 4:00PM, Room 416
Class Homepage: http:/cafe.daum.net/iamsaam. Supporting materials (such as
problem sets, answer key
Table 1 Political Platform Game
Republican
Moderate
Democrats
Moderate
Moderately
Liberal
Liberal
4.4*
Moderately
Conservative
Conservertive
6.3
8.2
3.6
5.5
9.4
2.8
4.9
7.7
Table 2 Pascals Game
Man
Believe
Do not believe
Reveal
3.4
1.1
Hide
4.2
2.3*
God
T
Extensive-Form Games
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Backward Induction
Illustrations
Extensions and Controversies
Introduction to Game Theory
Lecture Note 4: Extensive-Form Games and
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Haifeng Huang
University of California, Merced
Introduction to Bayesian Games
Surprises about Information
Bayes Rule
Introduction to Game Theory
Lecture Note 7: Bayesian Games
Haifeng Huang
University of California, Merced
Fall 2011
Application: Juries
Introduction to Bayesian Games
Surprises about In
Concepts and Tools
Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma
Innitely Repeated PD
Introduction to Game Theory
Lecture Note 5: Repeated Games
Haifeng Huang
University of California, Merced
Fall 2011
Folk Theorem
Concepts and Tools
Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dil
Lecture 1. Introduction to Game Theory
What is Game?
A game is being played whenever human beings interact.
Everyday life: Drivers maneuvering in heavy traffic are playing a driving game.
Consumer: Bargain-hunters bidding on eBay are playing an auctioning
Mixed strategy equilibria
Player 1
Pl
S
Player 2
Pl
Straight
Chicken
Chicken
Straight
C
S -10, -10
-1, 1
C
0, 0
1, -1
Mixed strategy: a player chooses between the moves
according to a probability distribution
Suppose each player chooses S with probabili
Finite Horizon Bargaining
Innite Horizon Bargaining: The Rubinstein Model
Application: Baron-Ferejohn Model
Introduction to Game Theory
Lecture Note 6: Bargaining
Haifeng Huang
University of California, Merced
Fall 2011
Finite Horizon Bargaining
Innite Ho
Outline
Introduction
Dominance
Nash Equilibrium
Mixed Strategies
Lecture 3: Static Games of Complete Information
Lecture 3: Static Games of Complete Information
Outline
Introduction
Dominance
Nash Equilibrium
Mixed Strategies
Outline
1
Static Games of Com